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         During George W. Bush’s first term many intellectuals in the International Relations (IR) 
field were talking about the greatness of American power. Many of them labeled the United 
States “the new Rome on the Potomac” or “A Modern-day Empire”. The United States 
accounted for twenty-five percent of the world’s economic output with its five percent of the 
world’s population (Nye, 2010: 2). The U.S. made up nearly half of global military expenditures; 
at the same time, it had the most extensive soft-power resources (Nye). However, starting with 
Bush’s second term in office, an increasing number of scholars have hotly debated the future of 
the U.S. power and its hegemony. They are insisting that something fundamentally changed in 
the U.S., and they interpret this fundamental change as the beginning of American power 
decline, which is very much reminiscent of the Athenians’ Sicilian Expedition. It is well-known 
case in the IR that the defeat of Athenians in Sicily was the turning point for Athenians. This 
changed the way their power was regarded by its enemies, and more importantly, by its allies. 
Before the shocked defeat, Athenians were seen as a powerful state that was able to hold wide 
and strong alliances against its enemies. However, after the defeat, due to the decline of 
Athenians power, many of its former allies made new alliances against Athenians. According to 
scholars, this is exactly what is happening to the U.S. They believe that starting from the second 
half of the first decade of 21st century the U.S. is losing its power in the international relations 
with fewer allies. Actually, this is not the first time that this debate has been raised. Since World 
War II, scholars, politicians and economists have resurrected the issue of the decline of U.S. 
power for each decade. Mao’s victory in China in the late 1940s, the Korean War, the Sputnik 
challenge of the Soviet Russia in the 1950s, the social unrest and Vietnam War in the 1960s, the 
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end of the Bretton Woods system and the oil shocks in the 1970s, Japan’s challenge and 
recessions in the 1980s, the dotcom bust, September 11, the war in Afghanistan, and especially 
in Iraq, were interpreted as the beginning of the American decline. The financial crises of 2008 
and the rise of China as a world next superpower could be the latest cases of the same debate. 
However, intellectuals who support the idea of U.S. power is in decline believe that this time is 
different and the decline is real.  
          This overall situation raises questions that if it is really something different than previous 
cases? Is decline of U.S. power for real this time? In most definitions, national or state power is 
defined as a mix of military, social, political and economic strengths. However, since the 
establishment of the modern state system, many intellectuals have considered economic 
strength or power as one of the most important indicators for measuring national power. 
According to them, without economic power there is no way to increase military and political 
power capabilities. The links among a nation’s economic prosperity and its growth as a military, 
political, and then super power became much stronger in last centuries. Economic power has 
become the key to success in world politics following the end of the Cold War. From that 
perspective, this research paper will focus on the economic side of the debate by scrutinizing 
whether U.S. economic power is in decline and whether China is replacing the U.S. as the 
world’s next economic superpower.  
          The questions above make measuring economic power correctly in the 21st century 
crucially important. It is also important that the inefficient or inadequate methodology or 
absence of good variables to calculate national economic power will make this research invalid, 
unreliable and inaccurate. However, before we take into account all these concerns and focus 
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on our economic variables, we have to know what power is and what are the resources of 
economic power in different parts of history and especially in today’s world?  
          Power is one of the most important and most discussed terms in International Relations. In 
its most general sense power is the ability to do things and to control others. Robert Dahl 
defines power as “the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do” (Dahl, 1957: 
205). Coercion plays important role on Dahl’s definition. Meanwhile, Morton Baratz and Peter 
Bachrach argue that it is possible to shape others’ preferences by controlling their expectations 
of what is legitimate or feasible (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963: 641-642). In this case, if others 
accept the legitimacy of the institutions and the social discourse, then these people may not feel 
coercion while they are taking their decisions. Finally, Joseph Nye argues that before measuring 
power in terms of the changed behavior of others, we have to know other people’s preferences. 
He thinks a person or an institution can shape basic or initial preferences. In other words, Nye 
says without overriding your initial preferences, a person or an institution can get you to want 
the same outcomes that this person or institution wants (Nye, 1990: 26). 
          It is commonly agreed by scholars that a state’s ability to shape other states’ behavior is 
associated with the possession of certain resources that this state has but other states do not or 
partially have (Waltz, 1978: 192; Morgenthau, 1967: 106-158; Kissinger, 2015: 9; German, 1960: 
138-144). However, the same agreement can’t be reached on what these resources are. Despite 
a wealth of data, there is persistent disagreement for the questions of how to measure the 
economic power of states in a changing world and what sources provide the best basis for 
economic power.  
          Throughout the modern state system, different economic power resources played a crucial 
role in different periods for measuring economic power of the leading countries. For example, in 
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early modern Europe, most of wealth creation and economic rise of states is connected to 
military capabilities of these states. However, it was clear that without economic resources 
there was no way to increase military capabilities. Since most of the 16th century, warfare was 
fought by armies composed largely of mercenaries of various nationalities that were paid by 
monarchies. From that point, once a country increased its trade and its finance, then this 
country would find it easier to maintain large armies. Paul Kennedy indicates this correlation. In 
his study, he points out the link between productive and revenue raising capabilities and military 
strength (Kennedy, 1987: xvi). Therefore, finding additional economic resources to cover costs 
of the wars was the only way to protect the wealth and prosperity of states in this era. From 
that point, starting from the 16th century, some countries took a leading role for exploiting 
natural resources and building colonial trade in the New World. 
         The link between controlling oversees trade and an individual nation’s economic rise 
become much stronger in the 17th century. A.T Mahan, George Modelski and W.R. Thompson 
believe that the economic leadership role of a state is based on the particular nation’s use of 
naval strength to control the world’s oceans and merchant marines (Mahan, 1890: 1 ; Modelski 
and Thompson, 1988: 1-5).  
          Average cost of any war was increased by double in the 18th century (University of Nevada 
– Las Vegas). Countries in this century fought until they were militarily and financially exhausted.  
Joseph Nye, J. Peter Submilch and Stephen Krasner stress population by emphasizing its 
economic side. According to them, the welfare of a country was directly proportional to its 
population. In this period, the extent and effectiveness of a population size could be seen in the 




          Many dramatic changes occurred in the 19th century that made it quite different from 
earlier eras. Due to that, economic power resources changed significantly. The mercantilist 
thought lost its popularity; meanwhile, the century witnessed the rise of free trade ideology. 
Improvements in transportation and communication played important roles on states’ strength 
in this century. Besides that, industrial and technological developments made drastic 
amendment in states’ economic power status.  
          Hans Morgenthau is one the most effective scholars who focuses on states’ industrial or 
economic capacity. He strongly believes that industrial or economic indicators lead to military 
power, and then national power (Morgenthau, 1967: 106-158). Many other intellectuals who 
analyze this century believe that countries’ share of world output was the main indicator of their 
economic strength. The production of coal and steel output was taken as a potential national 
strength and industrialization indicated a country’s overall economy and its technical capacity 
(Singer, Bremer and Stuckey, 1979: 165-166). 
          Scholars’ definitions of economic power in the 20th were not very different than that of 
19th century. Like in the previous century these scholars pay specific attention to production, 
industrialization and share of world output. Davis Kinsgley uses national income as a proxy for 
states’ economic power. In his study he stresses that the idea of increasing real income per 
capita is connected to attaining greater national economic power (Kinsgley, 1954: 206-242). 
Charles Hitch and Roland McKean use Gross National Products (GNP) in their analyses. They 
believe advancement in the military technology has dramatically changed the threat that 
nations face in the 20th century. Countries which effectively resist these new threats are the 
ones that have substantial economic power. According to Hitch and McKean, countries’ 
substantial economic power can be regarded as the nation’s capacity to produce goods, as 
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measured by gross national product (Hitch and McKean 1960: vi). Bruce Russett also believes 
that GNP is one of the best indicators for measuring national economic power in this century. 
However, he thinks due to the difficulties inherent in conversion to a common currency unit, 
total fuel and electric energy consumption for each nation might be even better summary 
measure of national economic power. He clarifies that by explaining the strong correlation 
between energy consumption and gross national product (Russett, 1968: 293). He also believes 
that using energy consumption as an indicator for national economic power makes cross-
national comparison much easier and more reliable.  
          Government revenue is another indicator that is used for calculating national economic 
power in this era. Steven Rosen used central government revenue as a rough measure of 
national economic power and explains that by saying there was no GNP data available for the 
time before 1930. Today the data is available; however, Rosen believes that government 
revenues as an indicator for measuring national economic strength may be more sensitive than 
gross national product (Rosen, 1972: 171). 
          Scholars who focus on a single economic indicator believe that their measures are 
sufficient and appropriate. However, they are criticized by mathematically sophisticated 
scholars. These intellectuals bring several multivariable approaches with many additional 
variables to the field of measuring national economic power.  
          One of the earliest users of multivariable measurement was Klaus Knorr. According to 
Knorr, main bases of national economic power consist of states’ foreign trade transaction, 
volume of this transaction to size of GNP, international currency reserves and gold and its 
natural resources (Knorr, 1973: 84-93). A.F.K. Organski focuses on a variety of economic 
elements for measuring economic power of nations in the 20th century. According to him, 
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economic power is about industrial and technological power, which is based on machinery 
production or manufactured goods (Organski, 1968: 139). He asserts that great manufacturing 
countries have always been great economic powers such as Germany, Great Britain and the U.S.  
According to him, elements that are very much related to national economic power are the 
share of world output, production of iron and steel and industrialization (Organski). 
          New technologies from information & communication to manufacturing, from biotech & 
life sciences to energy fields have created huge changes in the traditional bases of economic 
power in the 21st century. Scholars Nye, Ferguson, Kirshner, Cumings, Gilboy and Cox focus on 
economic indicators such as the size and quality of GDP, trade, export-import balance, finance 
stability, productivity, the level of technology and science, natural and human resources, and 
political and legal institutions for markets in order to measure economic power of the nations.  
                  As it mentioned above that different power resources played very different roles in 
different periods throughout history. Therefore, finding resources that provide the best basis to 
measure the states’ economic power is crucially important for analyzing this study’s research 
questions. It is important that this paper’s research questions have been studied at length by 
various scholars. However, as this paper covers them in the second chapter, most of these 
scholars’ studies suffer a multiplicity of weaknesses. Thus, there is a need for a more 
comprehensive research study that properly analyzes this topic. In that respect, this research 
study, which is different from earlier studies, not only gather and interpret the data. It also 
reveals the stories behind the data, and answers not only “what, when, and who” questions, but 
also “why and how” questions which prior research studies miss. This paper asserts that there is 
no way to draw a conclusion or persuade readers if the study does not provide a proper 
explanation behind the data. From that point, after taking everything into account, this research 
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study’s results contradict the results of previous studies. For example, contrary to most of the 
previous studies, which state that the financial crisis of 2007-09 created a situation that 
significantly undermined American economic power, this research study finds out that U.S. 
economic power is not in absolute, long-term, fundamental and irreversible decline. It is in a 
relative decline (a decrease in relative external economic power) that the U.S. has experienced 
several times in the past. From the same perspective, contrary to many previous studies, which 
argue that China will displace the U.S. as the world’s next economic superpower, this study 
reveals that it will be very hard for China to continue its high-paced economic growth in the 
future. That means rather than displacing the U.S. as the world’s next economic superpower, 
China’s future will be more about dealing with its own economic problems.  
          All these assertions are scrutinized in detail after the methodology chapter. In the next 
chapter this paper focuses on scholars and their analyses on whether the U.S. is a declining 
economic power and whether China is replacing the U.S. as the world next superpower. By 
reviewing literature, this research paper aims to find out new angles and ideas that further 











          The literature in this review encapsulates numerous perspectives. Some scholars in IR 
argue that American economic power is declining. They believe that something has changed in 
the U.S. (such as Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ huge domestic and international 
expenditures, serious financial and economic problems in Nixon and Carter administrations, 
growing income inequalities in Regan administration) and/or in the world (such as OPEC’s oil 
embargo, Japanese and German industrialization and their rapid economic growth) and they 
interpret these changes as the beginning of American economic decline. From that point, they 
think U.S. economy very much resembles those of the past eras of Spain, the Netherlands, 
France, and the British Empire. On the other hand, some contemporary intellectuals interpret 
the financial crisis of 2007-09 as a watershed event that changed the economic balance of 
power in the world. They believe it was an economic catastrophe for the U.S.; therefore, it 
diminished U.S. economic power in the world. In addition, a big part of contemporary 
intellectuals’ arguments are based on China. According to them, China has proved its economic 
prowess in the world by growing at ten percent on average for more than 30 years which 
permits China to challenge American economic power all around the world. From that point, 
many scholars who think American economic power is in decline also believe that China will 
displace the U.S. as the world next economic superpower. In order to explore certain 
perspective from important scholars, the following section will look at individual scholars’ 
perspectives.  
          One of the most well-known intellectuals, Paul Kennedy, pays special attention to 
countries’ productive economic resources in his prominent study in the late 1980s. According to 
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Kennedy, the U.S. was the most economically powerful country in the world after WWII. The U.S 
possessed two-thirds of the world’s total gold reserve, produced more than half of the total 
manufacturing production, and supplied one-third of the world’s exports (Kennedy, 1987: 385). 
However, not more than three decades later, he asserts the U.S. encountered serious economic 
problems, which cost the U.S. to lose the relative share of the world’s wealth, production, and 
trade. He links this decline to his theory of “imperial overstretch”, which refers to the 
overextension either economically or militarily eventually leads to the exhaustion of vital 
domestic resources, and decline (xv-xvi). Kennedy believes that all Great Powers –Spanish, 
Dutch, French and British- shared the same set of conditions that extensively allocate their 
resources for defense instead of investment and research and development. This eventually led 
them toward decline in their power and in losing their abilities to hold or carry out their 
economic and military roles in the world. Paul Kennedy believes that there are similarities 
between the U.S.’s position today and the declined Great Powers in the past. Like other great 
powers in the past, in order to secure its dominant status, the U.S. felt it necessary to assign 
more resources for defense while its economy was in decline. In the 1970s and 1980s U.S. share 
of global manufacturing and GNP was down, agriculture was in crisis, government was heavily in 
debt, and inflation was high (432-434). However, at the same time, the U.S. increased its 
military expenditures overseas and devoted a large share of its resources to the military forces. 
Kennedy believes this leads the U.S. decline in its economic power and then national power 
which is very much the same case for the Great Powers in previous centuries (434). 
          Clyde Prestowitz also believes that the U.S. economy is in trouble and supports Kennedy’s 
thoughts from different aspects. According to Prestowitz, America seriously over-stretched its 
economy (Prestowitz, 2010: 39). He asserts that due to six false doctrines, the U.S. is 
experiencing a relative and absolute decline in economy that makes the U.S. each year look a 
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little bit more like that of previous Great Powers of Rome, Spain and Great Britain. His list of 
doctrines includes; the prioritization of short-time geopolitical interests, the cultural shift 
toward consumerism, the belief of market fundamentalism, the theory of pure free trade, the 
globalization of U.S. corporations, and the addiction to cheap energy (72-247). Prestowitz 
stresses that most of these doctrines worked fine in the past; however, it becomes apparent as 
the global economy and the U.S. evolved that the U.S. needs to adopt new doctrines. Prestowitz 
believes that in today’s world, while the U.S. loses its economic supremacy, China is moving 
toward the top. Due to its production technology, its transportation and communication 
infrastructure, its tax and financial incentives, its highly disciplined and energetic labor force, 
and its currency that was managed to remain weak against the dollar, China is gaining more 
economic power each and every year, which turns the country a dominant power of the world 
economy. Prestowitz visualized China’s economic rise as a natural return to its historic position 
(2005: 58-75). However, he did the same kind of analysis three decades earlier. In the second 
half of the 1980s, he thought that U.S. economy was in decline and talked about the end of the 
American economic hegemony. According to him, a powerful state must sustain a leading role in 
a wide number of industries (1988: 503). In the 1970s, the U.S. was the world leader in 
technology, military, industry and finance. However, a decade later, the U.S. was the leader only 
in military power. In other areas the U.S. had traded places with Japan. According to Prestowitz, 
the dynamism of Japanese management, the cooperative and flexible attitude of labor and the 
supportive role of government were the reasons of Japan’s economic success (108). He asserted 
by that time that Japan became an undisputed economic superpower (3). Time shows that he 
was not right on his finding that Japan became the world undisputed dominant economic 
power. Since his analysis Japan has struggled with many crises that many times sent the country 
into serious long-lasting recessions and economic slowdowns. He admitted this two decades 
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later by saying Japan seems like a dying country. According to him, the reasons behind this 
include overvalued yen, changes in the tradition of government-business partnership, raising 
other new Asian competitors, its energy dependency and competitiveness (2015: 148-169). 
          Donald W. White is another scholar who also believes that U.S. economy has gone through 
cycle of rise and decline. He says after the end of the WWII, as the world’s leading economic 
power the U.S. had produced almost half of the world economy. In the early 1970s he indicates 
the figure had fallen to less than 30 percent (White, 1996: 383). White stresses that even though 
U.S. economy was in decline, many government officials by that time still believed that 
economically the U.S. were unchallenged in the world while they were celebrating the 
achievement of the world’s first trillion-dollar economy. A decade later, the American 
percentage of world production slid from almost 30 percent to nearly 20 percent (384). From 
that point, like Prestowitz, White believes that economic leadership of the U.S. was challenged 
by some countries, particularly Japan. However, White asserts that American economic decline 
was not the result of the revival of Japan. He thinks Japan had not grabbed some secret 
information that had been unknown to the Americans. According to him, Japanese were doing 
the same things that Americans had done in earlier periods, such as applying technology to 
production, working hard for the future reward, putting capital into production of high-quality 
goods at low cost, and providing most of their citizens a sense of well-being (402).  From that 
point White thinks that Americans opened the way for Japanese to exceed them economically 
by choosing consumption on luxury and foreign goods instead of focusing on discipline of 
production.  
          About two decades after White’s analysis, Charles A. Kupchan makes a claim about future 
challenger of the American economic hegemony which is very different than other intellectuals’ 
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findings. According to Kupchan’s research, with its superior technological base, its 
competitiveness and its huge market, Europe will soon emerge as America’s only major 
economic competitor. Kupchan believes that the intense focus on regional trade in the EU made 
European countries economically stronger and competitive. Besides that, following the sharp 
decline of the U.S. technology sector in the early 2000s, the venture capital began flowing 
primarily to Europe, which increased the possibility of productivity of Europe that the U.S. had 
enjoyed a decade ago (Kupchan, 2002: 137). Kupchan predicts that as Europe’s productivity, 
competitiveness and wealth increase, so will European’s appetite for greater international 
economic influence. And as the U.S. dominates the international economic order, the EU’s 
search for greater economic autonomy and status, which eventually take the form of resisting 
U.S. international economic influence (119-154). Since Kupchan’s analysis EU has experienced 
with many serious economic and political crises which brought the Union on the verge of 
disintegration. From that point, it is clear that like Prestowitz’s study over Japan, Kupchan’s 
analysis over EU was not justifiable. However, Kupchan sees the financial crisis of 2007-9 as a 
tragic event that created harsh economic realities for the U.S. According to Kupchan, new 
economic situation in the U.S. undermine its dominant status in the global economic order 
(2012: 62-67). Therefore, he thinks that in the twenty-first century the U.S. will not be the 
dominant power of the international economic order. However, Kupchan argues that nor China 
or anyone else will be the world economic superpower. He thinks there will be many economic 
power centers in the world such as China, India, Brazil, and Europe. From that point, he believes 
that for the first time in modern history, the world will not have an economic center of gravity 
(2012: 3). 
          Robert O. Keohane, in his influential 1984 book, agrees that the ability and willingness of 
the U.S. to allocate significant resources to maintain its international economic regime declined 
19 
 
few decades after the WWII. He thinks it seems unlikely that the U.S. will regain its global 
economic leadership in the world that it had during the 1950s and the 1960s. According to 
Keohane, the reason for this decline was the production and control of oil (Keohane, 1984: 176-
178). He thinks the ability of the United States to carry out its economic leadership mostly 
depended on control and exploitation of oil supplies abroad and then the ability to remain as a 
leader in multilateral trade and monetary regimes (178). But due to the dramatic changes (end 
of the gold standard system, the oil crisis etc.) in the 1960s, and especially in the 1970s, the 
ability of the United States to control the oil market and use this control as a source of influence 
over Europe and Japan seriously declined. This decline eventually weakened U.S.’s trade and its 
monetary regimes. In all, it caused the U.S. to lose its global economic leadership (201, 244). 
          Like many other intellectuals Thomas J. McCormick believes that the U.S. emerged from 
the WWII as the only global economic power. According to him, the American economy at the 
end of the WWII was the workshop, the bakery, and the banker of the world. On the other hand, 
all other previous Great Powers; Great Britain, Germany, France, Soviet Union and Japan laid in 
ruin and their economies were completely devastated by war (McCormick, 1995: 47). However, 
few decades later in his analysis which is similar to Kennedy’s overstretch theory, he asserts that 
the U.S. global economic leadership is in decline due to transferring a huge amount of resources 
from civilian to military production, neglecting modernization and research and development 
needs of the domestic industrial plants, and overinvesting in foreign countries (7). McCormick 
indicates that these policies eroded American productivity and competitiveness. This situation 
eventually created serious economic crises, structural unemployment, economic slowdowns, 
income inequalities, heavy tax loads, and triple-dip recessions. He thinks that in the post-Cold 
War era the Soviet economy went over the cliff; however, the American economy hovered on 
the brink of the same cliff (239). 
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          Stanley Hoffman compares U.S economy at the end of the 20th century with U.S. economy 
at the end of the WWII. He argues that most of the economic decline is normal and also has 
been planned by the U.S. He thinks since WWII the U.S. has done everything possible to help the 
economies in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Western Europe even though its share of world 
GDP negatively affected from this policy. For the period after the Vietnam war Hoffman agrees 
with McCormick that overconsumption, underinvestment, insufficient industrial productivity, 
short-sightedness in industry, and lack of research and development were major factors that 
caused U.S. economy to decline (Hoffmann, 1998: 95-96). He believes in the current system U.S. 
global economic leadership status has been put in doubt, by Japan and also by the rise of United 
Europe mostly dominated by Germany (122). 
          Gideon Rachman characterizes the era after the end of Japanese threat to American 
economic hegemony as the age of American supremacy. However, about a decade later, he 
thinks this age come to an end with the arrival of new economic challenger, China. He asserts 
that China as an economic challenger is really different than previous ones (Rachman, 2011: 60). 
According to Rachman, China has proved its economic prowess on the global stage by growing 
at nine to ten percent on average for about three decades (60-61). This economic prowess is 
already allowing China to challenge American economic influence all over the world. On the 
other hand, he argues the predictions of the demise of the Chinese economic achievements 
were wrong in the past (such as the prediction of economic stagnation after the Tiananmen 
Square massacre in the late 1980s, or the prediction of economic meltdown due to fragile 
structure of Chinese financial-banking system), and these kinds of predictions will be wrong in 
the future (63). Roger Altman supports Rachman’s argument by revealing that China emerged 
from the financial crisis unscratched while countries all around the world were severely affected 
from it. According to Altman, the reason behind that is the nature of the Chinese political and 
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economic systems that are completely different than western world. First of all, the Chinese 
financial system plays a small role in its economy. China remains relatively closed economy in 
terms of foreign capital or portfolio investment. Besides that, China runs a budget surplus and 
carries little government debt. In addition, Chinese households save more than 40 percent of 
their incomes that increase Chinese investment and its foreign exchange reserves (Altman, 
2009: 8). In sum, Altman indicates that due to these factors China is little affected by the 
financial crisis while much of the rest of the world has been hit seriously (9). On the other hand, 
Rachman argues with the statement that says because globalization spreads liberal economic 
values such as a free and open market, deregulation, privatization, and competition to, China 
will become an economically more liberal country in the future. According to Rachman, these 
assumptions will not work out, by using Beijing Consensus or Chinese Economic Model, China 
has managed to use policies that curb liberal economic values on the one hand and it continues 
its economic success on the other hand. Therefore, Rachman believes that China will be 
dominant economic power in the world and that every country will be obligated to adapt to this 
very new situation (Rachman, 2016: 2-5). From that perspective, John Ikenberry probably 
disagrees with Rachman. According to Ikenberry, it is true that economic power and influence is 
undeniably flowing away from the U.S. to China and the U.S. will be less able to shape the world 
economic order. However, he asserts that economic system that was created by the U.S. and its 
allies after the WWII is still alive and well (Ikenberry, 2011: 57-58). Ikenberry thinks over many 
decades liberal economic order has facilitated many regional and global transformation. For 
example, many countries in East Asia, Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Latin America 
transformed their economic structures and joined the international trading system with the help 
of American-led liberal international order. From that point, he believes that neither China nor 
any other emerging powers want to contest the rules and principles of the liberal international 
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order. China just wishes to gain more authority within the system. Besides that, Ikenberry thinks 
that alternative economic order “Beijing Model“, which is less open, more strict, rule-based 
model that includes heavy state involvement in the economy, would not advance the interest of 
other states on a global scale due to the fact that there are always a few states in this system 
which opportunistically exploit the other countries (61). 
          Jonathon Kirshner does not agree with the idea that says the American-led liberal 
international economic model is strong and stable and China is fine with its principles. Kirshner 
believes that China has a huge desire for reducing its dependency on the U.S. dollar and 
American-dominated global economic model. For that desire, Chinese leaders accelerate the 
pace of RMB internationalization, promote regional monetary cooperation, and propose reform 
of American-led global monetary management (Kirshner, 2014: 120). Kirshner explains the 
reason why China wants to change global economic model with the declining economic power 
and influence of the U.S. He believes that the financial crisis of 2007-09 undermined American 
economic power and influence in the world (2). According to Kirshner, the starting point of this 
decline was actually before the financial crisis of 2008. He says in the East Asian crisis, the 
America-led economic model which advocates the free-market economic principles and the 
reduction of state involvement was met with skepticism first in some Asian and Latin American 
countries, and then in much of the world with big resentment (80). After various financial crises 
at the end of the 1990s and the early 2000s he emphasizes that, countries that rigorously 
followed American-led economic model or Washington consensus principles usually ended up 
with serious economic crises. Later, the financial crisis of 2007-09 accelerated this process. 
Kirshner thinks the crisis brought up another important consequence other than relative erosion 
of the economic influence of the U.S. It was the reality of the increased economic influences of 
China. He indicates that China has experienced sustained and exceptional growth for over thirty 
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years. Due to this growth, the Chinese economy reached over 50 percent of the size of 
America’s from its seven percent at the end of the Cold War (157). Therefore, China wants to 
play a major economic role in the new world; however, Chinese leaders think American-led 
global economic order prevents them playing that role.  
          Niall Ferguson is another scholar who thinks the time for China has arrived. According to 
him, China is on the brink of surpassing the U.S. as world’s leading economic power and the 
financial crisis of 2007-09 just acted as an accelerator of that trend (Ferguson, 2011: 307-308). 
He believes that the decline of U.S. economic power is mostly about huge budget deficit and 
public debt in the U.S. He believes that it is very hard to achieve any economic growth under a 
heavy debt and deficit burden (2014: 147). From that point, even before the financial crisis he 
tries to take attention to U.S. soaring budget deficit and national debt. However, he said even 
though the seriousness of the problem, many Americans including well-informed scholars 
refused to believe bad financial conditions of the U.S. Ferguson believes this is because of East 
Asian capital that finance and stabilize U.S. unbalanced budget each and every year (2004: 262). 
After the financial crisis, he indicates that the fiscal position of the U.S. was worse than that of 
Greece. The debt-to-revenue ratio (which is the ratio of sovereign debt to all government 
revenue) of the U.S. was over 300 percent in 2009 (2011: 310). Other than debt-to-revenue 
ration, he believes that government solvency is also very much depended on interest rate that 
investors demand. From that perspective, he stresses that more than half of the U.S. debt is in 
the hands of foreign creditors and over a fifth is held by the monetary authorities of China (311). 
In sum, Ferguson believes that the U.S. is at the end of its economic predominance and China is 
very ready to be world next economic superpower.  
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          Fareed Zakaria like most of previous intellectuals above believes that China has been 
experiencing rates of economic growth over the past few decades that were once unimaginable. 
On the other hand, the U.S. has been struggling with slow growth, high unemployment and 
overwhelming indebtedness (Zakaria, 2012: 2). The financial crisis of 2007-09 worsened the 
situation for the U.S. For many years saving and investment rates are low and trade, budget and 
account deficits are high in the U.S. By contrast, China has high saving and investment rates and 
trade and budget surpluses during the same period. In all, China has grown over 9 percent for 
three decades. Besides that, China’s income per capita has increased twentyfold and its foreign 
exchange reserve is the largest in the world (100-110). Zakaria describes the country as one of 
the most successful development stories in world history. From that perspective, he believes 
that the world is experiencing a great economic power shift. In the old world, American 
economic ideas had been the starting points for international economic action. However, after 
the financial crisis of 2007-09 the U.S. lost its economic power and its ability to create broad 
coalition in order to solve complex economic problems of states in the world (232). On the other 
hand, he states that China is taking up more space and more roles for the world economic 
problems.  
          There are some scholars on the other hand who think economically the U.S. is still the 
most powerful and most influential state in the world. They argue that there is no clear long-
term absolute U.S. economic power decline. Some scholars believe the U.S. is in a relative 
economic power decline in terms of U.S. share of world gross products, share of global 
manufacturing activity, employment and GDP growth. At the same time, they admit that the 
U.S. has serious debt and deficit problems. However, they assert that this is not the same idea 
that the U.S. is in irreversible economic power decline. There are many factors, such as market 
size, competitiveness, productivity, national resources, human development, technological and 
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scientific achievements and the role of dollar in the world that make the U.S. the largest and 
richest economic power in the world. On the other hand, they criticize scholars who think China 
will be the world’s next economic superpower. They believe these scholars are exaggerating 
China’s economic achievement. They believe that China will face serious financial and economic 
problems in the future that put this country into the middle-income trap like other countries 
such as Mexico, Russia, Brazil and Turkey. From that point, they predict that China in the future 
will be all about meeting the needs of its own people rather than creating a global economic 
hegemony. 
          Samuel Huntington believed there are no facts or events that prove the U.S. economic 
power is in decline. According to Huntington, scholars who believe the U.S. is losing its economic 
hegemony in the world, tend to paint an impressionistic and fictitious picture of U.S. economy. 
He indicates that according to these scholars U.S. economy is in irresistible decline due to its 
mounting trade and fiscal deficit and its continuing and even accelerating decline of world 
production (Huntington, 1988: 76-81). However, Huntington argues that debt and deficit are 
overwhelmingly the result of the economic policies of U.S. government. These policies are used 
in order to stimulate investment, growth and revenues. According to Huntington, if these 
policies fail, they can be reversed by another set of policies that possibly not create any debt 
and deficit. On the other hand, he points out that the U.S. produced around 40 percent of world 
product in the 1950s. That share declined drastically to lower 20 percent of world product at the 
end of the 1960s (81). Since then it has remained the same. He argues that in the past two 
decades (1968-1988) the share of gross world product certainly has not declined. From that 
point he asserts that the arguments of scholars who believe the U.S. has suffered precipitous 
decline and center of economic production is shifting from the U.S. to other countries are 
obviously not supported by the facts (90-96).  
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          Bruce Cumings agrees with Huntington’s analysis. Cummings believes the U.S. is still the 
only dominant economic power in the world at the end of the twentieth century. He indicates 
that the unemployment and inflation rates decreased at twenty-year low, the stock market 
went up and broke the records, the big federal budget deficit turned into a surplus, and 
economic growth reached almost five percent in the United States (Cumings, 1999: 271). After 
all of these factors, like Huntington’s thesis, he claims that no regional or major powers can 
challenge American global economic position. He thinks American international economic 
leadership is dependent on various strengths from mass consumption to scientific and 
technological prowess (275-295). Michael Cox agrees with Cumings and believes the U.S. has a 
great deal of economic power, much more than any other country in the world, now and for the 
foreseeable future. He approves Cumings’s list of factors that makes the U.S. a dominant 
economic power and adds more factors to the list such as natural resources (oil, gas, coal, and 
food that the U.S. possesses), economic competitiveness, innovation, corporate strengths, and 
American position in the world economic system (Cox, 2012: 371-376). On the other hand, he 
accepts that after the financial crisis there are some serious economic problems in the U.S., such 
as the declining trend of the U.S. share of the world GDP, growing public and external 
indebtedness and rising income inequalities. However, Cox believes that this is hardly the same 
idea that U.S. economy is in irreversible or absolute decline. Robert Kagan agrees with that 
statement. Kagan thinks during and after the financial crisis due to dismal economic situation 
the perception of American economic decline is certainly understandable. However, he believes 
the financial crisis cannot be interpreted as the beginning of the American economic decline. 
According to Kagan, it is true that there is a relative economic decline in the U.S.; however, this 
is mostly about the choice of Obama administration (Kagan, 2012). He states in order to decide 
whether American economy is in absolute decline one should do a more rigorous examination 
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by scrutinizing long-term data such as the size and the influence of the U.S. economy. Kagan 
argues in terms of long-term factors the U.S.’ economic position in the world has not seriously 
changed despite the financial crisis of 2007-09 (2012). Kagan interprets the financial crisis of 
2007-09 is just another crisis like in the past. He indicates that the U.S. suffered deep and 
prolonged economic crises in the past; however, in each case, the U.S. rebounded and actually 
ended up in a stronger position relative to other powers than before the crisis (2012). From the 
same point, Matthias Matthijs argues that in order to decide whether U.S. economy is in decline, 
we have to look beyond short-term economic growth performance. We have to focus on long-
term growth indicators such as human capital, technology, research and development, 
innovation as well as on aspects of economic legitimacy such as influence over international 
institutions, and ability to create and impose economic ideas (Matthijs, 2012:42). He says when 
we consider all these ingredients we see the U.S. economy is still far ahead of all other 
countries. In total, he believes the U.S. is more likely than any other states to stay at the top of 
the world economy in the coming decades (44, 51). 
          Michael Cox thinks China’s economic success is exaggerated by politicians, intellectuals 
and some parts of the public. He thinks China, like many other regional powers, has serious 
internal and external challenges that limit this country’s economic ability to move ahead (Cox, 
2012: 379). George Gilboy focuses some of these challenges. Gilboy asserts that Chinese 
government frequently resists political and social reforms that are needed for a healthy 
economy. Due to the risks that inherent in China’s unreformed political and social system, 
Chinese managers focus on short-term profits, local autonomy and excessive diversification 
(Gilboy, 2004: 33-35). On the other hand, according to Gilboy, Chinese economic reforms are 
mostly inefficient (36). Gilboy claims that these reforms strongly favor state-owned enterprises 
that prevent the creation of private sectors. Besides that, China’s entry to the world economy 
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reinforces its dependence on foreign investment. In order to attract more foreign investment, 
the Chinese government creates an investment friendly environment for foreign investors. Due 
to this environment foreign firms accounted for 55 percent of China’s exports and also secure 
strong positions in the Chinese domestic market (38-40). China’s entry to the world economy 
also reinforces its dependence on foreign technology. Many Chinese firms need to import 
critical, high-tech components and manufacturing equipments from the US and other 
industrialized countries for their domestic operations (38). He believes Chinese markets are 
fragmented and the rules are constantly changing under manipulation by officials. So from that 
point, he predicts that without implementing structural economic reforms China cannot be a 
global economic competitor of the U.S. Matthias Matthijs agrees with these statements and also 
talks about the stability of Chinese financial market and Chinese economic model that is called 
“Beijing Consensus”. According to Matthijs the Beijing model and financial market have their 
own vulnerabilities and without serious reforms they cannot last long (Matthijs, 48-51). 
          Salvatore Babones’s analyses the issue from different perspective; however, his findings 
match with earlier scholars’ analyses. According to Babones, China‘s massive economic growth 
over the past two decades was mostly about the two one-time boosts that led to massive 
increases in economic productivity in China (Babones, 2011: 82). One of these boosts he talks 
about the population’s declining fertility rate. Babones says declining fertility rate freed up 
women in China to join the formal labor market. Women, who used to work in the home, are 
now working in the money economy which increases China’s GDP. The second factor he talks 
about is urbanization. From the same point, he indicates hundreds of millions of people who 
used to stay in the village and work on the farm, now moved to cities. Urbanization in China 
increases GDP because urban populations are more financially productive than rural ones. 
Babones believes these are the one-time benefits and it already boosted Chinese economy (85-
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88). Therefore, China will face all kinds of economic problems in upcoming future, which make 
China enter into the middle-income trap (88). From the same perspective, Michael Beckley 
believes it is true that over the last two decades, China’s GDP has risen more than 8 percent 
annually and its reported debt-to-GDP ratio reported is very low (Beckley, 2012: 58-59). 
However, Beckley thinks GDP cannot be taken as a proxy of national economic power. Besides 
that, Beckley thinks China’s true level of public debt is much higher than reported figures. 
According to Beckley, China’s real debt-to-GDP ratio is between 70 and 150 percent, which will 
negatively affect China’s GDP growth soon (60). Beckley also thinks that several factors (surplus 
of cheap labor and capital, expanding export market abroad, and sufficient natural supplies such 
as water and air) that promoted rapid Chinese growth in the past are now disappearing (60). 
From that point, he thinks China’s economic growth will slow in the future, which will create 
various economic challenges for China.  
          Charles Krauthammer thinks the China threat is vastly exaggerated. According to 
Krauthammer, American economic strength is in relative decline and this decline is a choice and 
it is in America hands (Krauthammer, 2009: 1-5). From that point, his analysis gets very close to 
that of Robert Kagan. Like Kagan, Krauthammer believes the Obama administration’s liberal 
ambitious economic policies move America from its traditional individualistic policies to more 
equitable European style social democratic policies. Krauthammer thinks social democratic 
policies come with some cost that include higher unemployment, higher debt and deficit 
amount, less innovation, less dynamism, less productivity, and less overall economic growth (1-
5). Besides that, Krauthammer asserts that one of the major threats to the American economy 
comes from trade deficit, and two-third of this deficit comes from imported oil. However, he 
thinks this is not a fixed fact. It is a choice. He indicates, for example, if we remove the ban on 
new nuclear plants, and offshore and Arctic drilling, then we can eliminate our massive trade 
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deficit. In all, Krauthammer thinks all of these threats cannot still be interpreted as the U.S. is in 
absolute economic decline. He believes the U.S. has the most dynamic, innovative, productive, 
technologically advanced economy in the world (5). Krauthammer believes these are the factors 
that will continue to make the American economy the most powerful economy in the world.  
          One of the most influential foreign policy thinkers, Joseph Nye, also think that U.S. 
economy is not in absolute decline, and in relative terms, the U.S. economy will remain its top 
position in the world in the coming decades (Nye, 2010: 11-12). Nye agrees with Krauthammer’s 
forces list that makes American economy the most powerful economy in the 21st century. 
However, he adds more forces such as competitiveness, leading in critical new sectors, 
investment in R&D, energy and education. According to Nye, the U.S. is doing well for almost all 
of these forces. For example, U.S. productivity increased significantly after 1995 as well as its 
competitiveness, which is now ranked as one of the highest in the world (2002: 126-128). He 
indicates that the U.S. is the world leader for investment in R&D with its huge spending, which is 
higher than the next seven countries combined (2011: 192-193). The U.S. also leads in many 
critical new sectors such as information technology, nanotechnology and biotechnology. Besides 
that, according to Nye, after the shale revolution, the U.S. decreased its dependence on energy 
imports and actually starts exporting energy to other countries (2015: 79-80). Finally, he thinks 
American higher education is strong. Higher education spending as a percentage of U.S. GDP is 
doubled as compared to countries such as France, Germany, Britain and Japan (191-197). 
However, he claims that doesn’t mean there is no challenges and challenger. For challenges, 
Nye’s list includes saving, debt, income inequalities and lower level education. According to Nye, 
U.S. personal saving rate was down to near zero at the beginning of the 21st century from almost 
10 percent in the 1970s (2002: 128). In addition, U.S. government debt level exceeds 90 percent 
(critical point for many economists) of GDP (2011: 195). Nye also argues that income inequality, 
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which poses serious problems to the economy, is high and it has risen steadily over the past 
decades. Finally, he asserts that American education is struggling at the lower level. According to 
Nye, American students at the lower levels are not really improving their knowledge and skills 
enough to keep pace with an advancing economy in the 21st century (196). On the other hand, 
he scrutinizes China as an economic challenger to U.S. economic supremacy. It is true that there 
is a rapid economic growth in China for the last few decades. It is important to know that China 
benefits greatly from imported technologies and cheap labor in the early stages of economic 
growth. However, Nye believes China’s growth rates will slow as its economy reaches higher 
level of development. In addition, Nye asserts that China will face serious economic problems 
from income inequality, corruption, inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOE), and unstable 
financial market. From that perspective, Nye believes that China still lags far behind the U.S 
economy. He thinks China is not likely to become a peer rival to the U.S. on a global basis; 












Rationale of the Study 
          After scrutinizing previous researchers’ analyses on declining economic power of the U.S. 
and rising China’s economic power as the world’s next superpower, it has been found out that 
there are some gaps and weaknesses in these intellectuals’ analyses. First of all, some scholars 
have a flawed understanding of American economic role in the world. It is interesting that 
scholars such as Charles Krauthammer, Niall Ferguson, Clyde Prestowitz and Robert Kagan 
confused being an economic superpower in the world and enforcing and pressuring on other 
countries such as Japan, Germany, France, and China to get what it wants on every economic 
issue. In addition, there has been confusion about one of the critical terms, “decline”, in some of 
these intellectuals’ studies. The term is ambiguous and has many different meanings. For 
example, some scholars draw a distinction between relative and absolute economic decline in 
their analysis such as Joseph Nye, Bruce Cumings, Fareed Zakaria, Michael Cox and Paul 
Kennedy. On the other hand, some scholars, such as Donald White, Gideon Rachman, Jonathan 
Kirshner, and Thomas McCormick do not make a distinction and use these two terms 
interchangeably. However, it is important to know that relative economic decline is very 
different than absolute economic decline. In relative economic decline, other countries’ 
economic power increase much faster or greater than the first country’s economic power. For 
instance, in the 17th century and especially in the 18th century, the Netherlands’ economy was 
still in a good shape. However, they were in economic decline relative to other countries such as 
France and Britain, which were growing much faster and greater than the Netherlands. On the 
other hand, in absolute decline, a country loses some of its critical economic power resources or 
loses its ability to use economic power resources effectively that leads that country to a long-
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term economic (GDP) decline. According to Nye, this type of economic power decline starts 
inside the country and then it contributes to loss of external power (2015: 20-21). Holy Rome 
and Ottoman Empires, that experienced a significant decline in economic activities (GDP) over 
an extended period of time, can be examples of absolute economic decline.  
          On the other hand, some intellectuals, such as Charles Kupchan, Clyde Prestowitz, Niall 
Ferguson, and Roger Altman measure current economic power of the countries with short-term 
data and then make predictions about the future economic conditions of these countries. 
However, it is crucial to know that there is no single future, there are many possible futures. If 
factors like humans and their complex interactions are involved in the process, then predicting 
the economic future of states become so much harder. For example, some intellectuals and 
politicians such as Horace Walpole and David Tume predicted that the United Kingdom (U.K.) 
would be an unimportant economic power when the U.K. lost its colonist in the New World 
(Walpole, 1842: 266; Stanlis, 1976: 192-193). However, they couldn’t foresee the effects of 
industrial and technological revolutions, which gave the U.K. another century of economic 
hegemony. In a more contemporary example, it was famously calculated and predicted by many 
respected intellectuals such as Prestowitz, Hoffman, and White in the U.S., taught that Japan 
would become “number one” economic power in the world; however, not even a decade later, 
the Japanese financial system almost collapsed and the country fell into a long-term recession 
which is known as the Lost Decade of Japan. Finally, in a more dramatic example, before the 
financial crisis of 2008 -after thousands of research and enormous of data analysis- the 
president of the Federal Reserve Bank told Americans that the U.S. market could never fail; 
however, it did only about two years later. All of these examples assure that confidence should 
be reserved when intellectuals and politicians explain what the world economy is going to look 
like in 50, 30 or even 10 years later.  
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          From the same perspective, some scholars, such as Charles Kupchan, Gideon Rachman, 
and Roger Altman, use linear projection of economic growth trends in their studies. However, 
this could be misleading. It is essential to know that when countries grow, their growths will be 
more difficult to achieve and happen more slowly. When economies move up the value chain, 
they move their production from simple manufactured goods to more technological and 
complex products. In the early stages of production, countries such as China benefit from cheap 
labor and imported technologies; however, in the upper stages, they have to change their 
growth model in order to produce more sophisticated products. That process usually slows 
down their economic growth rate. For instance, it took 30 years for South Korea to raise its GDP 
per capita from one-thirtieth of U.S. GDP per capita to one-third of U.S. GDP per capita. 
However, it took about 20 years to reach from one-third of U.S. GDP per capita to one-half of 
U.S. GDP per capita (Babones, 80). More importantly, if the country fails to innovate or is 
unsuccessful in changing its economic growth model, then this country’s growth slows down. 
This is the situation that some countries, such as Mexico, Russia, and Turkey, have already 
experienced for more than two decades.  
          It is also important that some scholars failed to focus on key variables related to measuring 
economic power in the contemporary world in their studies. From that point, they take some 
economic variables as dogma and ignore the rest. For example, Gideon Rachman, Michael Cox, 
and Fareed Zakaria consider GDP as the single and most important variable and interpret the 
health of the country’s economy based on this indicator. GDP is one of the most important 
indicators; however, measuring overall health of the economy only by this variable makes any 
research study questionable. GDP is a measurement of a nation’s overall economic activities. 
From that point, GDP gives no information about composure or structure of an economy. 
Besides currency values, exchange rates play important roles for measuring GDP. When a 
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currency is under speculative attack, the market exchange rates of that country become 
inaccurate which cause a major shift in GDP. On the other hand, for elections or many other 
short-term benefits, law-makers can use policies such as easy credit and low interest rates in 
their country in order to increase employment and maximize GDP. However, in the long-run, 
these policies could have disastrous effects by raising inflation and budget deficit. It is important 
to know that if there is spending, GDP increases. However, high spending doesn’t always mean a 
flourishing economy. For example, many oil rich Arabic countries do irresponsible spending on 
projects that actually bring no benefits to the country in the future. Besides that, GDP does not 
give information about income inequalities, environmental quality, unemployment, and many 
other factors that affect people’s standard of living. Finally, in many countries, the value of 
currencies varies from market to market. For example, Iran uses three foreign exchange rates in 
its economy. Countries such as Iran, China, Turkey, and Russia constantly use this and other type 
of methods in order to manipulate their official GDP data. From that point, it is clear that using 
GDP as a proxy for economic or national power of a country is controversial. In order to support 
findings about GDP, many other variables should be taken into account such as inflation, 
demand and supply of currency, debt, saving, export-import balance, and monetary and fiscal 
policies. GDP is calculated by market exchange rate and market exchange rate is determined by 
various variables mentioned above. The GDP of a country will be inaccurate if that particular 
country manipulates any of these variables.  
          This is not only the case for GDP. The same kinds of challenges are common for the 
variables such as debt, unemployment, productivity, savings, and interest rates. For example, 
Niall Ferguson, Paul Kennedy, and Robert Keohane pay specific attention to debt. According to 
them, it is very hard to achieve any economic growth under a debt and deficit burden. It is true 
that debt affects the economy and creates serious economic problems from higher inflation to 
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lower income and from lower investors’ confidence to higher unemployment. However, it is 
important to know that in some cases debt can be created in order to boost economic growth 
and finance the investment. For example, many times the U.S. government has increased debt 
and deficit spending in order to overcome economic slowdowns. This means the debt or deficit 
spending is not always a bad thing.  
          Another field which many scholars over-simplify is savings. Savings is one of the essential 
parts of economics. If there is low savings then there will be low investment and low growth. 
Many scholars such as Paul Kennedy, Stanley Hoffmann, Gideon Rachman, Fareed Zakaria, 
Joseph Nye, and Michael Backley emphasize the low savings rate in the U.S. and talk about its 
negative effects on overall economy. However, it is important to know that in many cases 
American savings rates are miscalculated. Many intellectuals usually focus on one side of the 
story by scrutinizing personal and/or government savings of the U.S. However, at the aggregate 
level the situation looks much better when they add corporate saving into the account. In other 
words, the low level personal and government savings are balanced out by corporate savings in 
the U.S. Nonetheless the situation could be at critical level if all three savings levels are low. But 
even in that case the U.S. has some exceptions. Because there are still many foreigners who 
want to invest in the U.S. or they want to hold their capital in the U.S. market, which gives the 
U.S. ability to cover the savings gap. However, that doesn’t make everything fine. If foreigners’ 
money that comes into the U.S. is used for investment, research and development projects, 
then this brings beneficial impacts for economic growth. However, if this money is used for 
budget deficits and excess U.S. consumption, then this creates huge buildups of debts and 
causes additional serious deleterious impacts on economic growth in the U.S.  
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          Productivity is another variable that needs specific attention. It is one of the most 
important indicators in economics. A country’s sustained long-term economic growth and its 
ability to improve its standard of living come from increases in productivity (BCCampus, 2019). 
Nye, Prestowitz, Babones, Huntington, and Cox focus on productivity and analyze the 
relationship between productivity and economic growth of the U.S. in their studies. However, in 
their studies, these scholars rarely analyze the factors that affect productivity. For example, 
there are some forces that influence productivity over time, such as technological development, 
human capital, and public capital. However, it is important to know that each of these forces has 
different level of contribution to productivity. For example, increases in public capital cannot 
constantly contribute to productivity. It has one-time benefit that boosts the productivity and 
then its contribution margin decreases. It is important to know that the rate of productivity is 
very much dependent on the type of force. From that perspective, for example, the reason of 
Chinese productivity growth in the 1980s is very different than that of 2000s. Due to that, 
Chinese economy experienced different rates of growth in each of these decades.  
          It is also important to mention that psychology plays an important role in many 
researchers’ analyses. When it is compared to other nations, it can be seen that Americans are 
more likely to worry about their economic decline. Even after the financial crises in the late 
1950s and early 1960s, there was pessimism about the future of the country’s economy. The 
current discussion of decline of U.S. economic power and the possibility of China to be the next 
economic superpower touch at the nerve of many American intellectuals. From that point, some 
scholars, such as Niall Ferguson, Jonathan Kirshner, Fareed Zakaria, John Ikenberry, Robert 
Kagan and Gideon Rachman, constantly talk about Chinese economic growth and its leading 
position in some fields such as manufacturing and its foreign reserves especially in the U.S. 
However, in most of the cases, they rarely address whether China can sustain such high 
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economic growth rates for the next twenty years or more in order to catch up to the U.S. or, 
they do not specifically focus on factors such as growing imbalance between high savings and 
low consumption, reliance on export market for growth, weak banking and financial system, and 
high level of corruption in China. Furthermore, they rarely touch upon political, environmental, 
social, and territorial difficulties that China is facing at present and which will likely grow more 
intense in the future. It is clear that all these challenges undermine the overall efficiency of 
Chinese potential economic growth in the future.  
          In all, there are many gaps and weaknesses in these scholars’ studies that seriously 
undermine the measurement of economic power in the 21st century properly. Due to these 
weaknesses and gaps, it has become clear that their judgment on whether U.S. economic power 
is in decline and whether the rise of China as the world’s next economic superpower is highly 
questionable. The overall situation above raises the importance of the following question; why 
we need to scrutinize this topic. 
          Creating economic prosperity, stabilizing markets, supporting employment, and protecting 
business development are the major economic objectives of almost all countries. In order to 
reach these objectives, countries use various economic policies. It is important that countries’ 
economic policies are very much relevant to their economic role and/or position in the world. A 
government can adopt different economic policies if this and other countries’ economic roles 
and positions in the world have significantly changed. From that point, it is highly possible that 
the U.S. changes its economic policies if the country is in economic decline or if China rises as a 
world’s next economic superpower. It mentioned above that scholars who believe the U.S. is in 
economic decline and China is replacing the U.S. as world’s next economic superpower 
substantially support protectionist and nationalist policies against China. For instance, if they 
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persuade the public and officials with their findings, although the situation shows the opposite, 
then their policies can be adopted as the U.S. official economic policies. These policies like 
Smoot-Hawley tariff in the early 1930s, can create disastrous consequences by increasing 
protectionist and nationalistic policies in the industrial sector first and then to all sectors of the 
economy and not between the U.S and China but all around the world. From many perspectives, 
this is actually very much what is happening to the U.S. now. However, there is a big chance that 
these actions or these policies can diminish American economic power even more without 
necessarily strengthening it. The same can be said for scholars who think the U.S. has the most 
powerful economy in the world and China cannot be world economic superpower. 
Underestimating Chinese economic power and ignoring problems such as debt, and low savings 
in the U.S. and taking no action for fixing them can also create catastrophic consequences for 
the U.S. economy. For example, it would be a serious mistake for the U.S. to assume that the 
Chinese economic challenges in the future will disappear. It will be wise for the U.S. to deal with 
these issues before they get unsolvable. In sum, it becomes clear that a study that fairly 












          Due to gaps and weaknesses in previous scholars’ analyses, there is a need for a more 
comprehensive study that accurately analyzes whether U.S. economic power is in decline and 
whether China is replacing the U.S. as a world’s next economic superpower. For analyzing and 
answering these research questions accurately, we have to measure economic power of the U.S. 
and China in a changing world correctly. In order to achieve that, this research study adopts the 
pragmatic research approach. In a pragmatic research approach, there are many different ways 
of interpreting the world and undertaking research. No single point of view can give the entire 
picture (Saunders, Thornhill and Lewis, 2012: 109). A pragmatic researcher does not see the 
world as an absolute unity. The truth is what works at a specific time. There is no law of nature; 
for example, a certain amount of economic power doesn’t always give any country a guarantee 
to implement its policies accordingly. It is important to know that there is no country in today’s 
world and there never was in the past that has/had capacity to get what it wants on every single 
economic issue. For example, Great Britain which was economically one of the most powerful 
countries in the world in the 1860s adopted a free-trade policy; however, many countries such 
as U.S. Austro-Hungarian Empire, the U.S. and Russia by that time opposed this policy by using 
protectionist policies. From that point, it is crucial that economic power measured in resources 
does not always equal to economic power measured in preferred outcomes.  
          For the method of this research study, this research study uses a mixed method research 
approach for collecting, analyzing, and reporting the database. The reason why this paper 
choses this particular approach is because pragmatist approach creates an environment where 
researchers can use multiple methods, assumptions, and analysis in order to answer their 
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research problems much more accurately (Croswell, 2003: 204-205). The mixed method 
research approach basically integrates quantitative and qualitative research and data in a 
research study. That means for this study this paper collects and analyzes not only numerical 
data, which is the norm for quantitative research, but also narrative data, which is customary for 
qualitative research in order to address the research problems. Therefore, this approach 
provides qualitative and quantitative research strengths. With this approach this study is also 
able to employ deductive and inductive analysis. 
          In the first part, this research study qualitatively explores existing case-studies and 
analyzes perspectives of American economic power. These cases are international economic and 
financial events such as the collapse of the Bretton Woods financial system, OPEC oil embargo 
and trade and tariff disagreements in the GATT and WTO from World War II to today. From 
these cases, this research paper aims to find out whether the U.S. has enough economic power 
to get other countries to do what it wants them to do. In other words, this study explores 
whether the U.S. has ability to get other countries to do what they otherwise would not do. 
After a substantial amount of cases have been scrutinized, this research paper builds a pattern 
and then develops a theory that explains the data results. In this section, qualitative data is used 
with an inductive analysis. Cases are gathered from the resources such as documents, books, 
scholarly and newspaper articles, reports, and historic records such as archives.   
          A deductive analysis succeeds inductive analysis. Research questions of this section are “Is 
U.S. economic power really in decline?” and “Can China replace the U.S. as the world’s next 
economic superpower?” For these questions, this research starts with a hypothesis that says 
“U.S. economic power is not in decline and China cannot replace the U.S. as world next 
economic superpower”. These hypotheses are examined by analyzing quantitative data that 
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collected to explore different economic power variables. It was mentioned earlier that since the 
beginning of the modern state system, different economic variables have played important roles 
in different periods for assessing national economic power of states. From that point, it is 
important to find variables that provide a right mix for measuring economic power in the post-
industrial world. For that aim this research study focuses on economic variables such as GDP, 
consumer price index (CPI) or inflation rate, productivity, saving, and finally budget deficit and 
debt. The following section provides an introduction to variables, and scrutinizes their 
interconnected relations by analyzing how a change in one variable very much affects the other 
variable/s. From that perspective, the next section also tries to explain the reasons why these 
particular variables are taken as right basis for measuring economic power.  
          A. Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  
          The economic power of nations is usually measured by gross domestic product. GDP is 
basically the total market value of all final goods and services produced within a country (Callen, 
2018). Each county measures its GDP in its local currency therefore comparison can become a 
challenge. Due to that, countries convert their GDP which measured in local currency to GDP in 
U.S. dollars by using market exchange rate. Market exchange rate is the worth of a country’s 
currency in terms of another currency. Market exchange rates are usually free-floating and they 
are determined in the international financial market by the demand and supply of currencies. 
The demand and supply of any particular country’s currency is determined by several factors 
such as inflation, unemployment, trade, interest rates, and monetary and fiscal policies of this 
country. The process seems smooth; however, things are not working out as it is planned. It is 
always the case that when a currency is under speculative attack, the market exchange rates of 
countries become inaccurate and misleading which cause significant shifts in GDP measurement. 
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This is not the only challenge. There are many other cases. For example, for political and social 
reasons law-makers can make unwise decisions in order to maximize GDP and acquire short-
term benefits. Government and the Central bank have a significant impact on the growth of the 
GDP of a country. For elections or many others short-term benefits government officials can use 
policies such as easy credits and low interest rates which increase the spending, employment 
rate and GDP. However, in the long-run these policies could have disastrous effect on overall 
health of the economy by raising inflation, and budget deficit. In addition, government officials 
can do irresponsible spending on projects that bring no benefits in the long-run. By definition, if 
there is a spending, the GDP increases. However, it is crucial that spending doesn’t always mean 
a flourishing economy. Thus, it is clear that GDP is only interested in the quantity in spending 
and ignore the more important part of quality in spending. From that perspective, GDP sees 
them the same way if a country spends $300 million for developing a new tank for the army that 
never use and a company in this country spends $300 million for producing high tech 
machineries. Furthermore, GDP does not give information about income inequalities, 
environmental quality, unemployment and many other factors that significantly affect people’s 
standard of living. However, all these factors play crucial role on stable and healthy economy in 
the long-run. GDP neglects the value of non-monetary activities. From that point, it excludes 
non-market transaction such as household production and unpaid services. However, in many 
developing countries, major business transactions occurred informally and big parts of 
transaction are not registered which result in inaccurate low GDP numbers for these countries. 
It is also important to know that GDP makes no distinction between productive and destructive 
activities. GDP increases when the numbers of transactions increases in an economy. From that 
point, it is not very important if the people are sick, if there is a huge natural disaster like a 
major flood or earthquake, or there is an accident as long as money is spent to treat the sick and 
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repair the damage. From the same point things such as unsustainable credit card debt, stock 
market bubbles or sub-prime lending all increase GDP. Besides that, crime, pollution, and 
resource depletion are also increase GDP if there is spending for preventing crime, mitigating 
the pollution and rescuing wetlands and forests. In total, it can be said that the GDP alone may 
not be accurate indicator that gives information about health of the economy. However, its 
variation can at least give an idea that if the economy is growing or stagnant or in a recession. It 
is usually accepted that if there is a stable rising GDP then there is a healthy and growing 
economy. In this economy people get jobs, earn good wages, and increase their income. On the 
other hand, if the GDP decreases then the economy of this country shrinks. People lose their 
jobs, and income. Investors do not invest and production drops. Business revenue and customer 
spending decline. All these factors can cause a recession. The rule of thumb is that two 
consecutive quarters of shrinking GDP is the signal for a recession (Berge, 2014: 1). Finally, it can 
be said that GDP gives a rough view about how well a country’s economy is functioning. It is a 
good picture that gives an idea about a country’s economy, but it is not a complete picture. For 
scrutinizing GDP, this paper focus on indicators such as percentage change in the value of all 
goods and services produced in a country, reason of percentage change, causes of change, 
sources of long-term GDP growth, share of a country GDP as a percentage of global GDP, 
monetary and fiscal policies that increase or decrease GDP, and domestic and international 
events that spur or curb GDP growth.  
          There are times when the GDP increases as a result of rising prices. In that situation, the 
country still produces the same amount of goods and services. However, these goods and 
services are priced higher than a year before. Therefore, in order to compare changes in the 
production of a country between different periods more accurately, the effect of price changes 
or inflation must be isolated. For this reason, the term Real GDP is used in this study. Real GDP is 
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an inflation-adjusted measure that indicates the value in base-year prices of goods and services 
produced by a country in a given year (Callen). Real GDP provides a more accurate figure of GDP 
growth.  
          Conversely, this paper is highly concerned about the reliability of purchasing power parity 
(PPP), particularly for China’s PPP. PPP is an important economic concept that compares 
different countries’ currencies through a model called basket of goods and services. In this 
model, PPP assumes that prices of (basket) goods and services in one country should be equal to 
prices of similar (basket) goods and services in another country when they are expressed in a 
common currency (OECD, 2020). This assumption derives from the Law of One Price (LOOP) 
principle. It is crucial to note that this principle only works within strict circumstances. However, 
there are some forces, such as trade restriction, transportation cost, government intervention, 
tax differences, and limitations on competitions, contribute to persistent price differentials in 
some countries. In that respect, this paper asserts that China strongly uses these forces and 
manipulates the prices of goods and services. This paper will further discuss this topic within the 
third section that Chinese authorities use price control mechanisms in various critical areas that 
includes energy (oil, gas, electricity), food (pork, corn and wheat) and most of the real estate in 
order to keep the prices of these goods and services within socially reasonable ranges (below 
the market level). In addition to that, due to various reasons, the Chinese government keeps 
non-tradeable goods and services (wages, insurance, rent and utilities and public services) 
artificially low. This is another factor that leads to lower prices. Moreover, low transportation 
and logistics costs in China reduce the input cost and put downward pressure on prices. Trade 
restrictions, limitations on competition, and taxes are the other factors that Chinese authorities 
use for manipulating supply and demand curves in China. All in all, the prices of most of the 
goods and services are not determined under the free-market principles. Therefore, using PPP, 
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which works under the LOOP principles, is not an appropriate way to measure China’s economic 
power in the global economy.  
          Scholars, such as Jeffrey Frankel and Michael Pettis, address this concern and state that 
PPP is a good measurement if someone wants to compare people’s living standard or income 
per capita across countries (Frankel, 2014; 2020; Pettis, 2014). However, if someone wants to 
compare countries’ power in the global economy, it is better to use GDPs at market exchange 
rates (2014; 2020). According to Frankel, the size and/or power of a country’s economy is about 
how much goods and services this country’s currency can buy in the world market; it is not 
about how much local goods and services this county’s currency can buy in their domestic 
market (2014). Additionally, World Bank has some concerns regarding the reliability of its PPP 
statistics. World Bank states that PPP comparisons between countries with different economic 
structures are less accurate than PPP comparisons between countries with similar economic 
structures (World Bank, 2017). From the same perspective, World Bank announces that PPP 
measurement for services are less precise than PPP measurement for goods (2017). Finally, 
World Bank warns that the credibility of PPP measurement very much depends on the quality of 
the price data that participating countries contribute (2017). In that respect, it is important to 
know that China only partially joined World Bank’s International Comparison Program (ICP) in 
1993 and, until 2005, China had never participated in a full ICP program (Deaton, 2009: 34). In 
2005, China’s price collection took place in 11 cities that Chinese government decided (35). 
Since then, the Chinese government has increased its contribution to ICP. However, in 2020 
Chinese authorities still have many concerns about the reliability of ICP’ results. They believe 
serious limitations exists in ICP’s results (National Bureau of Statistic of China, 2020). In that 
respect, they don’t endorse ICP’s results as official statistics (2020). From that point, Chinese 
officials recommend the use of exchange-based GDP statistic, which is recognized by 
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governments all over the world (National Bureau of Statistic of China, 2017). From the same 
perspective, OECD does not recommend using its PPP statistics in many situations that include 
calculating national growth rate and establishing precise rankings of countries (OECD, 2012: 37). 
There are also serious concerns about ICP’s methodological shift in PPP calculation. It is 
important to note that ICP, is one of the world’s largest and most complex statistical 
measurements, has been updating its technique and methodology, such as weighing the 
importance of different goods and services in different countries, in order to make a meaningful 
comparison of prices across countries since the end of 1960s (Deaton, 52). Nevertheless, after 
many years of updating ICP’s approach, it is still far from optimal. In sum, this paper asserts that 
using PPP is not an appropriate way to measure China’s economic capacity. In that respect, the 
figure (GDP based on PPP) that indicates China’s economy has already surpassed that of the U.S. 
to become the world’s largest economy is misleading. Therefore, this paper does not take this 
indicator into account.  
          B. Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
          Consumer Price Index (CPI) measures the average change in prices of household goods and 
services such as food, transportation, medical care, housing, education, appeal and recreation 
(U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2016). According to changes in prices the country experiences 
inflation, or deflation. For example, increasing in prices of goods and services (CPI) refers to 
inflation. There are many ways that lead to inflation; monetary policy is one of them. If a 
country uses monetary policies and increases its money supply more than its size of the 
economy then the purchasing power of currency in that country decreases while prices of 
everything rise. Besides that, expectations, demand and supply shocks also create inflation. In 
order to curb inflation, countries usually raise the interest rates. High interest rates lead to high 
48 
 
unemployment, low investment and low economic growth. Eventually all these factors 
contribute to an economic crisis. Therefore, raising prices are bad for the economy. However, on 
the other hand, falling prices also create a situation that hurts economy. For example, if prices 
are falling in a country, then consumers postpone their purchasing decisions in order to get 
goods and services cheaper in the future. However, this leads to less demand for goods and 
services in that country which results in less production, less investment and more 
unemployment. Overall, that situation also causes serious economic slowdown. Therefore, 
finding the right balance is very important task for governments and central banks. From that 
point, for example, while decreasing interest rates in order to boost the economy, officials have 
to be aware of the risks of driving up inflation. From the same perspective, while increasing 
interest rates for cooling down the economy, officials have to be mindful of the risks of 
recession that slows productivity, and reduce employment. For analyzing prices and its effect on 
economy this paper will focus on average price changes over time, causes of these price 
changes, effectiveness of fiscal and especially monetary policies in controlling price changes, 
consequences of these policies and its effect on GDP growth. 
          C. Budget Deficit and Debt  
          Budget deficit is the annual differences between government spending and government 
revenue (Peter G. Peterson Foundation, 2019). If the government spends more than it collects 
then there is a deficit. One the other hand, national debt is the total amount of money that 
government owes (U.S. Government of Accountability Office, 2019). Therefore, debt means the 
accumulation of past and present deficits. Budget deficit and national debt affect each other. 
For example, if there is a deficit then the government has to raise the money to cover the 
deficit. This type of financing creates public debt. On the other hand, debt decreases tax 
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revenue and increase budget deficit. Besides that, the interest on the debt is added to the 
deficit which also increases the deficit. Deficit and debt seriously affect the economy. In some 
cases, deficit spending can boost economic growth and finance the investment. However, deficit 
in most of the cases causes serious economic problems. First of all, it increases the national 
debt. Secondly, in order to cover budget deficit government borrows from the private sectors. 
Because of that transaction, the private sectors have fewer funds to spend and invest which at 
the end slowdown the economic growth. Countries with large and chronic deficit struggle to 
attract investors due to low confidence rate about the future of this economy. Finally, budget 
deficit causes inflation. For example, in order to cover budget deficit government issues bonds. 
However, if government-issued-bonds are not attractive then government has to print money to 
buy bonds on its own. However, during this process money supply increases higher than that of 
the actual size of the economy which eventually decreases purchasing power of currency. The 
scenario can be set up differently but each time deficit negatively affects the purchasing power 
of currency. From the same perspective, national debt also causes serious economic difficulties. 
First, due to the accumulation of past and present deficits, cost of interest increases. The more 
government spends on interest, the less is left for anything else. Thus, government raises taxes 
or cut spending on services for paying the increased debt services. Therefore, rising debt leads 
to lower incomes. High level of debt diminishes investors’ confidence and decreases foreign 
investment. From same points, investors doubt about government’s ability to repay debt which 
results in demanding even higher interest rates. Lower confidence and reduced investment slow 
down productivity and wages first, and then overall economic growth later. Debt also decreases 
government’s ability to respond future economic, political and social crises. Finally, the inflation 
becomes a serious problem if the government prints money to pay for its debt. This (inflation) 
would reduce the value of domestic debt; however, it increases the burden of its foreign debt. 
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Besides that, inflation creates many crucial problems that it mentioned earlier. For scrutinizing 
deficit/debt section, questions such as how big is the debt/deficit (amount of debt/deficits, 
debt/deficit-to-GDP ratio, share of global debt as a percentage), what cause the debt/deficit, 
what percentage of the debt/deficit owned by domestic/foreign entities, and is the debt/deficit 
getting better or worse need to be answered.  
          D. Saving 
          Saving simply means the portion of income that left over after personal expenditures on 
goods and services is subtracted from the total income (Perozek and Reinsdorf, 2002: 14). 
Factors such as people’s preferences for the future over present consumption, economic 
uncertainties, changes in interest rates, government fiscal policies and population 
characteristics play important role on saving decision. Other than individuals, companies and 
governments also do saving. Companies’ savings are the part of their profits that do not pay out 
to shareholders in order to finance investment in the business. From the same perspective, 
government’ saving occurs when its revenues exceed its expenditures. This is the amount that 
left to spend for future investments. It is widely known that saving is important for economic 
prosperity of a country. Savings leads to increase income through investing in investment 
vehicles. However, if there is not enough saving then there will be less investment which causes 
lower economic growths, shortages and eventually crisis. Therefore, if the saving rate is low, 
then individuals, companies or governments have to look for available savings through domestic 
and international financial institutions. However, that way of finding investment resources bring 
cost with them. It is also crucial that individuals, companies, and governments cannot heavily 
depend on financial intermediaries for their investments. Because it is important to note that 
borrowing indefinitely from financial institutions causes higher inflation and higher interest 
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rates and then an economic downturn. For that reason, these entities have to cover their 
investments with their savings. For analyzing saving, this study focusses on indicators such as 
total amount of saving, gross national saving as a percentage of GNI and GDP, differences 
among the amount/rate of personal, business and government saving, changes in these 
amounts/rates over time, the reason of changes and its effect on overall economy. 
          E. Productivity 
         Productivity measures output for every unit of input. Increasing productivity indicates 
greater efficiency in production of goods and services. There are some factors that increase 
countries’ productivity. Technological development is one of them. Countries improve their 
productivity as new technologies are introduced and diffuse through the economy (National 
Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine, 2017: 55-59). Countries also increase their 
productivity by investing in human capital. Workers who receive better education, better 
training, and higher level of knowledge become more productive over time. Another way of 
improving productivity is investing on public capital. Besides that, countries that provide better 
infrastructure such as roads, railways, harbors, bridges, airports and power plants make their 
companies more productive than their counterparts in other countries that suffer from 
inadequate infrastructure. It is crucial that productivity helps countries to increase their GDP. 
Other than GDP growth, higher productivity also leads to higher competitiveness, lower unit 
costs, higher wages, higher profits, better trade performance, and better living standards. 
Productive countries are more dynamic and very much connected to the world. They invest in 
technology and critical sectors. They attract highly skilled and creative people all around the 
world. In the long run it is fair to say that a country’s ability to improve its living standards very 
much depends on its ability to raise its productivity (Krugman, 1992: 9). On the other hand, 
52 
 
when productivity decreases in a country, it reduces workers’ wages and corporate profits in 
that country. Reduced wages and profits lead to lower investment rate and lower investment 
rate causes lower GDP growth rates. In order to examine productivity this paper emphasizes on 
output per hour of workers, ratio of aggregate output to aggregate inputs, resources that 


















Case Studies  
          Introduction  
          As it mentioned earlier that power is the ability to influence behavior of others in line with 
one’s own interest (Organski, 104). Therefore, powerful countries have capacity to force other 
countries to do things they otherwise would not do or have at least a serious impact on other 
countries’ decision-making (Nye, 1990: 154; Baldwin 1979: 161). From the same perspective, 
economic power is the ability to control and influence the behavior of other countries through 
use of economic assets (Whalley, 2009: 2-9). An economically powerful country has capacity to 
make decisions that benefit itself alone at the same time this country has ability to decrease the 
capacity of other countries that pose threats to its interest. In that respect, since the end of 
WWII, it has been believed that the U.S., as the world’s leading economic power, has played a 
dominant role for identifying and structuring world economic issues, taking measures to deal 
with these issues, organizing and implementing international efforts and enforcing norms, rules, 
and principles to address these issues. However, starting from the end of the 2000s some 
scholars began to argue that the financial crisis of 2007-09 undermined the legacy of this 
success. They think due to the financial crisis the world experienced enormous (power) changes, 
and these (power) changes diminished U.S.’s ability to set the rules and provide solutions for the 
world economic issues. In order words, these scholars claim that after the financial crisis of 
2007-09 the U.S. lost its capacity to influence other countries in line with its own interest. From 
that point, this study scrutinizes four case studies in the following section and finds out whether 
the U.S. experienced an alleged power decline. Put it differently, whether the U.S. has enough 




France and the Breakdown of the Bretton Woods International Monetary System 
          Introduction  
          It is important that after WWII, the U.S., as the world’s largest economic power, took a 
special role to provide norms, rules, and principles of the world economic system in order to 
maintain its dominant position in the system. In that respect, in 1944 the U.S. took a leading role 
in designing foundation of the world’s international monetary system, Bretton Woods system, 
which created the rules, norms and principles for commercial and financial relations among the 
countries.  
          However, on the other hand, France criticized the Bretton Woods international monetary 
system from different perspectives, challenged the U.S. leadership position in the system, 
undermined the confidence of the system and finally played a crucial role in the breakdown of 
the system. 
          From this point, this case study aims to scrutinize the relationship between these two 
powers by focusing on how a war-devastated ‘middle power’ country, France, successfully 
undermined the Bretton Woods international monetary system, which was mostly designed by 
the world’s dominant economic power, the U.S. In the first section, this paper gives a brief 
history of the US-France relations. It is important to examine historical background that could 
provide possible explanation of the French action of challenging the U.S.-designed international 
monetary system. The second section focuses on creation of the Bretton Woods international 
monetary system and tries to find out why the world in the first place needed another monetary 
system at the end of the WWII. The next section examines whether Bretton Woods succeeded 
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and whether it contributed to the world’s economic development. From that point, this paper 
explores who really benefited most from the system and more specifically if the U.S. benefited 
disproportionately from Bretton Woods agreement. In the last section the focus will be on the 
French criticism toward the Bretton Woods system and their actions that effectively weakened 
and helped to accelerate the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system.  
          History of the U.S. & France Relationship  
          Even though there may have several areas of disagreements between France and the U.S., 
the relationship between these two countries has been strong, stable and mutually beneficial 
for both countries since the 18th century.  
          It is important that at the end of the Seven Years’ War in the second half of the 18th 
century France was heavily defeated and expelled from most of its North American lands from 
the British. Due to the bitterness of its humiliating defeat in this war, having lost most of its 
territories in North America and a way to get a retaliation from Britain without involving in 
another direct war with them induced the French to help American colonies for their 
Revolutionary war against Britain. As a result of that, France formed a critical and friendly 
relationship with American colonies by signing treaties of commerce and alliance in the middle 
of the American Revolutionary War. While the treaty of Commerce promoted trade and 
commercial ties between these two countries, the treaty of Alliance created a mutual defense 
between the U.S. and the France against Great Britain (The Library of Congress, 2020). It is 
important that, according to these treaties, neither France nor the U.S. could seek a separate 
peace agreement with Great Britain (The Library of Congress). It is also important that with 
these treaties Kingdom of France was the first country that formally recognized the U.S. as an 
independent nation (U.S. Department of State, 2019).  
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          Starting from the end of the 18th century till the last quarter of the 19th century there were 
several events that put strain on the relationship between these two countries. The undeclared 
Quasi War at the end of the 18th century, the declaration of Napoleon as the Emperor of France, 
his conquest of Europe, depredation of American neutral shipping during the Napoleonic Wars, 
procrastination in payment of indemnities to the U.S. and then election of Andrew Jackson and 
his decision of reprisal of indemnities that were not paid by the French were several events in 
the first half of the 19th century that temporarily raised tensions between these two countries 
(U.S. Department of State, 2019; 2020; McLamore, 1932: 234-235; Thomas, 1976: 51).    
          During the U.S. Civil War, France helped the Confederate forces. The reason behind that 
was to weaken the U.S. power in order to protect its cotton trade in the U.S. and also its large 
investment in Mexico (U.S. Department of State, 2020). Beside that France took advantages of 
the U.S. Civil War and placed Austrian archduke of Habsburg on the throne in Mexico. However, 
the U.S. did not recognize the new government in Mexico and increased its pressure for France 
to withdraw its forces from there (Library of Congress, 1997).  
          After the fall of Napoleon III in the middle of the second half of the 19th century the 
relationship between France and the U.S. started to develop again. However, it was important 
that there was a significant change on countries’ power. The events after the U.S. Civil War, such 
as the expulsion of French from Mexico, the withdrawal of the Great Britain from Canada and 
the purchase of Alaska from Russia made the U.S. only dominant power in the continent. In 
addition to that, the U.S. went through a big economic transformation. The rapid technological 
innovation and large-scale agriculture production in the late 19th century accelerated economic 
growth in the U.S. In sum, from Civil war to the end of the 19th century U.S.’s relative share of 
world wealth boosted from 15 percent to over 35 percent (Singer and Small, 1993: 60-71). 
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Meanwhile, France was experiencing a serious stagnation. Its economic power was in decline 
compared to the U.S. and all other major power at the end of this century. France’s relative 
share of world wealth declined from 12 percent in 1860s to 8 percent at the end of the century 
(Singer and Small). There was an economic growth in France from the beginning of the new 
century to the WWI, however, it was too little too late. France became very dependent on 
American supplies and financial assistance when WWI started. During the war American support 
to France was incalculable. It was clear that without the U.S. support the victory would not have 
been possible for France (Lloyd, 2014). During this period, France acted like a privileged ally of 
the U.S. France would able to ask for anything and obtain everything from the U.S. 
          It was important that France was one of the victors of the WWI; however, at the end of the 
war, France was much needier and much poorer than Central Powers. During the war, France 
had suffered millions of causalities and borrowed heavily especially from the U.S. Large part of 
France were devastated and economic growth declined substantially. The huge cost of the war 
crucially weakened the financial structure of France. Therefore, French thought that the country 
should never experience anything like that in the future. From that point, France’s main goal 
was that Germany as the only cause of the war should not be able to rise again. Thus, France 
aggressively engaged in diminishing German military, economic powers, and its capabilities. On 
the other hand, the U.S.’s aim was to integrate Germany into the world economic and political 
community as an equal partner.  
          These two completely conflicting views created tension between the U.S. and France. 
Other than that, there were some other issues such as President Wilson’s 14-points proposal for 
the World peace and prosperity, the U.S. senate’s decision that refused to ratify the League of 
Nations treaty, the problem of France’s huge war debts and the U.S.’s demand on repayment of 
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its bonds in full, on the other hand, American financial assistance to Germany which allowed 
that country to pay for reparations, French insistence on building a strong Poland that annexed 
some German land in order to create hostility between these two countries and their desire for 
establishing an European army that watch and keep Germany down added more pressure to the 
U.S.-France relationship (National Archives, 2020; U.S. Senate, 2020; BBC, 2011; Reinhart and 
Trebesch, 2014: 23-24).  
          It is important that in the early interwar years the U.S. became the de facto economic and 
financial center of the world (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 1989: 433). On the other hand, 
France and its economy were devastated due to loss of labor and infrastructure in WWI. France 
accounted for only 5 percent of world total wealth at the end of WWI (Singer and Small). It was 
crucial that as a victorious nation of the Great War, France, seemed unable to create solutions 
for the political and economic problems of the world. From that point, France, in these years, 
found itself playing a lower level role in the world politics. The Great Depression in the early 
1930s brought many other serious economic and financial problems to this country. In addition 
to that, political crisis just worsened the overall situation. The country torn apart; governments 
fell one after another. French public were deeply divided. On the one hand, far right parties 
supported Mussolini, Franco and Hitler, on the other hand, communist party praised Stalin 
(Embassy of France in Washington D.C., 2015). Meanwhile nationalist became pacifist due to the 
fear of communism (Embassy of France in Washington D.C.). French Third Republic was in a 
serious crisis in the 1930s that made France changed its primary concern from a German 
invasion to a possibility of a civil war. During this time American influence in France which had 
started decades ago reached its peak. From that perspective, France desperately looked for help 




Figure 1. Relative Share of the World Wealth (1830-1940) 
Source: J. David Singer, and Melvin Small. (1993). National Material Capabilities Data, 1816-1985. Ann Arbor, MI: 
ICPSR. 1993. Note: Singer and Small take state’s mobilizable wealth (which refers to economic resources) and 
technological development as indicators of state power. They agree that GNP is probably the most commonly used 
indicator of state’s wealth. However, they think that GNP does not capture important differences in the mobilize 
wealth (economic resources) and technological sophistication of different states (62-63).  
          After WWII, Americans were welcome as a liberating force by France. The prestige of the 
U.S. was at its peak in France after the victory. During the early Cold War period the main goal of 
France was to secure itself from the German threat by keeping Germany down. Americans, on 
the other hand, decided to build up Germany, at least, the part of Germany they controlled. The 
U.S. also wanted to integrate Germany into the Western world. According to Americans, French 
policy of holding Germany down forever would eventually push this country to Soviet camp 
(Creswell and Trachtenger, 2003: 5-7). France had little choice in this manner. At the beginning 
very reluctantly and then increasingly inclined to accept the strategy that the U.S. promoted. 
French realized that with this strategy Germany integrate into the Western political system 
which would automatically limit Germany’s freedom of action. Besides that, if Germany stayed 
divided between east and west, and if Russian forces remained in the eastern part of the 
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which would provide France security not just against the Soviets, but also against Germany 
(Creswell and Trachtenger, 15).  
          However, it was important that the memories of the war were still in people’s mind in 
France and anti-German feelings were strong. In that respect, even though France officials 
embraced this strategy they wanted to proceed carefully, slowly, and cautiously.  
          Creation of German military unit was another important issue area in the early Cold War 
era. It was important that Americans were worried that entire Europe would eventually fall into 
Soviet camp if Western powers did not act on time for creating a defense bloc against Soviet 
Russia (Condit, 1996: 191-204). According to Americans, Western Germany would be an 
important part of their defense bloc (Condit). Therefore, the U.S. insisted on rearmament of the 
West Germany within the framework of an integrated European defense force. On the other 
hand, France tried to hold back that plan largely for their domestic political reasons, and instead 
of rejecting this plan they offered an alternative plan of their own which was a creation of highly 
integrated European Army. However, it is crucial that a few years after its proposal, the French 
government rejected its own plan and accepted American plan. From France’s standpoint they 
understood that the U.S.’s western defense force, NATO, plan made sense. According to them, 
integration of West Germany into the NATO with its limited power would pose no threat to 
France, and on the other hand, with this way West Germany could contribute to the defense of 
the West against the Soviet threats (Creswell and Trachtenger: 24-26).  
61 
 
          It was highly crucial that during this era France seemed incapable of following a firm and 
consistent policy against the U.S. The declining power of this country was the main reason of 
that. France became much weaker than previous times that could only be classified as a middle 
power country. From that point, France was rarely likely to get its way for most of international 
issue. On the other hand, the U.S. rose as the dominant economic power and one of the two 
military superpowers of the world. Like in other cases for rearming the West Germany and 
creating the western defense force, NATO, the Americans was holding all the cards and 
eventually got what they wanted.  
 
Figure 2. Share of World GDP 
(1950-1970) 
Source: World Bank (2020), St 
Louis Federal Reserve Bank 
(2019). Note: Nominal GDP is 
used for measuring countries’ 
share of world GDP.  
          However, it was 
quite important that 
starting from the end of 
the 1950s and throughout the 1960s France was able to pursue completely different policy 
which was much more stable and persistent than its previous policies. This policy was basically 
against the U.S. designed international monetary system which is also known as the Bretton 
Woods international monetary system.  
          Bretton Woods International Monetary System 
          In its peak of the WWII Allied power governments decided to establish an international 
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economic policies of countries in the interwar period. These weaknesses (beggar-thy-neighbor 
trade strategy, unstable exchange rate policies, protectionism, and incompatible national 
monetary principles) were considered as the main contributors of the Great Depression, and 
many other economic and financial downturns all around the world that led countries by that 
time to WWII. In the middle of the 1940s the new international monetary system (Bretton 
Woods) was established. It is important to know that contrary to its name, Bretton Woods 
international monetary system did not only include countries’ monetary policies. It also covered 
their economic and financial policies. Two institutions International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) later known as the World 
Bank also created under this system.  
          Bretton Woods international monetary system very much resembled the gold exchange 
standard system in the pre and interwar period. However, it was concentrated on dollar. In this 
system, the U.S. declared par value of its currency as $35 per ounce and all other countries 
declare par value of their currencies in terms of dollars (Bordo, 1993: 49). Declaring a par value 
was important. Because member countries had to exchange their own currencies for gold or 
convertible currency if other countries that held their currency requested it. In this exchange, 
countries used their declared par value. With this way, countries established a fixed relationship 
among their national currencies. It is crucial that in Bretton Woods system countries could 
change their declared par value only within a narrow margin which was plus or minus of no 
more than 1 percent of point (Simard, Bordo and White, 1994). However, in case of 
fundamental disequilibrium countries were able to adjust (revalue or devalue) their parities. 
But, even in this case before adjusting their currencies, countries had to have IMF’s permission.  
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          It is important that in order to prevent external financial and economic difficulties, which 
created serious disequilibrium problems for its members, IMF could provide financial assistance 
from its funds. That means, member countries had not relied on specific mutual support 
agreements among central banks like in the previous monetary system of the interwar period 
(Truman, 2017: 5).  
          On the other hand, the Bretton Woods monetary system required its member countries to 
remove their restrictions on current account. Member countries had to permit inflow and 
outflow of goods and services (export-import). However, the system allowed them to maintain 
their controls on capital accounts such as foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and 
loans from foreign governments (Helleiner, 1994: 47-48; Ghosh and Qureshi, 2016: 4-5). The 
reason behind that was the huge speculative movements of money which had undermined the 
currency stabilities of countries in the previous period (Helleiner, 25-33).  
          Besides that, member countries in this monetary system accepted some obligations that 
restricted their discretion. Bretton Woods institutions used surveillance over its member 
countries’ economic, financial, and monetary policies. A member country that in external 
financial problems could receive some financial support from the funds only if this country 
adopted adequate fiscal and monetary policies to correct its underlying economic problems, 
also if this country’s policies had very little adverse economic effects on other member countries 
(International Monetary Fund, IMF, 2020).  
          It is important that it took more than a decade for Bretton Woods international monetary 
system to fully operated. It was also important that even though all its planning and designing 
stages the system lasted a little more than a decade (1959-1971). However, it made some 
significant changes in the world economic and financial environments.  
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          Benefit of the Bretton Woods System      
          The system was relatively successful and contributed a lot to development of the world 
free trade. During the era of the Bretton Woods system, the world economy experienced a rapid 
GDP growth from about $1 trillion in 1959 to $3.3 trillion in 1971 (World Bank, 2020). Besides 
that, world industrial production grew significantly, and real exchange rates were mostly 
stabilized. There was a high level of capital mobility, especially between the U.S. and Europe, 
that helped to increase investment and financial integration among countries (Morawetz, 
1977:11-22). A high level of capital mobility and overall economic prosperity substantially 
increased trade. On the other hand, Bretton Woods institution’s IMF served as agency that set 
the rules for discouraging opportunistic behaviors of countries, coordinating transition to 
stability, and increasing confidence in the system. Likewise, another Bretton Woods institution, 
GATT, reduced tariff, and regulated international trade. Cooperation between governments and 
countries’ financial institutions increased during this period. Countries tried to find solutions for 
their problems even in the troubled times. On the other hand, dominance of the U.S. assured 
confidence in the system especially during the early years.  
          Who Benefit the most from Bretton Woods System  
          However, it is important that other than providing confidence to the Bretton Woods 
system, there were many factors that brought generous benefits to the U.S. First of all, the U.S. 
dollar was the reserve currency and the U.S. was the currency provider of the system. This is 
because of the U.S. was the only country at the end of the WWII that was prepared to exchange 
its currency into gold at the request of other countries. Due to that role, the Bretton Woods 
system provided a substantial seigniorage right to the U.S. at the expense of other countries. 
With that privilege, the U.S. was able to print money and send it abroad in huge amount without 
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the fear of inflation and devaluation. However, it is important that the seigniorage right works 
only if other countries are willing to accept and add to the dollars they already held in their 
reserves. The U.S. was able to finance its balance of payment deficit by its seigniorage right 
(Eichengreen, 2011: 3-4, 117-118). With this right, the U.S. made massive investment, built 
many military bases, and expanded its influence all around the world.  
          Moreover, due to its currency role in the world the U.S. had a huge flexibility for deciding 
its fiscal and monetary policies. The U.S. was able to determine its rate of monetary or fiscal 
growth with its substantial freedom; however, other countries, given their commitment to peg 
the value of their currency to the dollar, would have to adjust their monetary and fiscal growth 
in order to stabilize the exchange rate. Therefore, when the U.S. changed its monetary or fiscal 
policies, there would be serious spillover effects on financial stabilities in other countries. For 
example, if the U.S. used expansionary policies, that would create inflationary pressure in other 
countries. Thus, other countries had to decide what they would do with their surplus dollars, 
whether they hold it as reserve, or they request conversion of their dollars into gold.  
          France’s Actions and the Breakdown of the Bretton Woods System 
          The position of the U.S. in the Bretton Woods international monetary system helped this 
country to maintain its economic hegemony over the world until the late 1950s and other 
countries could not resist that. However, starting from the late 1950s and especially in the 1960s 
there was a country that took the leading role of opposing the position of the U.S. in the world 
monetary system. This country was France.  
          France criticized the extraordinary position of the U.S. (as a currency provider) in the 
Bretton Woods system. French officials thought that due to this extraordinary position American 
corporations made huge investment in the world especially in Western Europe, and American 
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government created numerous military bases and launched many military operations all around 
the world (Simard, Bordo and White, 1994). Moreover, French officials believed that this 
position allowed the U.S. to fund its balance of payments deficit without making any substantial 
adjustment. They thought financing account deficit by simply issuing money was the way of 
exporting inflation to the rest of the world (Bordo, 2017:15-17). French government strongly 
criticized these and launched a nationalistic policy that deliberately converting their dollars 
holdings into gold in order to undermine confidence in the dollar and challenge the Bretton 
Woods international monetary system. With that policy French officials aimed to reduce 
American political and economic dominance position in Europe and also in the world.  From 
many points, French policy of threating the Bretton Woods system was somehow successful. 
The system faced serious difficulties in the second half of the 1960s and finally it collapsed in 
1971 when President Nixon cut the link between the dollar and gold.  
          However, it should be pointed out that the French influence was very weak during the 
establishment and the early years of the Bretton Woods international monetary system. For 
example, France officials and intellectuals did not offer any plan of their own in the Bretton 
Woods conference in New Hampshire. They simply supported the U.S.-U.K. plan as a final 
agreement. This was because the French economy was experiencing serious internal and 
external imbalances that restrained France from playing a major role for contributing and 
designing the world’s next monetary system in this period.  
          France created its own plan in the late 1950s that put the gold at the center of the world 
monetary system. From that point, French version of monetary system could be interpreted as 
an initial phase toward a return to an international gold standard. However, this proposal was 
mostly neglected by reserve countries. At the end of the 1950s, French government started to 
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convert its dollar reserves into gold in order to reduce American gold reserves and weaken 
confidence in the dollar. World Gold Council (WGC) and World Bank financial statistics stated 
that France increased its gold reserves from 516 metric tons in 1957 to 1458 metric tons in 
1960. It is important that most of these golds were purchased from the U.S. Treasury (World 
Bank, WGC, 1999). Thus, in the same period the U.S. gold reserved declined from 20312 metric 
tons to 15822 tons (IMF and WGC). A year later in 1961 there was a disagreement between 
France and reserve countries about expanding IMF’s resources. French government thought 
that there is no shortage of IMF’s resources. They believed 
providing limitless source of reserves to nations in 
difficulties would weaken balancing budget principle of the 
Bretton Woods system (Dale, 1961).  
 
Table 1 U.S. and U.K Balance of Payments 
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. (2020). U.K. Office for National 
Statistics. (2020).  
From that point, France specifically focused on the size and persistence of the U.S. balance of 
payments deficit. French officials in the early 1960s warned reserve countries, the U.S. and the 
U.K., for their huge balance of payments deficit. They believed that due to huge budget deficit of 
the U.S., the world experiences a generalized inflation. From that point, France criticized the 
international monetary system from several points. First of all, French officials asserted that 
Bretton Woods monetary system had no effective institution to control balance of payments 
deficit. French officials also thought that there was an asymmetry between reserve countries 
which could easily finance their deficit by printing money and other countries that that had no 
such a right. From this point France made a proposal for a reform of Bretton Woods monetary 
system; however, this proposal was rejected by the U.S. 
















Figure 3. Gold 
Reserves from 
1957 to 1971 
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Source: World 
Bank (2020) and 
World Gold 
Council (1999) 
          
Meanwhile, 
French continued to convert its dollar holdings into gold. Gold made more than 73 percent of 
French reserves at the end of 1964 (Simard, Bordo and White). The next year when French 
reform proposal was rejected by the U.S. they retaliated that by increasing their gold reserved 
from 3314 metric tons to 4182 tons (WGC). With that rise, gold accounted for 86 percent of the 
French reserves (New York Times, 1966). Besides that, several high ranking French official 
include French President de Gaulle aggressively attacked the existing monetary system and 
discussed the probability of retuning to a gold standard system.  
          The clash between the French and American views was intensified in the middle of the 
1960s. French decided to drop their support for composite reserve unit (CRU) and increased its 
gold reserves. It was clear for many countries in the middle of the 1960s that official dollar 
liabilities held by foreign countries exceeded that of the U.S. monetary gold stock (Triffin 
Dilemma) (Bordo 2020: 198-200). From that point the U.S. began to worry about the French 
action of constantly converting its dollars into gold could be followed by other countries that 
eventually reduce the U.S. gold stock to a point that lead to a run. It was important that there 
were many signs that, this was already happening. More and more countries started to convert 
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falling since 1957. By that time the U.S. became fearful that a serious loss of gold reserves would 
carry the risk of undermining confidence and encouraging speculation not for the U.S. currency 
but also for the overall Bretton Woods international monetary system. From that point, the U.S. 
Treasury developed policies that include many controls and policies in order to decrease balance 
of payments deficits and discourage conversion of dollars into gold. The U.S. officials had put 
many of these controls and restrictions into effect even in the early 1960s. For example, U.S. 
government encouraged export by subsidizing loans from the Export-Import Bank in order to 
increase dollar inflow as early as 1960. Besides that, the U.S. government reduced its defense 
and non-defense government purchases abroad, asked banks and other financial institutions to 
curtail their overseas lending, increased taxes on foreign earnings of U.S. corporations, and 
reduced allowance for tourist purchases abroad. These early actions were able to decrease 
capital outflow and increase capital inflow; however, it provided just temporarily short-term 
solution. Problem would have returned when the control and restrictions eased or removed.  
          From that point, the U.S. Treasury introduced several measures in order to provide more 
concrete and stable solutions that encourage capital inflows and prevent foreign officials from 
converting their dollars into gold. The creation of the Gold Pool was one of these measures in 
the early 1960s. Eight countries in that organization pooled some of their gold reserves in order 
to prevent a rise in the free market price of gold which led to a run on the U.S. gold stock 
(Bordo, 1993: 56). Another action was the Reciprocal Credit Agreement which also called “swap” 
agreement that the U.S. signed with each major Western country. This agreement allowed 
Federal Reserve Bank of the U.S. to borrow other countries’ currency in time of need. With this 
agreement the U.S. increased its banks’ access to affordable financing and maintained liquidity 
without selling any of its gold reserves. Moreover, Roosa Bond allowed the U.S. to borrow other 
countries’ currency that could be used instead of gold when a country wanted to convert its 
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dollars into gold (Bordo). Besides that, lending facilities of IMF were expanded under General 
Agreement to Borrow (GAB). Member countries that were in economic crisis used these 
expanded resources instead of applying the U.S. to borrow money which increase the U.S. 
capital outflow. The U.S. issued an “interest equalization tax” that imposed a tax in foreign loans 
which also aimed to reduce capital outflow (Langer and Schwartz, 1965: 42). Meanwhile the U.S. 
monetary officials used a policy that called “operation twist” for strengthening dollar and 
stimulating capital inflows. In this policy Federal Reserve sold short-term treasury bills to raise 
short-term interest rates for encouraging capital inflows; at the same time, the U.S. Treasury 
bought long-term debt to lower long-term interest rates and attract investment (Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2011). Another long-term plan was to issue composite reserve 
unit (CRU). Under this plan the U.S. and other members placed some of its currency to a pool 
and received a related amount of CRU’s that could be used as equivalent to gold. An extension 
of the CRU was special drawing right (SDR) which also operated as an addition to the existing 
money reserves of member countries. This was because the gold was not sufficient to support 
growth in global trade and financial transactions in the second half of the 1960s. SDR was not a 
real currency; however, member countries used it as a real currency and traded their SDRs 
between each other.  
          Most of these policies, controls and restrictions relatively helped the U.S. to protects its 
gold reserves, at the same time they encouraged capital inflows and reduced balance of 
payment deficit until the middle of the 1960s. However, France on the other hand, opposed 
many of these policies. For example, they dropped their support for CRU, pulled themselves out 
of Gold Pool, opposed creating an international currency reserve unit, followed uncooperative 
policies that merely put France in an isolated position many times, and some other times 
convinced other common market countries to go along with them in order to put pressure on 
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U.S. for a reform in the system. Besides that, numerous French officials including finance 
minister and president used hard bargaining line by making contradictory statements for the 
international monetary system which created a confidence problem inside the system and 
contributed to serious speculative attack against dollar. France kept systematically converting 
their dollar reserve into gold. Late in the 1960s France seemed to not use this policy explicitly. It 
was crucial that by that time there was a high possibility that French government used other 
countries’ central bank to convert its dollars reserves into gold at the New York Federal Reserve. 
Countries in the Northern Africa, especially Algeria and Libya which were heavily dominated by 
France, had the highest demands for converting their dollars holdings into gold by that time. 
Algeria increased its gold reserves from $5.7 million in 1966 to $156 million in 1967 and $245 
million in 1968 (World Bank, 2020). From the same point, (before Gaddafi) Libya boosted its 
gold reserves to $102 million in 1968 from $2 million in 1966 (World Bank). However, French 
authorities denied these claims.  
 
Figure 4. Algeria and Libya Gold Reserves from 
1965 to 1969 
Source: World Bank and World Gold Council 
(2020)  
 
          It was important that world 
economy became more turbulent in the 
second half of the 1960s. Inflation rate increased steeply in the U.S. after Kennedy and Johnson 
administration monetary and fiscal policies. When these policies met with growing gold scarcity 
it created a situation that increased speculations in the financial market and undermined the 


























U.K. experienced serious balance of payments deficit. In order to improve its economic 
situation, the British planned to join into the European Common Market. However, French 
prepared two conditions for British membership. The first condition, it said that the British had 
to drop sterling as an international reserve currency and second condition French insisted that 
British had to achieve equilibrium in their international balance of payments (Simard, Bordo and 
White). From that point, it was important that France persuaded other European Community 
(EC) countries for supporting its policies against Britain. Besides that, a combination of domestic 
and overseas events such as Arab-Israeli Six-Day War, closure of Suez Canal, rise in oil and other 
commodity prices, increased tension with China after British embassy attacked in Beijing, riots in 
Hong Kong, civil war in Nigeria, British withdrawal from Aden and weathered support of the U.S. 
for British economy created a situation that force the sterling parity be changed. Therefore, at 
the end of 1967 British currency was devalued from $2.80 to $2.40 (House of Common Library, 
2017).  
         In the aftermath of the sterling devaluation French reinforced their pressure for a reform in 
the Bretton Woods system. This situation increased speculative attack to the system, at the 
same time it set off a huge wave of buying gold from the market. From that point, main reserve 
currency, dollar, started to weaken. There were various reasons that explain the depreciation of 
dollar. First of all, devaluation of the British pound sterling as the second reserve currency in the 
Bretton Woods system meant that the devaluation of dollar could be the next. Besides that, 
both countries (the U.S. and the U.K.) had been running balance of payments deficit. Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations in the U.S. and labor party in the U.K. had used expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policies and both countries had been reluctant to take severe measures for 
restraining inflationary pressure in their economies. From that point, in the eyes of foreign 
authorities two countries were the same. If one failed, other would follow. It is also important 
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that in order to provide support for the pound sterling, the U.S. had led international initiatives 
by that time which strengthened the sense of the dollar increasingly linked to the credibility of 
the pound sterling. Eventually, sterling crisis increased speculation on the gold-dollar parity. Due 
to that, the Gold Pool which established for stabilizing price of gold at $35 was collapse at the 
end of the 1960s. The end of Gold Pool provoked the creation of a two-tier gold market (Bordo, 
Monnet, Naef, 2017: 2). This new situation seriously threatened gold-dollar convertibility on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, it mounted speculative pressure for the overall system. After 
all these speculative pressures, the U.S. abandoned its commitment to peg the dollar to gold. In 
other words, the U.S. destroyed the foundation of the gold-dollar exchange system. With this 
end, the U.S. lost its privileged positions and lost its leadership position in the international 
monetary system.  
          It is very essential that France played a crucial role in the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
international monetary system. Except few periods including the one in the early 20th century, 
the French economy was in constant decline compared to not only U.S. but also all other major 
countries. France became far more dependent on U.S. assistance during WWI. After the war, the 
French economy was on the verge of collapse. In the interwar years, the Great Depression and 
serious domestic political crises made the situation even worse for France. From that point, the 
country was unable to create any policy for the world’s economic and political problems. Thus, it 
is not surprising that France was in desperate need of U.S. assistance when WWII started. After 
the war, France became much weaker than previous times and ranked as a middle power 
country. During the early post-war period France seemed incapable of following solid and stable 
policies to get its way for most of international issues. However, it is quite important that 
starting in the second half of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s France, as a middle power 
country, followed completely different policies against U.S. designed international monetary 
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system that included aggressively, purposely and systematically converting its dollars holding 
into gold that aimed to deplete the stock of the U.S. gold reserves and reduce the capacity of 
the U.S. to support its currency in circulation in order to undermine U.S. economic leadership 
position in the world. It was important that after many years of steady and consistent effort 
France successfully challenged the U.S. leadership role in the international economic regime by 
playing a major role in the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system.  
          In total, this case raises the question that whether the U.S. power was in decline in this 
period. According to many power definitions, an economically powerful country has capacity to 
make decision that benefit itself, at the same time it has ability to decrease the capacity of other 
countries that intend to reduce its benefit and challenge its leadership position (Organski 1968; 
Nye 1990; Baldwin 1979; Whalley 2009). However, in this case that did not happen, even though 
France’s policies ultimately hurt U.S. interests, and upended the system that constructed by the 
U.S. which was the world’s dominant economic power. From that perspective, it can be said that 
in the post-industrial world there is no country in the world that has ability to get what it’s want 
on every issues. In order words, the U.S.’s inaction against France does not necessarily mean 
that the U.S. power was in decline by that time. Following cases would help us to understand 
more about this theme.  
 
                                         The Oil Crisis and the Role of Saudi Arabia  
          Despite major social, economic, political, and cultural differences between Saudi Arabia 
and the U.S., these two countries were able to overlook their differences and establish a 
mutually beneficial relationship in general. After three decades of struggling, King Abdul Aziz Al 
Saud was able to unify the Arabian Peninsula and proclaimed the independence of Saudi Arabia 
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in 1932 (Embassy of the Kingdom of the Saudi Arabia, 2020). However, the U.S. at that time had 
no interest and had no official representation in this country. On the other hand, King Abdul Aziz 
Al Saud (Ibn Saud) was very willing to establish full diplomatic relationship with the U.S. In order 
to build stronger relationship, Ibn Saud granted a concession to a U.S. oil company, Standard Oil 
of California, to explore for oil in the Saudi Arabian lands (Sorkhabi, 2018). Not even a decade 
later, when the rich oil resources were found for the first time in this country, the relationship 
between the Saudi Arabia and the U.S. strengthened.  
          Until WWII, the relationship between these two countries grew gradually. It is important 
that during WWII some of Saudi’s oil facilities were bombed by Axis powers, which made Saudis 
look for closer relationship with the U.S. On the other hand, the U.S. by that time began to 
realize the importance of oil, more specifically the importance of Saudi oil. The U.S. petroleum 
companies by that time urged the president to accept more liability for security and political 
stability of Saudi Arabia (Metz, 1992). From that point, in 1945 Saudi’s King Abdul Aziz Al Saud 
and the U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt met for the first time in their countries’ history. In 
this meeting King Abdul Aziz allowed the U.S. military to use Saudis’ air space and also build 
airfields in Saudi Arabia in order to protect oil facilities from possible attacks and also secure the 
region against Marxists and nationalist/revolutionist movements which posed a direct threat to 
the Saudi monarchy (Beauchamp, 2016). Meanwhile due to the threat of communism after the 
end of the WWII, the U.S. planned a strategy, containment, that prevent the spread of 
communism in many parts of the world included Arabic peninsula. From that point, because of 
its important geographic location and its world’s richest oil reserves, the security of Saudi Arabia 
became one of the top priorities for the U.S. President Truman formally assured King Ibn Saud 
about his country’s political stability and territorial integrity was a primary objective of the U.S. 
(U.S. Department of State, Office of Historian, 2020). A few years later, the U.S. expanded their 
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initial relationship with Saudis into a more stronger security alliance and signed a mutual 
defense assistance agreement in 1951 with Saudi Arabia (U.S. Department of State, 1952: 1460-
1462).  
          In 1953, King Abdul Aziz died and his son Saud became the new King of Saudis. Meanwhile 
President Eisenhower revised the U.S.’s anti-communist alliance strategy. This new anti-Soviet 
strategy turned some of the Saudis’ regional rivals and enemies such as Iran and Iraq into 
important players for the U.S. Saudis displayed their displeasure with this new strategy by 
replacing U.S. forces with pro-Soviet Egyptian forces in the middle of the 1950s. However, a few 
years later when the Suez crisis broke out Saudis changed their previous policy and began to 
cooperate with the U.S. again. The U.S.’s opposition to the French-British-Israeli plan of seizing 
the Suez Canal played important role on Saudis’ decision to improve relationship with the U.S. 
King Saud of Saudi Arabia interpreted this policy as the U.S.’s opposition to Israelis plan and 
giving the land back to Arabs. However, the U.S.’s real intention of opposing this plan was 
because of the high possibility of increasing Soviet influence in this region if Britain-France and 
Israel seized the Suez Canal (U.S. National Security Agencies, 1988: 8-12). 
          At the end of the 1950s Saudis once again approached to pro-Soviet alliance after the 
Egypt and Syria united their power to form United Arab Republic in 1958. Nevertheless, few 
years later when the Yemeni revolution started, Saudi used anti-revolution policies in order to 
curb this movement. King Saud predicted that revolutionary feelings could reach Saudi Arabia if 
it succeeded in Yemen (Ferris, 2016). On the other hand, Egypt strongly supported 
revolutionists. In the early 1960s, Egyptian forces started to attack Saudi Arabia from its bases in 
Yemen due to Saudis anti-revolutionary interventions (Rugh, 2015: 140-141). After these attacks 
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Saudi desperately sought the U.S. support. By that time, U.S. responded Saudis’ request urgently 
by sending several war planes to the region (Public Broadcasting Service, PBS, 2014).  
          When the conflict ended before the middle of the 1960s Prince Faisal forced his brother 
King Saud to abdicate in his favor to become the new king. King Faisal strongly rejected to have 
any relations with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, except the 1967 Arab oil embargo which 
was imposed on some Western countries including the U.S. during and after the third Arab-
Israeli war, he established close relationship with the West especially with the U.S. Even though 
there were many accusations of his pro-American foreign policies, he continued to cooperate 
with the U.S. and remained a strong ally of the U.S. until 1973.  
          Oil Embargo 
          In October 1973, Arab oil producing countries led by Saudi Arabia cut their oil production 
and imposed an oil embargo against the U.S. and some other western countries in retaliation for 
their support to Israel during the Arab-Israeli War, also known as the October War or Yom 
Kippur War. Due to embargo and oil production cuts the average oil price of crude petroleum 
first doubled and then quadrupled (from $2.90 per barrel to $11.65) in a few months that 
created serious structural challenges to stability of the U.S. economy (Corbett, 2013).  
 
 
Figure 5 Price of Crude Oil from 
1960 to 1976 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank 
of St Louis, FRED. 2020 
This embargo and high oil 
prices came as a shock to 
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the U.S. Because the October War or Yom Kippur War was not the first war between Arabs and 
Israelis and from the same perspective the embargo of 1973 was not the first oil embargo that 
was imposed on the U.S. and Western world.  
          There were three Arab-Israeli wars (first in 1948 when Arab countries attacked Israel after 
Israel announced its independence in 1948, second in 1956 when Israel attacked Egypt after 
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nassar seized and nationalized the Suez Canal, and finally in 
1967 when Israel launched an air strike to Egypt and its allies after years of diplomatic tension 
between Israel and Arabs) before the October war and there were four oil crises (first in 1948 
during the first Arab-Israel war, second in 1951-53 when Iranian prime minister Mohammed 
Mosaddegh nationalized Iranian oil industry, third in 1956 during the Suez Canal crisis, and 
fourth in 1967 during the third Arab-Israeli war) before the oil crisis of 1973. None of these 
initial cases contributed to significant economic setback in the U.S. also in the Western world 
like the one in 1973. From that point, it is important to know that this embargo and oil 
production cut coincided with many other factors in the U.S. such as declining domestic oil 
production, rising oil import, growing dependence on foreign oil, devaluation of the U.S. 
currency, rising consumer prices and national debt and declining employment in the U.S. in the 
first half of the 1970s and caused the U.S. to experience the worst economic recession in 1973-
75 since the Great Depression. 
          The effects of the Saudi-led oil embargo of 1973-74 on the U.S. economy were disastrous. 
First of all, high oil prices weakened the consumer confidence in the U.S. and made them spend 
less on goods and services. On the other hand, due to high oil prices and lower consumer 
demand producers reduced their production significantly. In sum, oil embargo decreased U.S.’s 
economic growth by approximately 2.5 percent (Verrastro and Caruso, 2013). It is important 
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that under the embargo, the Nixon administration extended its wage-price control policy of 
1971. An initial 3 months control policy turned into almost 3 years of policy. During this period 
companies were forced to keep wages high. Due to high wages companies could not reduce 
their production costs. Consequently, they could not lower their prices to stimulate overall 
demand. In order to survive companies laid off workers which increased the unemployment 
number over 7 percent by that time (Bryan, 2013). In addition to that, government price control, 
which planned to maintain oil affordability, created even higher oil shortages in the markets. 
When the price control was dismantled the results were devastating. The oil shortage and high 
oil prices had widespread effect on commodities throughout the economy which created a 
serious inflationary pressure. The consumer price index rose above 10 percent in 1974 (Bryan). 
Meanwhile, the Federal Reserve tried to control inflation and stimulate economic growth or 
decrease unemployment at the same time by using stop-and-go monetary policies. Due to Fed 
stop-and-go policies companies in the U.S. lost their confidence for the future. In order to 
survive these companies simply reduced their cost by laying off employees which worsening the 
overall economy. 
          Besides that, embargo brought up new challenges to the U.S. designed world economic 
and political system. First of all, the embargo led to significant increase in prices of goods and 
services in the world. High inflation slowed down the world economic activities. The world 
economic growth declined to 4 percent annually after the embargo which was 5.1 percent 
before the crisis (The Washington Post, 1978). The rise in the world oil prices created big 
account surpluses for oil-exporting countries; however, these surpluses mostly deposited in 
Western banks for lending out to oil-importing developing countries in order to finance their 
energy imports. High oil prices increased these countries' budget deficit/debt which contributed 
to deteriorate their overall economic situation. Eventually these countries aggregated, 
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nonaligned movement, in the U.N. and passed a resolution that demanding the creation of a 
new international economic order in which included a series of economic reforms such as more 
equitable distribution of resources, a greater share of benefits derived from the exploitation of 
southern resources, preferred trade agreements with developed countries, a more 
comprehensive approach to third world countries’ debt relief and a more sustainable solution 
for economic development of the third world countries (Karunanayake, 1976: 111-118). From 
that perspective, there was a serious challenge to U.S. designed international economic order 
from the Third World Countries. On the other hand, economic downturn also had serious 
impacts on developed countries which were highly dependent on export revenues for their 
economic growth. Price rise of oil caused a serious inflation of other goods in the world which 
led to a low demand for imports by developing countries. Before the embargo and high oil 
prices, developed countries’ economic growth was around 6 percent annually; however, after 
the embargo it decreased to 4 percent (Giovanni, 2014: 15-16). In addition to that, many 
developed countries’ unemployment number severely increased due to high oil prices.  
          From that point, many countries tried to rise against the embargo and Arabs or more 
specifically Saudi’s monopoly over oil; however, by that time they were too reliant on the 
imported oil. They felt that high oil prices and oil shortage created a very high level of economic 
uncertainty which posed a serious threat to their economic security. The overall situation put 
pressure on these countries which later turned into a tension between the U.S. and its allies and 
eventually made these countries to reexamine their alliance with the U.S. Most of these 
countries believed that the high oil prices and oil shortage in the world was the result of U.S. 
pro-Israeli foreign policies (Hughes, 2008: 3-4, 32-34; Licklider, 1988: 216-218). Besides that, 
during the oil embargo Saudi-led Arab governments classified Western countries as they support 
or oppose to Arab position in the Arab-Israeli conflict and used their policies toward these 
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countries accordingly. From that point, in order to get different treatment from oil producing 
countries especially from Saudi Arabia some Western countries and Japan reconsidered their 
relationship with the U.S. Some of them shifted their policies remarkably and disassociated 
themselves from U.S. pro-Israeli foreign policies. For example, Britain refused to allow the U.S. 
to use British bases in U.K. and Cyprus for its airlift to resupply Israel (Licklider, 212). Other 
European countries also turned down many U.S. requests and distanced themselves from it. 
Even Canada after the embargo imposed on some countries, they quickly moved to pro-Arab 
position and shifted their voting practices in the U.N. even though their Middle Eastern oil 
dependence by that time was extremely low (213-14). It is important that some developed 
countries such as Japan moved ahead and almost broke off diplomatic relationship with Israel 
(Stork, 1974: 7).  
          In all, under the embargo many former U.S. allies started to use more independent policies 
in order to get friendlier treatment from the oil producing countries. From that point, it is 
important that Saudi’s led oil embargo of 1973-74 undermined the U.S. power in terms of 
influencing behavior of other countries in line with its own interest. The consequences of this 
embargo seriously challenged the U.S. position in the world by undermining the country’s 
confidence. It is important that there have been very few events in the U.S. history such as the 
Saudi led embargo of 1973-74 that produced deep, significant, and enduring economic, political, 
and social consequences both domestically and internationally.  
          Saudi Arabia’s Role in the Oil Crisis  
          It is crucial that as an only swing producer of oil (the ability to manipulate the price of oil in 
the world market by raising or lowering its own production) by that time Saudi Arabia, which 
was believed to be one of the closest U.S. allies in the region, was the leading proponent of the 
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1973-74 embargo. This was not the first attempt of the Saudis. After the Six-Day War between 
Arab countries and Israel in 1967, Saudi Arabia and some other oil producing Arab countries 
imposed an oil embargo to countries that aided Israel (the U.K. and the U.S.). However, due to 
the lack of unity among Arab countries, this embargo failed to achieve its objectives and 
resulted in the weakening of embargoing countries rather than those embargoed.  
          The Six-Day War caused severe losses of life and land for the Arab countries. The 
expansion of Israel provoked radicalization in many parts of Arab world. The Arab nationalist 
Baath party overtook Iraqi government in a military coup in 1968, a leftwing revolution 
overthrew a conservative monarchy in Libya in the following year, and the situation in North and 
South Yemen continued to be problematic. Arab Nationalist government took the control of 
country in South Yemen few months after the Six-Day War which brought revolutionary 
movement to Saudi Arabia’s doorstep. It is important that all these revolutionary regimes aimed 
to destroy Saudi Arabia’s or King Faisal’s monarchic regime. On the other hand, King Faisal of 
Saudi Arabia connected revolutionary movements and states with communism that denies the 
existence of God which is the worst sin in the religion of Islam. From that point, right after the 
embargo King Faisal remained close to the U.S. for protecting himself and his monarchic regime 
from the threats in the region.  
          King Faisal expanded his defense budget tremendously with the U.S (Sher, 2017: 20). Due 
to increased military power King Faisal was able to secure his monarchy from the anti-imperial 
nationalist movements that were sweeping the Arab world after the Six-Day War. However, on 
the other hand, King Faisal was exasperated by U.S.’s willful ignorance of implementing UN 
Resolution 242, which was adopted unanimously by the U.N. Security Council in the aftermath 
of the Six-Day War and mandated the return of the Arab territories lost in this war (United 
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Nations Security Council, 1967). He believed unless the Arab-Israeli problem was solved, there 
would be more wars and more revolutionary movements that seriously threaten his regime in 
Saudi Arabia. From that point, he warned the U.S. and tried to get the U.S. to hear his political 
demand. Despite that, the U.S. dismissed Faisal’s demand. That ignorance convinced King Faisal 
that he had to change his initial policy to a more aggressive policy that include inducing other 
countries to wage a war against Israel, and using the “oil weapon” against the U.S. He therefore 
agreed to send weapon and hundreds of millions of dollars to Egypt for building a strong military 
that able to fight against Israel in the early 1970s. Faisal also thought that with this help he could 
draw Egypt’s Anwar Sadat away from Libya’s Qaddafi who also offered help to Egypt. Faisal 
believed that Qaddafi is a dangerous man who supports most of the radical revolutionary 
movements all around the Middle East. In addition to that, a few months before the Yom Kippur 
War, Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal had secretly met with Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and 
persuaded him to use an oil embargo for punishing Western countries if they supplied weapons 
and aided to Israel in the upcoming military conflict. With the assured backing of King Faisal, 
Anwar Sadat attacked Israel in October 1973. From that point, it is important that Saudi Arabia 
played a major role in events that leading up to the Yom Kippur War which triggered the Oil 
Embargo of 1973-74.  
          When the Arab-Israeli war broke out, U.S. supported Israel against the Arabs and deployed 
significant military aid to that country. Due to that Saudis decided to cut all exports to the U.S. In 
addition to that, right after the war a coalition of oil producing Arab countries headed by Saudi 
Arabia abruptly reduced their oil production as Saudi’s Faisal had promised Anwar Sadat to do 
so. Saudi Arabia (with Emirates accounted for 40 percent of the OPEC resources by that time) 
alone lowered its oil production by almost 30 percent in October which triggered widespread 
speculation in the oil market that led massive oil price rise in the world (Alhaji, 2005: 228). High 
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oil prices devastated oil consuming economies, planted distortion between the U.S. and its 
Western allies and transferred billions of dollars to Arab oil producing countries particularly 
Saudi Arabia.  
 
Table 2 Saudi Arabia Oil Revenue (1969-1974) 
Sources: Saudi Arabia Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, 
Statistical Survey 1977 
 
It is important that when the U.S. Defense Secretary 
mentioned that he wanted to see the oil fields under the U.S. military control, the Saudi Arabia 
administration threatened to light fire to all Saudi oil installations and widening the embargo to 
the whole world (Alvarez, 2004; Frankel 2004). While many U.S. top officials denounced Saudi’s 
use of blackmail, Saudi Arabia on the other hand leveled complete opposition against the U.S. 
Months after the war, Saudi Arabia made several contradictory announcements about the 
embargo, claiming they agreed to lift it one moment and then postponing their decision the 
next; this led to a lot of speculation over oil prices (Sher, 36).  
          The situation brought important opportunities to Saudi Arabia that they were able to make 
money (their oil revenue jumped from $4 billion to over $ 22 billion within a year) and at the 
same time they pretended to be resilient defender of Muslim’s right in the region. From that 
point the crises and the embargo helped Saudi Arabia to expand its state capacity, modernize its 
economy and rise its power to a position that they could play a leadership role in the Middle 
East. On the other hand, the U.S. entered a recession not seen since the Great Depression. GDP 
plunged 6 percent between 1973 and 1975, unemployment doubled to 8 percent and inflation 













Figure 6 U.S. GDP, GDP growth Rate, CPI, Unemployment Rate from 1972 to 1976 
Source: GDP, CPI and Unemployment rates derived from FRED 2020, GDP growth rate derived from World Bank 2020.  
          The embargo threatened not just the stability of the U.S. economy, but the economic and 
political sustainability of the entire Western bloc. In that respect, Saudi led oil embargo seriously 
weakened country’s confidence and challenged the U.S.’s position in the world which 
undermined the ability of the U.S. to influence behavior of other countries in line with its own 
interest.  
          It is important that Saudi Arabia which was thought to be one of the closest U.S. allies in 
the region played a pivotal role for the events that leading up the Yom Kippur War or October 
War in 1973. Once the war started Saudi Arabia again played a serious role that deliberately 
crashing oil prices and imposing embargo to the U.S. and some other Western countries in order 
to inflect damage on their economies. It is important that Saudi Arabia was one of the poorest 
countries in the world that craved for establishing relationship with the U.S. when it was 
founded in the 1930s. The situation was almost the same in the 1940s. Saudi’s economy was 
undeveloped and mostly depended on the revenue that generated from pilgrims who visited 












































U.S. GDP, Growth Rate, CPI, Unemployment 1972-1976
GDP Growth R. CPI Unemployment
86 
 
King decided to grant exceptional concessions to U.S. for exploring oil in his country in order to 
build stronger military and political relationships with the U.S. From the same point, when 
Egyptian and Yemeni forces attacked Saudi Arabia due to Saudi’s anti-revolutionary polices in 
the early 1960s, Saudi’s King desperately sought the U.S. support. In 1963 U.S. government sent 
war planes to Saudi Arabia in order to protect the Kingdom from Egyptian and Yemeni assaults. 
It is important that almost a decade later the same country played a leading role in the oil crisis 
that caused the U.S. have the worst economic recession since the Great Depression. The U.S. 
faced similar challenges in the following decade. However, this time, countries that challenged 
U.S. leadership role in the world were its closest allies in Europe and Japan.  
 
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the U.S. - the European Communities 
(EC) – Japan Triangle 
          In 1947, twenty-three countries, led primarily by the U.S., created the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (World Trade Organization, 1998). The reason for this agreement 
was to increase economic recoveries of the countries after WWII by reducing tariffs and 
removing non-tariff barriers such as quotas, standards, licenses, and administrative and 
technical barriers (WTO). The purpose behind that was to avoid a repeat of the mistakes 
(adopting protectionist policies) of the previous decades. It was critical that at the end of WWI, 
countries increased non-tariffs barriers and imposed higher tariffs on each other. This was 
completely different than the previous period’s trade structure. Before WWI, international trade 
relations centered on a network of bilateral trade agreements that also contained the most-
favored-nation (MFN) clause. In this period countries were free to set their tariff rate so long as 
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it adhered to the MFN clause. This scheme was able to maintain very low trade barriers along 
with very little trade discrimination without any monitoring mechanism (Irvin, 1995: 323-324).  
          Nevertheless, WWI ruined this scheme. An outbreak of even greater protectionism started 
with the world economic downturn in the late 1920s and early 1930s. During this period, the 
U.S., despite having a large trade surplus, raised the average tariff on dutiable imports about 20 
percent in order to save its domestic industry and protect its own workers (Irving, 2010). 
However, this action provoked retaliatory responses from many countries all around the world, 
and eventually the combined effect of all these anti-trade policies led to a collapse of 
international trade.  
Table 3 International Trade from 1929 to 1932  
Source: Jerome Blum, Rondo Cameron, and Thomas G. Barnes, 
A History: The European World (Boston, 1966), p.842 and 
W.S.and E.S. Woytinsky, World Commerce and Governments 
(New York, 1955), p. 48-50.  
This situation seriously worsened the economic problems of the countries and contributed to 
political conflicts between countries in the second half of the same decade which finally led to 
the outbreak of the WWII. After experiencing the heavy cost of protectionist policies for more 
than a decade, the U.S. government officials decided to create rule-based liberal trade policies 
that reduced trade barriers and increased international trade after the Second World War. The 
reason behind that policy was about a belief in the U.S. that said trade binds nation together 
and makes war unthinkable (World Trade Organization 2004).  
          As the prime designer of the GATT, the U.S. played a leadership role by pushing other 
countries to keep the GATT moving forward. From that point, first five rounds of GATT 
negotiations that covered from Geneva to Dillon (1947-61) were highly dominated by the U.S. In 
these rounds the U.S.’s focus was on reducing import barriers in countries where it wanted to 
                 Foreign Trade (1929-1932) 
(millions of dollars) 
1929 1932 % Change
U.S. 9.788 2.967 -69.7
U.K. 8.956 3.555 -60.3
Germany 6.415 2.471 -61.4
France 4.247 1.945 -54.2
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export. It is important to note that during this period the U.S. was able to convince many 
countries that international trade was not a zero-sum game. In that respect, other countries had 
no rationale to build national economic barriers that restrict international trade. Besides that, 
the U.S. used the trade-off of expanded market access abroad for its exporting industries against 
increased market access granted for its home markets to foreign industries (Grossman, 2016: 
41). These negotiations mostly occurred between the U.S. and other developed countries. In 
other words, in these GATT rounds the U.S. asked other developed countries to reduce their 
tariffs. By that time developing countries’ world import and export shares were little. Therefore, 
little was asked of them in terms of their own trade liberalizations.  
    GATT Trade Rounds   
Year Place/name Subjects covered Countries 
1947 Geneva Tariffs 23 
1949 Annecy Tariffs 13 
1951 Torquay Tariffs 38 







Tariffs and anti-dumping measures 62 
Kennedy Round 
1973-1979 
Geneva Tariffs, non-tariff measures, “framework” 
102 
Tokyo Round Agreements 
1986-1994 
Geneva Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services, 
intellectual property, dispute settlement, 
textiles, agriculture, creation of WTO. 
123 
Uruguay Round 
Table 4 GATT Trade Rounds  
Source: WTO website, “The GATT Years: From Havana to Marrakesh” 
          Starting with the Kennedy Round of negotiations in the middle of the 1960s through Tokyo 
Round in the 1970s and Uruguay Round in the 1980s, more and more countries joined to trade 
negotiations.  In the Kennedy Round, for example, member countries more than doubled (62 
countries). Most of these countries were developing countries that played only a minor role like 
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in previous trade negotiations. Primary concern of the Kennedy Round was further reducing 
tariffs in developed countries’ markets. Besides that, this round brought about anti-dumping 
measures. Overall the Kennedy Round went well, tariff reductions worth more than $40 billon 
(Norwood, 1969: 314). The U.S. was able to demonstrate Washington’s leadership role in 
Kennedy Round by organizing, leading and controlling most of trade issues. However, at the end 
of the round it became obvious that a more comprehensive perspective was needed for the next 
round in order to deal with the emerging challenges such as high economic growth of Japan and 
European Community (EC), formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), and EEC’s 
protectionist and inward looking policies in some sectors.  The Tokyo round in the 1970s 
continued the GATT’s efforts to reduce tariffs to a very low level. In this round $33 billion worth 
of trade reductions made (Krasner, 1979: 514). However, it is important to note that Tokyo 
Round had mixed results for the problems that affecting agriculture and emergency import 
measures known as “safeguards.” 
          Before the Uruguay round, a series of economic recessions in the 1970s and the early 
1980s caused high inflation and high unemployment rates in many countries which eventually 
made these countries use protectionist economic policies in the following decade. Besides that, 
high growth rates in Japan and countries in the European Community (EC) turned these players 
into major global traders over the last few decades. It is important that a few decades earlier 
these countries lay in ruins at the end of the WWII. Cities and towns in these countries were 
devastated by ground battles and aerial bombings. Homes, ports, bridges, railroads, factories 
and many other key infrastructures essential to economic commerce were completely 
destroyed. Economic cost of the war was also huge for these countries since WWII was the most 
expensive war in human history. WWII had taken a huge toll in people lives. It caused 40 million 
deaths in Europe alone. Total cost was around 60 million lives in the world (United Nations, 
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2010). People who survived from this war in these countries suffered heavily from the shortage 
of food, water, fuel and all kinds of consumer products at the end of the war. These countries 
basically could not produce enough goods for their people. In total, they were desperately 
seeking help for their reconstruction at the end of the war.  
          From that point, the U.S. started to provide aid to these war-torn countries with various 
programs after WWII. From the end of the war to 1952 the U.S. invested $22 billion (over $180 
billion after adjusted for inflation) for rebuilding post-war Europe (U.S. News, 2014). Besides 
that, the U.S. invested $2.2 billion ($18 billion after adjusted for inflation) in Japan for their 
reconstruction efforts (U.S. News). In addition to that, the U.S. opened its market to these 
countries for many decades after WWII. Finally, for their security concerns in post-war era the 
U.S. stationed hundreds of thousands U.S. troops in these war-torn countries.  
          After all this U.S. assistance, Europe and Japan reacted favorably to U.S. requests and its 
initiated programs in the early GATT negotiations. For example, Japanese government was 
submissive in terms of responding to trade actions against Japanese import surges, and agreed 
to voluntary export restraints. Rather than resisting the U.S.’s trade restrictions against Japan in 
a confrontational manner, the Japanese government generally looked for ways to adjust these 
trade restrictions. From the same perspective, in the following decades after the WWII, the EC 
major concern was to achieve its post-war construction. After its establishment of EEC at the 
end of the 1950s, Europe focused mostly on its integration, pursued an inward-looking approach 
for their trade interest, and desired to have as little trade disagreements outside of Europe as 
possible. It was also clear that in the post-war period individual European countries were 
relatively small and had no power to significantly influence global trade negotiations.  
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          Nevertheless, this changed dramatically in the late 1970s and early 1980s. First of all, the 
process of EC integration progressed further in Europe. In the 1970s, the U.K, Denmark and 
Ireland and in the 1980s Spain, Greece and Portugal joined the EC. It was important that 
countries in the EC significantly benefited from this integration. They stimulated their 
agricultural and industrial production, increased their trade with other countries, improved their 
balance of payments, and promoted their political and economic stability. In total, they 
experienced high growth rates in this period.  
Figure 7 EU – Japan GDP 
(1960-1986) 
Source: Derived from FRED, 
IMF and World Bank  
Meanwhile, Japan also 
experienced a rapid 
economic growth 
through the 1960s, and 
70s, and still high in the 
1980s. It became clear 
in the 1980s that due to 
rising economic power and growing importance in the world economy, Japan and EC countries 
started to pursue more assertive trade policies in the GATT Uruguay trade negotiation that was 
very much different than the approach they had followed in previous periods.  
          Starting from the 1980s, Japan and the EC supported policies that were mainly focused on 
their economic interests in the GATT negotiations which include more aggressive export and 
more defensive import policies. Due to that, GATT Uruguay trade negotiations between the U.S. 
and Japan and the U.S. and the EC became more tension-ridden. For example, European 
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countries started to use strong and increasingly protectionist policies in the 1980s due to serious 
recessions in the 1970s and early 1980s. Rather than further liberalizing multilateral trade, these 
countries focused on their regional market and restricted their international trade by using non-
tariff barriers such as unjustified packaging, labelling, and product standards, complex 
regulatory environment, unreasonable safety and health regulations and discriminatory rules of 
origin in order to preserve their jobs and protect their employees and their sectors from the 
U.S., Japan and the newly industrialized countries.  
          On the other hand, after the turmoil of the crises in the 1970s, the Reagan administration 
tried to re-establish the U.S. leadership role in the international economy under the rules of free 
trade and free market (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Achieves, 1985). From that point, the 
EC’s protective measures and restrictive trade practices strained its relationship with the U.S. in 
the GATT Uruguay trade negotiations. In addition to that, the tensions also arose in the GATT 
negotiations between the U.S. and the EC over some specific sectors such as agriculture and 
steel. In these conflicts, the U.S. aimed to extend world trade principles to these sectors, on the 
other side, the EC strongly resisted to U.S.’s request and continued to use agricultural and 
industrial subsidies for these sectors.  
          From the same perspective, after experiencing decades of rapid economic growth, Japan 
became one of the major powers in the world in the 1980s. This played significant role on Japan 
to transform its submissive and passive trade policy to a more assertive policy against the U.S. 
From that point, following the 1970s trade relations between the U.S. and Japan became very 
problematic. Japan’s predatory business practices and its industrial policies triggered serious 
conflicts between Japan and the U.S. over semiconductor, steel, aerospace, automobile, service 
and agriculture sectors.  
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          In all, it is clear that with their growing importance in the world economy both the EC and 
Japan insisted on setting their own economic priorities without considering U.S. designed liberal 
economic disciplines. This major policy change was obvious in the Uruguay Round trade 
negotiations in the 1980s and early 1990s. Contrary to previous trade negotiations, in the 
Uruguay Round both the EC and Japan became more assertive for their interest, more 
aggressive for their export and more defensive for their import against the U.S. even though 
these countries were the closest allies of the U.S. and shared a strong bond of friendship with 
the U.S. for decades after WWII. It is quite interesting that only few decades earlier, these 
counties were desperately seeking for U.S. assistance following the devastation of WWII. By that 
time, the U.S. provided billions of dollars to help finance rebuilding efforts in these countries. In 
addition to that, the U.S. was able to force these countries to reduce their tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. However, there was a significant change in the Uruguay Round negotiations that these 
countries significantly resisted U.S. led trade negotiations. From that perspective, this is another 
example that demonstrates the U.S., as the world’s largest economy, had no capacity to coerce, 
deter or punish countries that endanger its interest or behave in a way that violate norms, rules, 
and principles of U.S. designed world liberal trade principles. In addition to that, this action also 
weakened U.S. confidence and challenged its position in the world that undermined the ability 
of the U.S. to influence behavior of other countries in line with its own interest.  
 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Relationship between the U.S. and the Developing 
Countries 
          It is important that around the end of the Uruguay Round in the mid-1990s, the EC started 
to provide a joint leadership for further trade negotiations. From that point, the U.S. and the EC 
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had combined their forces and established the World Trade Organization (WTO). The reason of 
the establishment of the WTO was because of the weaknesses of the GATT. Starting with the 
last decades of the 20th century, the GATT failed to achieve its goals. During this period, 
international economic system became more complex after it experienced rapid quantitative 
and qualitative changes due to dynamism of the world economy. As a result of that, there were 
many issues, fields, and sectors in the world trading system that were not covered by GATT 
rules. In addition to that, the GATT was believed to always be in favor of the developed 
countries (Page, 2002: 6-7).  
          It is crucial that 123 countries were participated the Uruguay round trade negotiations and 
almost a hundred of them were developing countries; however, developed countries specifically 
the U.S. dominated most of the trading process. Even though an increasing number of 
developing countries joined round negotiations, they were not powerful participants in the 
functioning or governance of the GATT system. For example, most of the developing countries 
had comparative advantages in textile, clothing, and agriculture sectors. Therefore, if these 
sectors were liberalized under the GATT system then these countries would reap benefits. 
However, many times these sectors were not even on the discussion table of GATT and the 
major industrial countries particularly the U.S. had no interest in liberalizing these sectors. U.S.’s 
focus was on the tariff reduction for the fast-growing industries. With the implementation of 
tariff cuts in these sectors, trade among the developed countries significantly increased. In all, 
due to the rising trade, developed countries particularly the U.S. experienced an exceptional 
rate of economic growth in this period. Meanwhile developing countries were struggling to 
protect their infant industries from developed countries’ industries. They criticized the non-
discrimination concept of GATT and asserted that unequal countries can not be treated equally. 
They worked for a legal foundation that allow special treatment in their favor. Besides that, they 
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were also trying hard to make their voices heard for the issues such as fluctuating commodity 
prices, rules on GATT trade negotiations and protectionist policies of the developed countries 
(Shukla, 2000: 7). However, most of these efforts were largely ignored by the U.S. and some 
other developed countries due to developing countries’ lack of bargaining power. For example, 
developed counties pressured developing countries and introduced Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in the Uruguay round trade negotiations 
(World Trade Organization, 2021). However, developing countries could not able to do the same 
for GATT’s Multi-Fiber Agreement which limited imports from the developing countries in order 
to protect developed countries’ domestic textile industries. In this case, developing countries 
only had little concessions that included gradually dismantling of textile quotas which was 
completed in the middle of the 2000s (World Trade Organization, 2020). 
          It is important that, this situation considerably changed at the end of the 20th century with 
the WTO Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999 and the WTO Doha Development Round in 
2001. In these negotiations developing countries became more assertive in demanding that 
their issues need to be addressed. Some revolutionist developing countries even insisted that 
they would not support another round of trade negotiation unless they noticed the negotiation 
program included their interests such as reduction of agriculture tariffs and subsides in 
developed countries, non-reciprocal market access for manufacturing sectors and finally 
protection for their service sectors from powerful counterparts in developed countries (Cimino-
Isaac, Fefer and Ferguson, 2015: 1-2).  
          On the other hand, developed countries, particularly the U.S., aimed to increase access to 
developing countries’ industrial and service sectors while protecting their agriculture, textile and 
clothing sectors from developing countries that have comparative advantages. It is clear that 
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countries in the WTO divided between these two diametrically opposed thoughts. The strict 
philosophical divergence in the Doha Round was the main reason of deadlock.  
          After more than a decade from its first meeting, a report from the General Council of the 
WTO indicated that after many years of solid multilateral work, countries in the WTO still fail to 
narrow down their differences (The New York Times, 2016). That shows that in the 
contemporary world there is a shift in balance of trade power with the rise of many emerging 
economies. Developing countries now, like Japan and the EC in the 1980s and 1990s, pursued 
more assertive and reactionary policies. Unlike previous negotiation rounds from Geneva to 
Uruguay, developing countries played a much bigger role in the Doha Round. They set their own 
priorities and supported polices that were truly based on their economic interest which aimed 
to maintain a fair unemployment rate and protect their jobs and their sectors from the 
competition of developed countries. It is fair to say that all these policies limited the capacity of 
the U.S. and some other developed countries to shape the WTO and its rules in the 21st century. 
In other words, contrary to previous trade rounds, developing countries successfully challenged 
the U.S. and other developed countries’ hegemony in Doha Round and pushed these countries 
to seek bilateral trade agreements in order to expand their market access. In total, this is 
another case that weakened U.S. confidence and ability to control and influence the behavior of 
other countries.  
 
          Conclusion for the First Part (Case Studies) 
          As mentioned at the beginning of this section, power is the capacity of a country to 
influence another country, or countries, in line with its own interest (Organski, 104). Therefore, 
an economically powerful country has the ability to make decisions that benefit itself; at the 
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same time reduce the capacity of other countries that aim to threaten its interest or decrease its 
freedom of movement. In that respect, scholars believe that the U.S., as the most powerful 
country in the world, took a dominant role in the world economy after WWII. With this 
dominant role, these scholars state that the U.S. punished countries that threatened its interests 
and its special position in the world economy, and, at the same time, rewarded others that built 
positive and cooperative relations with it. However, at the end of the first decade of the 21st 
century, some (declinist) scholars started to argue that the financial crisis of 2007-09 eroded the 
legacy of this success. They think due to the financial crisis there were many power changes that 
occurred in the world and these power changes significantly reduced the ability of the U.S. to 
set global economic rules, provide solutions for world economic problems and punish some 
countries that challenge and reward others that promote its interests. From that point, they 
think the U.S. will never experience its dominant position in the world economy that it enjoyed 
from WWII to the financial crisis of 2007-09 again. 
          Nevertheless, after analyzing cases above, this section of the paper finds that contrary to 
declinist intellectuals’ argument there is no major difference between U.S.’s economic power 
after the financial crisis of 2007-09 and its economic power in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s 
and 2000s. Like in the period after the financial crisis of 2007-09, the U.S. was not able to direct 
or influence the behavior of other countries in line with its own interest for every economic 
(including major) issues in the period before the financial crisis. Therefore, it is important to 
make a distinction between declinist intellectuals’ perception of indisputable and undeniable 
power like the deities in Greek mythology and actual, tangible exercise of that power, like we 
see in the U.S.’s economic influence over other countries in the post-financial crisis world. There 
is no country in today’s world and there never was in the past that has/had capacity to get what 
it wants on every single economic issue that included even major global economic issues. For 
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example; in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s France played a major role in breakdown 
of the U.S.’s designed international monetary system, Bretton Woods. It is important that in this 
case France, one of the closest allies of the U.S., was in a constant decline. It was in desperate 
need of U.S. assistance for both world wars. Its economy was on the verge of collapse before, 
during and after WWII. From that point, France, as a middle power country, in this period had 
no capacity to follow solid and stable policies to get its way for most of international economic 
and political issues. On the other hand, the U.S. rose as a major economic power of the world 
around the same time. Nevertheless, it is quite important that not even a decade later, France 
pursued completely effective and efficient policy against the U.S.’s designed global monetary 
system. French policies (include pulling themselves from the Gold Pool, opposing for creation of 
an international currency reserve unit, following uncooperative policies and aggressively and 
purposely converting its dollars holding into gold that aimed to deplete U.S. gold reserve) 
intended to undermine U.S. economic leadership position in the world. It is crucial that after a 
decade of steady and consistent effort, France successfully challenged the U.S. leadership role in 
the world by playing a key role in the breakdown of the Bretton Woods international monetary 
system.  
          From the same perspective, one of the other closest allies of the U.S., Saudi Arabia, played 
a similar role for an event in the 1970s that seriously threatened the stability of U.S. economy 
and undermined the ability of the U.S. to influence behavior of other countries in line with its 
own interest. It is important that from its independence to the event of Oil Crisis in the 1970s, 
Saudi Arabia sought assistance from the U.S. in order to address its economic and security 
challenges. For example, Saudis desperately sought the U.S. support when Saudi’s oil facilities 
were bombed in WWII and when Egyptian forces attacked Saudi Arabia from Yemen. The U.S. 
responded to these and many other Saudis’ requests by sending U.S. troops to the region to 
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help maintain order. However, like France a decade ago, Saudi Arabia in the early 1970s started 
to play a key role for the events that ultimately hurt U.S. interest and threaten its leadership 
position in the world. Saudi Arabia followed policies that made major contributions to the 
causes of the Yom Kippur War. Once the war started Saudi Arabia played a pivotal role that 
deliberately crashing oil prices and imposing embargo to the U.S. that caused the U.S. to 
experience the worst economic recession since the Great Depression. In addition to that Saudi-
led oil crisis created serious challenges to the U.S. designed world economic and political 
system. Many of U.S. allies reexamined their alliance with the U.S. during the oil crisis and 
started to pursue more independent policies afterwards. On the other hand, due to worsening 
economic conditions of the developing countries in this period there was a serious demand for 
the new international economic order. In sum, contrary to declinist intellectuals’ argument the 
U.S. in this period had not enough power to get what it wanted on this issue. In other worlds, 
the U.S. was not able to influence Saudi Arabia’s policies accordance with its own interest.  
          U.S. capacity to control policies of other countries was almost the same in the next 
decade. After experiencing rapid economic growth from the 1950s to the 1980s, Japan and the 
E.C. countries increased their importance in the world economy in the 1980s. It was important 
that after WWII, these counties lay in ruins. Cities and towns were all devastated. Homes, roads, 
bridges, factories and many key infrastructures were destroyed. They were like France and Saudi 
Arabia in the previous cases desperately seeking assistance from the U.S. Therefore, the U.S. 
started to rebuild these war-torn countries with various programs. In addition, the U.S. opened 
its market to these countries and stationed hundreds of thousand U.S. soldiers in these 
countries for their security reason in the post-war period. Meanwhile, these countries acted 
favorable to U.S. requests and its initiated programs in the early GATT trade rounds. However, 
with their increasing importance in the world economy, these countries started to set their own 
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economic priorities without considering U.S.’s requests and its initiated programs. From that 
point, contrary to earlier trade negotiations, Japan and the EC countries became more assertive 
for their interests, more aggressive for their export and more defensive for their import in the 
Uruguay Round. In addition to that, they strongly resisted the U.S.-led GATT trade principles. In 
all, this is like previous cases that the U.S., as the world’s most dominant economic power, in the 
1980s and early 1990s was not able to punish Japan and EC countries that threaten its interests 
and violate rules and principles of U.S. designed world liberal trade principles. From that point, 
in opposition to declinists claim the U.S. was not capable of affecting behaviors of other 
countries in line with its own interest not only in the post-financial crisis period, but also in the 
1980s and early 1990s.  
          Finally, U.S. power and its ability to influence other countries’ policies did not change that 
much in the 1990s and early 2000s. In this period developing countries, like Japan and EC 
countries in previous decades, pursued more aggressive policies that challenged U.S.’s interests. 
It is important that in the early trade negotiations these countries’ requests were not even in 
the GATT’s agenda. In that period, the U.S. had simply no interest in responding to developing 
countries’ claims. However, in the late 1990s this situation dramatically changed. Unlike 
previous trade negotiations, developing countries set their own priorities and supported policies 
that were truly based on their economic interests in the Doha Round trade negotiations. 
Developing countries’ assertive, aggressive and reactionary policies in Doha Round significantly 
reduce the capacity of developed countries, particularly the U.S., to shape the WTO and its rules 
in the 21st century. Ultimately, this case like previous cases that weakened U.S. confidence and 
its ability to control and change the behavior of other countries that aimed to threaten its 
interest and its freedom of movement.   
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          After scrutinizing all these cases, it can be said that contrary to declinists’ arguments, the 
U.S. was not able to control and influence behavior of other countries in line with its own 
interest (even for the most significant world economic issues) not only in the period after the 
financial crisis of 2007-09, but also in the 1960s, 1970s, 1990s and 2000s. In that respect, it can 


















Economic Power of the United States 
          Introduction  
          As this study mentioned earlier, many intellectuals (both declinists and Americanist) 
believe that the U.S. was the most economically powerful country in the world after WWII. 
These scholars indicate that as the leading economic power of the world, the U.S. produced 
around half of the world’s industrial output, supplied almost a third of world total export and 
possessed over 70 percent of the world’s total gold reserves in the post-WWII era. However, 
starting a few decades after the 1950s some of these scholars (declinists) started to debate 
about declining economic power of the U.S. They argued that due to some significant changes in 
the U.S or in the world, the U.S. lost a relative share of the world industrial production, trade 
and wealth. From that point, they interpret these changes as sure signs of the decline of 
American economic power. It is important that the reason why U.S. economic power is in 
decline changes for each intellectual. According to some intellectuals, the U.S. power was in 
decline because of domestic and international economic policies that were used in the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations. For some, it is because of the financial and economic crisis in the 
Nixon and Carter administrations. Some find massive debt and deficit that were created in the 
Reagan administration brought the U.S. to its knees. Finally, some contemporary scholars 
believe that financial crisis in the first decade of the 21st century is the main reason of U.S. 
economic power decline. They also argue that the latest decline is something different than 
previous economic power declines. They believe the decline is real this time. The overall 
discussion made the question of “is U.S. economic power in decline?” necessary to reexamine. 
In order to answer that question correctly, properly and efficiently this research study collects 
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and scrutinizes different economic power indicators (GDP, consumer price index, debt, saving 
and productivity) in the following section. 
 
          The Truth About U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth 
          At the end of the World War II, there was an expectation that due to sharp decline in 
defense expenditures the U.S. would go back the days of Great Depression. However, the U.S. 
economy experienced a steady economic growth till 1960. The Gross National Product (GNP) 
rose from $300 billion in 1950 to $500 billion dollars at the end of the 1950s (Federal Reserve 
Bank of St Louis, 2019). The GDP average growth rate was more than 4 percent in the 1950s 
even though there were negative economic growths in two years in 1954 and in 1958 (Yarrow, 
2010: 7).  
          It is important to know that these figures represent the market value of all goods and 
services. Market value depends on output of all goods and services and their respective prices. 
From that point, reason of the U.S. GDP growth could be only about price increases in the 1950s. 
In order to fix that, real GDP is used. Real GDP is the total value of all goods and services in a 
county during a given year (Callen, 2018). In real GDP, prices have been adjusted for inflation 
and deflation. Therefore, in real GDP if there is an increase in GDP that definitely means this 
particular country produces more output from a year earlier. In order to calculate real GDP, 
there is a need for a base year and GDP deflator. The following tables show real GDP of the U.S. 
from 1950 to 2018 based on 2010 price index. In terms of real GDP, American economy overall 
grew from $2.289 billion in 1950 to $3.178 billion in 1959 which means U.S. GDP increased by 
more than 38 percent (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019).  
104 
 
          There were many factors that played significant role on the economic boom in this decade. 
First of all, most parts of the world, especially countries that used to be industrialized were 
destroyed in WWII. From that point, after the war, these countries struggled very hard to 
rebuild themselves. These countries such as Germany, France, Great Britain, Soviet Union and 
Japan used to be the potential competitors of the U.S. On the other hand, the U.S. benefited a 
lot from wartime production. Wartime production not only pulled U.S.’s economy out of 
depression, but also helped individuals in the U.S. to accumulated significant amount of 
resources during the War. When the war ended, the consumer goods became available to 
people who were already very willing to spend for these goods. It is important to mention that 
some factors significantly increased customer demands in that period. For example, there was a 
new way of spending mentality “buy now and pay later” that created first time in the 1950s 
(Constantine, 2017: 14-16). People began to use credit and club cards to buy goods and services. 
On the other hand, industries answered these huge consumer’s demands accordingly. With the 
advances in science and technology many new products were created in this decade such as 
television, dishwashers, washing machine, dryers, vacuum cleaners and air conditioner. Besides 
that, construction and automobile industries significantly benefited from huge consumer 
demands of the 1950s (U.S. Department of Labor, 2006: 21-26). Many people in the U.S. had 
never owned the products mentioned above. President Eisenhower and his administration on 
the other hand believed that government has a duty to stimulate economic growth (Public 
Broadcasting Service, PBS, 2018). From that perspective U.S. government directly or indirectly 
supported stimulus programs such as providing affordable mortgages for members of the 
military, constructing interstate highway system, or enacting the new way payment system such 
as club and credit cards. Other than providing access to low-interest mortgages, extended G.I. 
Bill also gave military veterans affordable access to education and work force which played 
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important role on the economic boom in the 1950s. In addition, cheap domestic energy 
resources such as oil help industries to produce their products efficiently. Meanwhile, due to the 
communism threats in many parts of the world, the U.S. continued to spend billions of dollars 
for war supplies which created a huge military-industrial complex in the U.S. Finally, recreation 
of international monetary system opened the world markets to U.S. exports. The privileged 
status of the U.S in this system helped the U.S. economy to grow faster in this decade.                          
  
Figure 8 and 9 U.S. – World Nominal GDP and U.S.-World Real GDP (2010 prices) 
Source: World current and constant GDP compiled from Earth Policy Institute with 1950-1979 GWP, The Conference 
Board (TCB), Total Economy Database and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; U.S. Gross Domestic Product current 
prices derived from National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) various years and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; 
constant 2010 prices for Real GDP collected from Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank 
The average GDP grew by 3.3 percent each year in this decade. Finally, in nominal term the U.S. 
accounted for 38.1 percent of the world GPD and with 2010 prices the U.S. made up 30 percent 
of the world GDP in this decade.  
          In nominal term GDP in 1960 was little bit over $500 billion. At the end of the decade it 
became over $ 1 trillion (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019; World Bank, 2018). And in real 
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index (World Bank, 2019). That means U.S. economy grew by little bit more than 50 percent in 
this decade. It is crucial that the economy was in recession when the President Kennedy took 
the office in 1961. Due to the recession, the GDP growth rate were around 2 percent in the 
beginning of the 1960s (Davies et al. 2011). In order to end the recession and stimulate 
economic growth Kennedy administration implemented an economic growth and recovery plan 
that consisted of increasing government spending with social programs and cutting taxes for 
business. These programs seemed to work out; the economy grew by 5 percent over the next 
two years (Emmons, 2012). However, president Kennedy believed that the economy needed 
additional stimulation packages in order to grow faster. After his assassination government role 
in the economy continued to grow. President Johnson used expansive economic programs that 
aimed to spread benefit of economy to all society. Federal government spending increased 
drastically with his “Great Society” programs. In this period government pumped billions of 
dollars into the economy with new programs such as Medicare, Food Stamps, several education 
programs, infrastructure and research and development programs. Military spending also 
increased dramatically in this period due to funding the Vietnam War and other proxy wars 
against communism all around the world. Federal revenues by that time were high enough to 
pay all these expenditures. All of these caused GDP growth to rise above 6 percent for few 
years. However, at the end of the decade things turned around and economy suffered heavily 
from all these large-scale government spending. Meanwhile, government was not able to raise 
taxes to pay for the war in Vietnam, the war on poverty and other social programs. From that 
point, at the end of the 1960s the economic growth that had flourished in the previous decade 
began to wane. The constraints in the international monetary system worsened the overall 
situation. In this decade consumer expenditures and government spending had major effects on 
overall GDP growth. They made up almost 80 percent of GDP growth (Patton, 2014). The GDP 
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growth rate was dropped by almost 3 percent at the end of this decade. However, throughout 
the 1960s real GDP growth rate in the U.S. averaged 4.2 percent. The U.S made up 38.5 percent 
of the world nominal GDP and in 2010 prices U.S.’s share of the world GDP was 27.1 percent in 
this decade.  
 
Table 5 U.S. – 
World Nominal 







Bank of St Louis, 
BEA and World 
Bank current 
and 2010 GDP database, U.S. current and real GDP derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Michael Roscoe, US 
Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank 
          In the early 1970s GDP growth rate slowed down to 2 percent from its previous rate. In the 
middle of the decade U.S. economy had negative growth. Country by that time entered a period 
of stagflation. Second half of the decade economic growth rate was little bit better than the first 
half. The average GDP growth rate in this decade was around 3 percent. Nominal GDP increased 
from $1 trillion at the beginning of the decade to $2.6 trillion in 1979 (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012: 183). It seemed that there is a fair growth in 
GDP; however, that growth included the price hikes of this decade. In real term there was a 
moderate U.S. economic growth. U.S. GDP rose from almost $4.7 trillion in 1970 to $6.5 trillion 
at the end of the decade with 2010 prices (World Bank, 2018; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 
2018). The overall economy grew by 36 percent in the 1970s. In other words, the economy 
slowed down 15 percentage point from the previous decade. There were many reasons that 
could explain that. First of all, the U.S. faced serious economic problems in the 1970s. Some of 
U.S. - World Nominal and Real (2010 Prices) GDP 1960-1969
US (nom) World(nom) percent US(2010) World(2010) percent
1960 542 1369 39.4 3173 11356 27.9
1961 562 1425 39.4 3246 11849 27.4
1962 604 1530 39.5 3444 12499 27.5
1963 637 1648 38.6 3596 13168 27.3
1964 684 1806 37.9 3804 14053 27.1
1965 742 1966 37.7 4048 14825 27.3
1966 813 2133 38.1 4311 15675 27.5
1967 860 2271 37.9 4418 16386 27
1968 941 2451 38.4 4630 17428 26.6
1969 1018 2705 37.6 4774 18500 25.8
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these economic problems were the results of policies that followed by Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations. For example, funding the war in Vietnam and social welfare programs created a 
situation in the 1970s that increased the inflation and government deficit. Vietnam War 
continued till 1975 that increased military spending in the first half of this decade. In addition, 
President Nixon maintained and even increased social programs that were created in previous 
decade. The war between Israel and Arab countries worsened the overall picture. After the war 
the OPEC imposed an embargo to the Western countries which had helped Israel during the 
war. Due to the embargo the U.S. faced oil shortages that rapidly raised oil prices first and 
increased the prices of everything else later which pushed inflation to record high. In order to 
decrease the inflation Nixon administration mandated wage and price controls (Yergin and 
Stanislaw, 2008: 60-63). However, wage and price control lowered overall demand in the 
markets that slowed down economic growth even further in the U.S. For stimulating growth 
Nixon administration aimed to protect domestic industries by imposing tariff on imports. 
However, a few months after the imposition of tariff, the Smithsonian agreement was signed 
which lifted the import surcharge (Irwin, 2012: 40). Besides that, U.S. companies couldn’t lower 
wages due to the power of the Unions; at the same time, they couldn’t raise prices either to be 
profitable. One thing was clear that rising import prices slowed economic growth even more.  In 
all, as it mentioned that the GDP growth rate fell to negative numbers in the middle of the 
1970s. Meanwhile Federal Reserve aimed to implement two contradictory objectives in this 
decade. At first, Federal Reserve raised its rates to decrease inflation and then lowered their 
rates to increase economic growth and employment. But these “stop-go” policies confused 
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businesses and mostly worsened the economic growth. 
 
Figure 10 and 11 World Nominal and Real (2010 Prices) GDP 1970-1979 
Source: World nominal and constant GDP derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, BEA and World Bank current 
and 2010 GDP database; U.S. current and real GDP derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Michael Roscoe, US 
Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank and BEA database 
In sum, U.S. real GDP growth rate averaged 3.2 percent in the 1970s. Like previous decade 
consumer and government expenditures were responsible for 80 percent of GDP growth 
(Patton, 2014). This was the first time that net export had a negative impact on economic 
growth. Finally, the U.S. GDP as a percentage of world GDP declined from 36.2 percent in 1970 
to 26.3 percent in 1979. However, in real terms (2010 prices) the decline is just 1 percentage 
point. Throughout decade the U.S. represented 23.7 percent of the world GDP.     
            Crises in the previous decade passed into the 1980s. Especially in the 1960s and 1970s 
there were high levels of government spending for the Vietnam War and social programs.  On 
the other hand, OPEC’s oil embargo and second oil price shock in the second half of the 1970s 
pushed oil prices record-high that caused U.S. economy to slow down (Kilian and Vigfusson, 
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reconstructing their economies from World War II. They strongly entered into the world market 
and gained a big share of world trade. 
 
Table 6 Export of Goods and Services from 1970 
to 1985 
Source: World Bank selected countries export 
of goods and services, IMF, OECD trade in 
goods and services (2020).   
 Due to fierce competition and changes in the world economic system, the U.S. lost some its 
advantages that it had enjoyed in post-WWII. All of these resulted in decreasing economic 
growth more down and increasing prices of goods and services more up. The Federal Reserve 
used restrictive monetary policies in order to fight with inflation. The GDP growth rate turned 
negative and the U.S. entered into a recession at the beginning of this decade. Due to economic 
slowdown the Fed backed off its restrictive monetary policies for a while and then it tried its 
second attempt to lower the inflation and expectation of inflation with its more restrictive 
policies (Volcker and Gyohten, 1992: 172-184). These policies made U.S. economy enter another 
recession which was more serious than earlier one. U.S. economy was decreased by 2 percent in 
1982 (Federal Reserve History, 2013). However, this attempt was more successful than the first 
attempt. Conditions began to improve at the end of 1983. The U.S.’s economy rebounded and 
then grew significantly till 1987 with an average of 4.6 percent. Reasons that explained this 
economic turnaround were various. President Reagan’s economic policies “Reagonomics” 
played important role on this economic comeback. First of all, he supported the supply-side 
economic theory for economic growth. In that theory it is believed that large tax cuts for 
U.S. U.K. France Japan Germany
1970 187.6 141.5 95.7 80.1 175.2
1975 262.2 178.9 141.3 124.2 221.3
1980 377.1 219.8 193.4 197 289
1985 383.8 254.9 229 289 373.6
Export of Goods and Services (2010 Prices) Billion Dollars
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individuals and businesses result in more savings, investment and production which at the end 
stimulate overall economic growth (Volcker and Gyohten, 1992: 248-249).  
          From that point, President Reagan reduced the taxes at first. On the other hand, he 
thought the federal government has been too large and too interfering. Failed Keynesian 
economic policies in the 1970s played important role on that decision. He cut government 
spending on some domestic programs: however, military spending in this period increased 
significantly. In addition to that, he reduced regulations that affecting consumers and 
businesses.  
          Other than Reagan administration policies, there were some factors that played important 
role on this economic growth. One of them was the falling oil prices. Annual average oil price 
dropped from $36-37 at the beginning of the decade to $16-17 dollars in the second half of this 
decade (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018). The sharp decline in oil prices push the 
cost of production down and stimulate the economic activities not only in the U.S. but all around 
the world. After many years of discussion between Japan and the U.S., Japan agreed to impose 
voluntary quota on its products to the U.S.by that time. Besides that, stock market was one of 
the key indicators that stimulated the economic growth in that period. The stock market tripled 
itself from 1983 to 1987 (White, 2006: 193-195). During this period rising returns of the stock 
market created unique opportunities for investors in the U.S. However, stock market later in this 
decade suffered heavily when it lost 22 percent of its value in a single day (Carlson, 2017). As a 
matter of fact, economic growth continued till the end of the decade. Average annual growth of 
real GDP was 3.1 percent in this decade. In nominal term the GDP increased from 2.8 trillion 
dollar in 1980 to 5.6 trillion dollars in 1989 and in real term GDP rose from $6.5 trillion to $8.8 
trillion during the same period. Overall the U.S. economy grew by 35.9 percent in this decade. 
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Consumer expenditure was responsible for almost two-thirds of GDP growth. Investment and 
government spending made up the rest. Like previous decades net export had negative impact 
on economic growth (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2001). 
Table 7 U.S. and 
World Nominal 







World Bank (from 
1980 to 1989), 
IMF, and Federal 
Reserve Bank of St 
Louis; U.S. current 
and real GDP 
derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank and 
BEA database 
 In total, the GDP value of the U.S. represented 28.8 percent of the world GDP in this decade. 
And in 2010 prices the U.S. made up 23.7 percent of the world GDP which was the same with 
previous decade average.  
          Like the beginning of previous decades, the economy of the U.S. had a relatively poor 
performance in the early 1990s. The economy fell into a recession in 1990. The growth rate was 
over 1 percent in 1990 but the next year it fell into negative number (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 2018). However, starting from 1992 to the end of the decade there was a completely 
different scenario. There was a constant economic growth that counted as one of the longest 
economic expansion in the U.S. The economy grew by an average of 4 percent per year from 
1992 to 1999. Overall U.S. economy grew by 34.6% in this decade. Globalization and technology 
played important role on this economic expansion. Globalization by that time dramatically 
increased trade between countries. Technological developments, on the other hand, worked as 
an engine of 1990s growth. Expansions in the production of important technologies such as 
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personal computer, cell phones, software and telecommunication components were the main 
drivers of this economic boom. Economic policies also played crucial roles in this growth. Most 
of times in this period, legislative and executive branches worked together for adopting the right 
economic policies. For instance, government eliminated many regulations in order to give 
flexibility for the private firms to function. Discretionary programs such as military spending, 
were decreased and resources transferred to other programs such as infrastructure and 
research & development that created more jobs encouraged economic growth. (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2019: 20-25). The Federal Reserve also played a crucial role for the growth. It 
raised interest rates when inflation threatened the economic expansion. On the other side, it 
lowered rates in order to stimulate economic activities and growth when there was a risk of 
recession. Free-trade zone –NAFTA- was another factor that accelerated trade and economic 
activities in the North America by that time (Dixon and Rimmer, 2014: 34). Oil prices fell sharply 
in this decade that helped to increase economic activities in the U.S. and in the world. Stock 
prices on the other side increased dramatically in the 1990s. It was also one of the key factors 
that stimulate the economic expansion by providing funds for investors. Besides that, relatively 
peaceful international environment made people more confident for the future of the economy. 
The fall of the Soviet Union and Eastern European communism in the late 1980s expanded trade 
and economic opportunities between East and West in the 1990s. Due to all these causes U.S 
economy in real term increased from 9 trillion dollars in 1990 to 12.1 trillion dollars in 1999 
(World Bank, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2018). GDP grew by an average of 3.2 
percent per year in this decade. Consumer expenditures made up over 67 percent of GDP 
growth. Investment and government spending share were over 15 percent in this decade. Like 
previous decade net export had negative impact on GDP growth in the 1990s (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 2001). Finally, the GDP value of the U.S. in the 1990s represented 26.6 
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percent of the world total GDP in nominal terms, and in real terms (2010 prices) U.S. GDP as a 
percentage of world GDP averaged 24.3 percent. 
 
Figure 12 U.S. – World Nominal and Real GDP (2010 Prices) 1990-1999 
Source: Compiled by World Bank and IMF (various years), world current and 2010 GDP database; U.S. current and real 
GDP derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank 
and BEA database      
          The public in the U.S. was in full of economic confidence at the beginning of the decade. 
The U.S GDP for the first time passed 10 trillion dollars in 2000 and GDP growth rate was over 4 
percent (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis). However, in 2001, the first recession of the decade 
started. Due to the recession many software firms went to bankrupt. Meanwhile the Federal 
Reserve ignored the market and kept the interest rate high which made the cost of borrowing 
high. The September 11 attack worsened economic downturn. The stock market closed for 
almost a week after the attack. When the market reopened again the shares of the stocks 
dramatically fell down. GDP growth dropped from 4.1 percent in 2000 to 1 percent in 2001 (U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2004). In order to end the recession and boost the economic 
growth Bush administration used expansionary fiscal policies. From that point, Bush 
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demand little bit. In addition, Federal Reserve used monetary policies for expanding economic 
growth more. The Fed decreased interest rates which made homes, buildings, auto purchases 
available. Due to these policies the recession was ended at the end of 2001. However, Bush 
administration and Federal Reserve maintained low interest rates till middle of this decade 
which contributed one of the most important causes of Great Recession in 2007-09. 
          There were other events that adversely influence economic growth in this decade. 
Hurricane Katrina was one of them. Estimation for the cost of this hurricane was around 180 
billion to 250 billion dollars which had serious negative impacts on economic growth (Blanchard, 
2008: 1-2). Beside that due to Hurricane Katrina, many oil facilities in the Gulf of Mexico 
damaged which caused oil prices to increase. The average annual price of one barrel of crude oil 
was $19 dollars in 1999 and a year later it rose up to $30 dollars. The oil prices constantly 
increased till the new decade. At the end of the 2000s the average price of oil reached $90 a 
barrel (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018). The sharp increases in oil prices had a 
negative impact on the economic growth. On the other hand, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq 
consumed vast financial resources (over 800 billion spent for two wars) in this decade. From the 
same point, Bush administration increased federal spending in areas of health care and 
homeland security. All these dramatically raised the federal budget deficit which created 
pressure for economic downturn. 
          In order to encourage consumer spending and economic growth, Bush administration used 
more federal spending and enacted larger tax cuts. At the same time Federal Reserve cut 
interest rates to historic low. However, due to these policies average home prices in the U.S. 
raised continuously. Meanwhile the financial institutions were supplying high-risk and high-
interest mortgage loans to consumers who had no ability to make required payments. 
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Everything was fine; however, when the housing prices started to decline in 2006 then the 
situation turned upside down. People started to default on their loans. Corporations, hedge 
funds, mutual funds and many other investors that invested in this field found themselves in 
danger. Banks stopped lending to each other. Some big prestigious financial institutions such as 
Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac filed for bankruptcy. However, 
President Bush, congress, treasury secretary and federal reserve chairman agreed to use $700 
billion federal funds to bail out troubled financial institutions in order to prevent banking and 
financial system from collapsing. Nevertheless, the bailout couldn’t prevent a recession in the 
U.S. economy. Stock market fell sharply. The Down Jones Industrial Average lost more than half 
of its values (Blumenthal, 2013). On the other hand, financial institutions were unable to lend 
money which made businesses unable to pay suppliers and employees. Due to growing 
economic uncertainties people stopped spending. The production and trade slowed. Millions of 
people lost their job. In sum, GDP fell more than 2 percent at the end of this decade. This crisis 
has been the worst and longest financial crisis in the United States since the Great Depression. 
The energy, confidence and optimism about economic expansion at the beginning of the decade 
completely vanished at the end of decade. The U.S. experienced serious of economic shocks 
from beginning to the end of this decade that made this decade maybe the most tumultuous 
decade for the U.S.            
          In total, nominal GDP increased from $10.2 trillion at the beginning of the decade to $14.4 
trillion in 2009 (World Bank, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2018). Real GDP rose from 
$12.6 trillion in 2000 to $14.6 trillion at the end of the decade (World Bank). In this decade 
consumer expenditure was responsible for 70 percent of GDP growth. Net export’s negative 
impact on GDP growth increased almost 5 percent. Government expenditure and investment 
contributed 15 and 19 percent to GDP growth. Real GDP grew by 15.8 percent in this decade 
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which is the slowest economic growth of the U.S. since WWII. The average GDP growth rate was 
1.9 percent in this decade. U.S. GDP represented 27.7 percent of the world GDP in this decade. 
And in 2010 constant prices the U.S. made up 24.2 percent of the world GDP which was almost 
the same with previous decade average. 
 
Figure 13 U.S. – World Nominal and Real GDP (2010 Prices) 2000-2009 
Source: Compiled by World Bank, world current and 2010 GDP database, from 2000 to 2009; U.S. current and real GDP 
derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank and 
BEA database     
  
          Due to crises in the previous decade the U.S.’s economy bottomed out. The GDP was 
around $15-16 trillion in the first half of the 2010s (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). GDP 
growth averaged 2 percent during the same period. That means the U.S. economic growth 
stayed weak during the Obama administration. There were some reasons behind this sluggish 
recovery. First of all, the Great Recession was not an ordinary recession and it hasn’t looked like 
any of recession that occurred earlier since Great Depression of 1929. The effect of this 
recession was huge. Many households and businesses were not confident about the future of 
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decisions. There were also many uncertainties over financial regulations and taxes that also 
curtailed business activities in the U.S. From many perspectives, the fiscal policies were poor. 
Government budget cuts stymied economic growth. On the other hand, monetary programs 
were also too slow to provide necessary monetary stimulus. Uncertainties in both financial 
market and the real economy forced Federal Reserve to used “wait and see” policies many times 
which caused a slow recovery. Factors outside of the U.S.’s government and Federal Reserve’s 
control such as global and financial crises in Europe and elsewhere lowered the demand for U.S. 
products by that time which had negative impact over economic growth in the U.S. Another 
factor that had negative impact on economic expansion in the U.S. was high oil prices. Average 
crude oil prices in the first half of 2010s remained around $90 dollars (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2018). However, consumer confidence and economic optimism gradually 
increased after the first half of this decade. The Trump administration aimed to increase 
economic expansion through tax and spending programs (Timiraos, 2017). For fast and strong 
economic growth, the administration tried to increase consumer demand and economic 
capacity by stimulating investment and supporting labor force participation (Baily, 2018). On the 
other hand, Europe and many parts of the world began revive from the financial crises at the 
beginning of the 2010s which have positive impacts for the U.S. economic growth. From the 
same perspective, the sharp drop in oil prices since 2015 expanded business activity. Overall, 
the GDP growth rate in the second half of the 2010s increased by almost 1 percentage point. In 
2018 GDP growth rate almost reached 3 percent and in nominal terms the U.S. economy was 
over $ 20 trillion which was about $5 trillion more than the 2010’s GDP of $15 trillion. In real 
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terms the U.S. had $17.9 trillion economy in 2018. GDP growth rate averaged 2.2 percent from 
2010 to 2019.   
          In this decade consumer expenditure like previous decade is responsible for around 70 
percent of GDP growth. Net export’s negative impact on GDP growth passed over 5 percent. 
Government expenditure and investment, both contributed between 17 and 18 percent to GDP 
growth. In all, in nominal terms U.S. GDP represents 22.9 percent of the world GDP until at the 
end of 2018 and in real terms it is 22 percent of the world GDP. 
 
Figure 14 U.S. – World Nominal and Real (2010 Prices) GDP 2010-2018 
Source: Collected by World Bank and IMF (various years) for world current and 2010 GDP database; U.S. current and 
real GDP derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World 
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Figure 15 U.S. Share as Percentage of World GDP  
Source: World nominal and real GDP compiled from Earth Policy Institute with 1950-1979 GWP from The Conference 
Board (TCB), Total Economy Database, World Bank, BEA and IMF database; U.S. nominal and real GDP derived from 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, BEA database and Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World 
Bank Database 
      
Figure 16 and 17 U.S. Overall Economic Growth and Average Real GDP Growth Rate by Decades 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank, BEA, World Bank, IMF and BAE database 
 
          The Evolution of U.S. Inflation - Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
          The table below shows annual Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 1950 to 2019. The base 
years for this index are 1982-1984. In other words, price of (market basket) consumer goods and 




















































































































































































services is 100 dollars in 1982-1984. From the table, it is clear that except a year at the 
beginning of the decade, there was relative price stability in the 1950s even though the U.S. 
experienced two recessions. First recession was mostly about the effect of Korean War. After 
the Korean War, annual prices of goods and services increased to almost 8 percent which 
generated pessimism toward the economy (Achinstein, 1958: 3). Federal Reserve stepped in and 
tightened money supply in order to curb the inflation. Inflation slowed down and stayed 0-1 
percent for the next four years (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019); however, Fed’s 
contradictory monetary policy caused U.S. to enter into another recession in the second half of 
the decade which was more intensive than the first one. Besides that, there was a downward 
pressure on production which reduced overall economic activities in the U.S. By that time, the 
world also suffered from a heavy recession; a strong dollar and a dollar shortage in the 
international markets by that time limited not only U.S.’s but also the world’s trade. At the end 
of the decade, government increased spending for social programs, military expenditures, and 
major infrastructure projects such as Interstate Highway System in order to supply dollars to 
markets. However, these policies pulled prices little bit higher. Overall, throughout this decade 
the U.S. experienced relatively modest increases in inflation. This was definitely different than 
previous decade that the U.S. exposed to sharp inflation and drastic deflation (Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis, 2019). Due to drastic price changes in previous decade, inflation-deflation 
still caused a lot of fear in the minds of policymakers in the 1950s. The total averaged price 
change for the market basket of consumer goods and services was $5 in this decade (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). There was 20.7 % 
increase for the prices of market basket goods and services. In other word, the U.S. had average 




Figure 18 U.S. Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, Index 1982-1984 = 100, Base Year  
Source: Collected from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis,  
          Recovery from the recession in 1958 was very slow. Besides that, the Federal Reserve 
started to tighten monetary policy in 1959 even though the prices of goods and services were 
not that high (Bordo and Humpage, 2014: 12). The major reason of this policy was about the 
psychology of the Fed’s members. The Fed’s members had experienced high inflation after the 
World War II which made them very fearful of any kind of inflationary rise (Reed, 2014). In the 
late 1950s and early 1960s they believed that the prices were running high which would create 
inflation in the future (Reed). Therefore, they acted to control it by tightening money supply. On 
the other hand, in the previous decade there was a dollar shortage in the international markets; 
however, starting from the early 1960s this turned into dollar glut that seriously threatened the 
Bretton Woods monetary system. In order to protect the dollar-gold exchange system, the U.S. 
used restrictive monetary policies. These policies lowered the inflation about 1-2 percent 
(Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis). However, it caused a recession at the beginning of the 
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consisted of twelve measures. The prices were modest, rising at a very slow rate till the middle 
of the 1960s. The average annual increase of inflation was 1.3 percent from 1960 to 1965. 
During this period, government officials and economic planners implemented policies that 
increase economic expansion at the same time limit inflation. From that point, for example, in 
order to curb inflation, President Kennedy put pressure on industries and unions to keep wages 
and prices down (Raskin, 1986). However, things started to change in the middle of this decade. 
From 1965 to end of this decade the prices rose at an increasing rate. Prices of all components 
of market basket surged by more than 20 percent. The annual inflation was 4.25 percent during 
this period (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis). Many factors played role on this surge. First of all, 
President Kennedy and then Johnson aimed to accelerate economic expansion by using 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies which helped the economy grew faster than previous 
periods; however, on the other hand these polices created inflationary pressure in the second 
half of this decade. President Kennedy performed his twelve measures package include funding 
for poor, farmers and disadvantages people. He also created programs that gave medical help 
for elderly and aid for inner cities. His successor President Johnson expanded these programs 
and added new ones. His “Great Society” programs that included medicare, food stamps, 
elementary, secondary and higher education and public work and development programs 
dramatically increased federal government spending (Brown-Collier, 1998: 26). Meanwhile 
military spending grew drastically due to the Vietnam War. Most of these programs and 
spending were funded by deficit spending without raising taxes. Therefore, rising cost of these 
programs resulted in domestic inflation. On the other hand, wage and price control started to 
break down in the second half of the 1960s which also increased inflationary pressure in the 
economy (Bryan 2013). Finally, the constraint of the international monetary system was another 
factor that exacerbated economic situation in the U.S. Overall the U.S. experienced high 
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inflation in the late 1960s, that means the demand exceeding the supply which mostly the case 
in heavily stimulated booming economies. The total amount of price change for the market 
basket of consumer goods and services was $7.1 in this decade (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019).  That means prices of goods and services increased 
23.9 percent in the 1960s. U.S. average annual inflation rate was 2.1 percent in this decade.  
          At the end of the 1960s the federal budget deficit grew rapidly due to social and economic 
programs. Military spending also increased sharply because of the Vietnam War and some proxy 
wars against the Soviet Union. Government aimed to close the budget deficit. Federal Reserve 
tightened monetary policies by raising interest rate in order to slow down the economy. On the 
other hand, Bretton Woods international monetary system by that time was in trouble. In order 
to defend the gold standard, the Fed raised rates again. These policies in the early 1970s created 
a recession which lasted about a year. However, it was important that even though high interest 
rates and recession, prices continued to rise (stagflation) by that time which cannot be 
explained by Keynesian economic principles. High inflation, high unemployment rate and high 
budget deficit played important role on rising prices in this period. Beside that escalation of the 
Vietnam War and taking the U.S. off the gold standard worsened the overall situation. For 
turning the trend around, President Nixon imposed wage and price control (Ghizoni, 2013). 
However, that didn’t work well. It slowed the rise in prices temporarily. On the other hand, it 
caused food and energy shortages that created serious inflationary pressure. In 1973 the first oil 
shock arrived. Sharp increase in energy prices pushes prices of goods and services record high. 
President Ford’s “Whip Inflation Now (WIN)” program which encouraged thrift also failed (Bryan 
2013). The second shock came in the late 1970s. This shock was even bigger than the first. All 
components of the CPI soared dramatically. It is crucial that no matter what the recovery 
programs were, the prices continued to rise in this period. From that perspective, in terms of 
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price stability the 1970s was different than earlier decades. Other than the contributors that 
mentioned above, there were also some serious other reasons that played significantly role on 
price hike in this decade. First of all, the wage and price control program started to break down 
at the end of previous decade. Unions in this period started to have power and with that power 
they were able to increase wages. Due to wage increase, the unit cost of output raised which 
pushed companies to increase their prices. This is like a spiral that once it’s started, wages and 
prices chase each other up and up. In addition to that, expectation about future of the economy 
played important role on the creation of wage and price spiral (Yellen, 2006). During the 1970s 
workers and investors had expectation for higher prices for the future. This situation created 
another spiral in this decade that higher expectation led to higher prices and higher prices 
required ever higher expectations. From that point, the impact of tightened monetary policies in 
this decade was felt on employment and output instead of prices. Complicated polices that were 
used by Federal Reserve confused workers and investors by this period. During this decade the 
Fed repeatedly raised its rates to decrease inflation and then lowered their rates to increase 
economic growth and decrease unemployment rate. However, these policies (which is called 
stop-go policy) created an unpredictable environment in the economy that caused the prices 
rise. Besides that, Federal Reserve by that time was very skeptical to use restrictive monetary 
policies to control inflation. It was crucial that till the end of this decade curbing inflation was 
not a high priority of many politicians and Federal Reserve (Nelson, 2004: 8-9). At the end of the 
decade the average price for the market basket of consumer goods and services was $33.8 
higher than the price of the same goods and services at the beginning of this decade (U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). The total increase for the 
prices of market basket goods and services was 87% in the 1970s. U.S. average annual inflation 
rate increased to 6.5 percent in this decade.  
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          The early 1980s was the continuation of the 1970s. Prices remained relatively high in the 
early 1980s. However, one thing seriously changed which was the policy shift in Federal Reserve. 
In this new period Federal Reserve quickly signaled that inflation reduction became the highest 
priority of Fed (Medley, 2013). From that point Federal Reserve tightened the monetary policies. 
High interest rates caused a recession. Inflation fell down little bit during the recession, but it 
was still relatively high (around 10 percent) (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2019). From 
that point, Federal Reserve started to use expansionary policies that reminded investors its stop 
and go policies that had used in previous decade. However, Federal Reserve pushed its 
tightening policies second time. The Fed started to raise its rates again this time above 15 
percent (Sablik, 2013). They kept interest rates high till 1982. The economy entered into another 
recession which was more severe and more extended than previous recession. As the recession 
worsened government pushed Federal Reserve to loosen monetary policies. However, Federal 
Reserve continued to use high interest rates and tight money supply to bring down inflation and 
inflation expectations that had created in previous decade. Finally, this persistence paid off and 
inflation rate got down to 6 percent in 1982 and 4 percent in 1983 (Federal Reserve Bank of St 
Louis, 2019). Other than Federal Reserve’s tight monetary policies, declining oil prices by that 
time also caused inflation rate to fall. Oil price which was the main contributors to inflation in 
the 1970s fell sharply from $37 dollars in 1980 to $15 in 1986 (U.S. Energy Information 
Administration, 2018). This severe drop in oil prices pushed overall inflation down. Therefore, 
the inflation was under 2 percent in 1986 (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis). However, a 
year later energy prices recovered and inflation rate returned to around 4 percent till the rest of 
the decade. Throughout the decade the prices of CPI increased from $82.4 to $124 which means 
the prices increased by 50.4 percent and first few years of this decade made big part of this 
increase (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019).  It is 
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important to know that during this decade inflation dropped from 13.5 percent in 1980 to 4.8 
percent in 1989. Finally, the average annual inflation rate was 4.1 percent in the 1980s.  
          Like previous three decades, there was a recession at the beginning of the decade. 
Reasons of this recession were various. First of all, President Reagan’s economic programs 
resulted in both an economic expansion and huge budget deficit. Investors at the beginning of 
the 1990s started to believe that large U.S. budget deficit might cause a serious inflation in the 
future. Beside that a large number of savings and loan institutions in the second half of the 
1980s went bankrupt due to the deregulation of this industry in the 1980s (Robinson, 2013). The 
collapse of savings and loan institutions negatively impacted the economy. Government spent 
billions of dollars in this period to save some of these institutions which placed further strain on 
the government budget. On the other hand, the Gulf War increased the price of oil. Due to the 
Gulf War energy prices was raised by 20 percent (Lieber, 1992: 163). Inflation rate at the 
beginning of the decade stayed around 5 percent which was relatively higher than the rest of 
the decade. The Federal Reserve like previous decade focused strongly on its role in promoting 
price stability. From that point, the Fed used restrictive monetary policies. When the inflation 
rate dropped to 3 percent, this time the Fed used low interest rates in order to protect the U.S. 
economy from serious international financial crisis; such as the Mexican Crisis in 1995, the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997, and the Russian Crisis in 1998 without causing price increases in this 
period. Second half of this decade the average annual inflation rate was 2.36 percent (Federal 
Reserve Bank of St Louis 2019). During this period employment rose, national deficit decreased, 
wages increased and inflation fell at the same time. In terms of inflation and prices the decade 
of 1990s was an exceptional quiet and stable decade. Except 1990 and 1991, throughout the 
decade all-items CPI increased between 1.6 to 3.0 percent per year. Total price of CPI goods and 
services increased from $130.7 in 1990 to $166.6 in 1999 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
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Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). That means the prices grew by 27.4 percent in this 
decade. Annual average percentage change in prices was 2.4 percent.  
          Price stability in the 2000s was very much a continuation of previous decade’s price 
change even though the U.S. faced many tumultuous events in this decade such as dot.com 
crisis, September 11 terrorist attacks, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and finally Great Recession. It 
is important to know that Federal Reserve and its focus on price stability played a major role on 
that. Consumers and investors’ confidence for the future of the economy boosted at the 
beginning of the decade. However, this created a situation that encouraged excesses, then 
these excesses caused bubbles and finally bubbles turned into crisis. That’s known as business or 
economic cycle and that’s what started to happen in 2001. Sharp increase in computer and 
software industries in the 1990s increased the stock price of many software companies. 
Investors bought a lot of shares of these companies without knowing whether they are doing 
well. When the computer and software business slowed down “dot.com boom” turned into a 
bust which sent the U.S. economy into a recession. Sharp increases in oil prices from $19 in 1999 
to over $30 dollar in 2000 (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018) and September 11 
attack just worsened the recession. Meanwhile, the Fed just ignored the market and raised its 
funds rate. This act showed that the Fed was willing to bear recession in order to reduce 
inflation in the future. However, after 2002 for the purpose of increasing economic growth, 
Bush administration used expansionary fiscal policies and on the other hand, Federal Reserve 
lowered the rates and increased money supply. From many points, these policies were the main 
factors that contributed to another recession in the second half of the same decade.  Due to 
easy money policies, house prices rose continuously. Meanwhile, because of the structural 
changes in the financial sector in the 1990s and the early 2000s financial institutions were able 
to make high-risk and high-interest mortgage loans to consumers who had no ability to make 
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required payments (Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 2010). Everything seemed under 
control; however, things turned around when house prices started to decline. Wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, low consumer confidence and high budget deficit worsened the economic 
downturn. Eventually the U.S. entered into the worst economic recession since the Great 
Depression. Market basket consumer goods and services remained around 2-3 percent (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2019). Meanwhile, oil prices rose dramatically. The average 
annual price of one barrel of crude oil was $72 dollars in 2007 and the next year it increased to 
$99 dollars a barrel (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018). This pulled the CPI rates 
little bit up to almost 4 percent. However, in 2009 the price of oil dropped almost by 40 percent 
to $61 a barrel (U.S. Energy Information Administration). Low confidence for the future of 
economy, low demand and low investment dropped the CPI rates even in negative numbers at 
the end of the 2000s. Easy money and easy credit policies could not stimulate overall demand in 
this decade. People lost their willing to buy goods and services. Investors lost their enthusiasm 
to invest for new projects. This situation created fears in this period that the U.S. might 
experience the same thing that Japan had recently suffered in their lost decade (1990s). Overall 
all-items CPI grew 24.6 percent throughout the decade. In other words, at the end of the decade 
the average price for the market basket of consumer goods and services was $42.3 higher than 
the price of the same goods and services at the beginning of this decade (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). U.S. average annual inflation rate was 
2.17 percent in this decade.   
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          During the recession the Fed and government took many actions such as lowering interest 
rates, making regulatory reforms and giving out hundreds of billions of dollars through stimulus 
packages. This generated fears in the economy that these policies would lead to a serious 
inflation. Despite that fear, after years from the recession the predicted inflation has not 
emerged. Economic growth has been slow and inflation has stayed around 2 percent (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 2019). There were some reasons behind that. First of all, 
catastrophic consequences of recession in the U.S. and also in the world prevented consumers 
and businesses from spending and investing. Less spending and less investing pulled down the 
overall demand and supply of the economy. Investors’ expectation for the future of the 
economy is another reason. In the past, it was usual that investors demanded an interest-rate 
premium for the risk of inflation. However, since the financial recession investors have been 
confident that the Fed will keep the inflation low. Therefore, investors don’t need that premium. 
This is the situation exactly opposite from the one in the 1970s. In the 1970s, expectation about 
higher inflation led to higher prices and higher prices caused even higher expectation. However, 
in the 2010s both consumers and investors don’t have expectation for higher inflation. Due to 
the Fed’s success at eradication expectation of inflation, prices remained stable around 2 
percent in this decade. Besides that, due to the Fed and government expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policies, 
corporate debts increased 
significantly (Board of 
Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 2019: 9-
15). In addition to that, 













CPI Price Increase (percent)
Figure 19 U.S. Consumer Price Index Price Increase by Decade 
Source: Calculated from the table of U.S. Department of Labor Statistics. 
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prices of stock and real estates in many cities (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System). It is important that as prices raises their returns decline. That creates a situation in this 
decade that there is no incentive to lend or invest for these assets. In other words, expansionary 
policies of the Fed and government could not stimulate spending in this period. Finally, the 
economy in the U.S. has changed in ways that diminish its capacity in reaction to price changes. 
Evolution from more manufacturing economy (more price sensitive) to more financial and 
services economy (less price sensitive) create an environment that can only allow a sluggish 
growth with price stability. In all, price of the market basket of consumer goods and services 
increased from $218 in 2010 to $251.1 in 2018 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and Federal 
Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). That means prices of goods and services increased 15.2 percent 
in the in this decade. All components of CPI increase 1.6 percent annually from 2010 to at the 
end of 2018 which means prices of goods and services remained stable.  
 
Table 8 U.S. Consumer Price Index - 1982-1984 Base Year. Figure 20 U.S. CPI Decade Average 
Sources: Derived from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers; FRED, Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis and. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,  
 
          The Long Story of U.S. Debt     
          The U.S. involved with the Korean War in the early 1950s. However, unlike previous wars 
in the history the Korean War didn’t significantly increase the deficit. There was an increase in 
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military spending for this period but the debt only grew a small amount. $257 billion dollars 
government debt rose to $274 billion debts in the middle of the decade (U.S. Council of 
Economic Advisers, 2019). During the same period federal debt as a percentage of GDP fell from 
86 percent to 55 percent. In the second half of the 1950s President Eisenhower aimed to 
balance the federal budget. From that point, there were surpluses in 1956 and 1957. However, 
till the new decade in order to end the recession in the second half of the 1950s and to 
stimulate economy growth, President Eisenhower allowed deficit to grow though government 
spending. Interest rates were lowered during this period. Meanwhile, people in the U.S. started 
to use credit and clubs’ cards which also induced Americans to spend more for the new products 
such as televisions, washing machines and air conditioners. In total, the household debt in this 
decade rose significantly from $51 billion in 1951 to $141 billion in 1959 (U.S. Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2019). That means household debt as a percentage of 
GDP rose from 16.6 percent to 27 percent of GDP. It is essential to know that providing access to 
low interest mortgages through GI Bill was one of the main players of this households’ 
borrowing hike. Besides that, during this time the international monetary system was in serious 
trouble. The world at the end of the 1950s was experiencing dollar shortage. Countries in the 
Europe and Japan wanted to increase their imports for recovering from war damage; however, 
by that time the dollar was the only internationally accepted money. That means these 
countries had to have foreign reserves denominated in the U.S. dollar for importing goods and 
services (Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff, 2017: 49). From that point, the U.S. increased its deficit in 
order to provide liquidity to allow these countries’ economies to recover. Throughout the 1950s 
federal budget debt grew from $257 billion in 1950 to $288 billion in 1959 (U.S. Council of 
Economic Advisers, 2019). It is important to know that strong GDP growth in this decade 
compensated the effect of increase in government spending. Therefore, federal budget debt as 
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a percentage of GDP decreased from 85.7 percent in 1950s to 55.1 percent in 1959. Average 
annual government debt grew by 1.1 percent in this decade. Corporate debt on the other hand, 
rose from $70 billion in 1950 to $133 billion in 1959 (U.S. Boards of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 2019) which means an average of 6.6 percent increase for each year in this 
decade. However, in this decade the ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP decreased from 26.6 
percent in 1951 to 25.5 percent in 1959. Overall, the total debt increased from $378 billion in 
1950 to $562 billion in 1959. Even though total debt rose by 170 billion in this decade, it 
declined in ratio-to-GDP.  During the 1950s GDP annual growth rate (4.6 percent) was higher 
than total debt annual growth rate (4.0 percent). From that point, the ratio of total debt-to-GDP 
declined from 126 percent in 1950 to 107 percent in 1959. Finally, at the end of the decade the 
U.S. made up over 40 percent of world total debt (Mbaye, Badia, Chae, 2018: 14-20; World 
Bank, 2019) 
 
Figure 21 U.S. Debt 1950-1959 
Source: Derived from U.S. Council of Economic Advisers for federal debt and household debt; Boards of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System for corporate debt and nominal GDP from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. For calculating 
1950s household debt, nonprofit organization and household and motor vehicle loans data derived from Federal 
Reserve Bank of St Louis.  
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          At the beginning of the 1960s the economy was in recession due to mostly Fed’s monetary 
policies. During this period Fed believed that CPI was high that would create serious inflation in 
the future. The experiences after WWII played important role on that belief. However, President 
Kennedy aimed to growth the economy by increasing government spending and cutting taxes. 
From that point, he launched many ambitious programs to help poor and elderly people and 
improve education and transportation. On the other hand, relationship between the U.S. and 
Soviet Russia became very dangerous by that time. Serious confrontations brought two 
countries close to war. In response to that, U.S.’s military spending reached 9 percent of the 
GDP (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, 2019). In addition, in the middle 
of the 1960s the U.S. engaged in a proxy war in Vietnam which made military spending remain 
around 9 percent of GDP (SIPRI). Overall discretionary spending was 12 percent of GDP in this 
period (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). Meanwhile, President Johnson continued 
and expanded Kennedy’s social programs. He also created new programs such as Medicare and 
Food Stamps in order to spread the benefits of the U.S. economy to more people. Besides that, 
he designed social programs to fight crime and end racial and gender discriminations Thus, in 
the second half of the 1960s mandatory expenditure increased by 1 percent to over 5 percent of 
GDP (U.S. Office of Management and Budget). However, these programs had positive effect on 
household debt. In previous decade 10.5 percent of annual household growth rate dropped to 7 
percent in the 1960s. Throughout the decade household debt rose from $155 billion to $308 
billion (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2019) and its share of GDP 
increased from 28 percent in 1960 to 30 percent in 1969. It is important to know that during this 
period for establishing a presence in the international political and economic environments, the 
U.S. maintained a high level of overseas spending. Most of the programs and spending were 
funded by deficit spending. After all of these expenditures that included mandatory and 
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discretionary expenditures, federal budget debt increased from $290 billion in 1960 to $366 
billion in 1969 (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, 2019). However, like in precious decade 
strong GDP growth in this decade led to decline in debt as a percentage of GDP. Government 
budget debt as a percentage of GDP declined from 53.6 percent in 1960 to 35.9 percent in 1969. 
Annual federal debt increased by 2.3 percent each year in the 1960s. Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations fiscal and the Fed monetary policies induced corporations in this decade to 
increase their borrowing. During this decade like previous decade they heavily invested in 
foreign countries. Their debt grew by 7.8 percent each year in the 1960s reached to $307 billion 
in 1969 from $142 billion in 1960 (U.S. Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
2019). Therefore, their debt as a percentage of GDP increased from 26.3 percent at the 
beginning of the decade to 30.2 percent at the end of the decade. The total debt rose from over 
a half trillion ($588 billion) in 1960 to almost a trillion ($981 billion) in 1969. U.S.’s debt 
accounted for 36.2 percent of global debt (World Bank, 2019: Mbaye, Badia, Chae, 2018: 14-20). 
However, total debt decreased in ratio to GDP. Total debt in this decade fell more than 10 
percent from 108.5 percent in 1960 to 96.4 percent in 1969. 
 
Table 9 U.S. Debt 1960-1969 
Source: Derived from U.S. 
Council of Economic Advisers 
for federal debt and 
household debt; Boards of 
Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System for corporate 
debt and nominal GDP from 
Federal Reserve Bank of St 
Louis. For calculating 1960s 
household debt, nonprofit 
organization and household 
and motor vehicle loans data derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.   
 
Government Corporate Household Total GDP
1960 290 142 155 587 542
1961 293 149 166 608 562
1962 303 158 181 642 604
1963 310 169 200 679 637
1964 316 182 220 718 684
1965 322 200 241 763 742
1966 328 225 253 806 813
1967 340 248 271 859 860
1968 369 274 289 932 941




          There were some attempts to lower federal budget deficit at the end of the 1960s. From 
that point, Fed raised its interest rates; however, that caused a recession. The budget debt 
continued to grow in the 1970s. Kennedy and Johnson administration welfare programs in 
previous decade played the major role for government budget deficit. When these programs 
were created they consumed less than 1 percent of GDP. However, at the end of the 1960s 
more and more people began to benefit from these programs. Their share of GDP rose to 5 
percent quickly before the new decade (U.S. Office of Management and Budget 2019). These 
programs in the 1970s also created government obligations that caused deficit to grow. On the 
other hand, the war in Vietnam continued in this decade which generated higher level of 
military spending in the first half of this decade. Government budget deficit was $15 billion in 
1973, but it dramatically increased to $53 billion in 1975 and $74 billion in 1976 (U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, 2009). The sharp rise in oil prices due to the OPEC embargo was 
another main player of this debt. By 1979, federal debt reached almost $830 billion. It was little 
bit over $380 billion at the beginning of this decade which means government debt more than 
doubled in this decade (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, 2019). However, like previous 
decades debt as a percentage of GDP decreased from 35.5 percent to 31.6 percent. Moderate 
GDP growth (36.8% percent throughout the decade) in the 1970s was the reason of this fall. 
Averaged annual federal deficit was over $35 billion dollar and annual government debt 
increased by 8.1 percent each year in the 1960s. On the other hand, due to sharp rise on home 
mortgage and auto loan in this decade, household debt increased higher and faster than 
government debt. In this decade household debt was almost tripled. It rose from $317 billion in 
1970 to $890 billion in 1979 which means there was 10.9 percent increase each year in the 
1970s (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2019). Household debt as a 
percentage of GDP increased from 29.5 of GDP in 1970 to 33.9 percent at the end of the decade. 
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There were many economic, political and social challenges and uncertainties in the 1970s that 
undermined the confidence of corporations. On the other hand, the U.S. government expanded 
business regulations in this decade in order to defend employee’s and consumers’ right and 
protect the environment. In total, businesses held or cancelled their investment projects and lay 
off hundreds of thousands of workers. From that point, the ratio of corporate debt to GDP 
dropped 1.5 percentage points from 32.8 percent to 31.3 during the 1970s. However, the 
amount of corporation debt increased from $352 billion to $820 billion (U.S. Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System). The amount of total debt in this decade rose from $1.050 trillion 
in 1970 to $2.541 trillion in 1979 and its share as a percentage of GDP decreased just 1 percent 
from 97.8 to 96.7 in the same period. U.S. total debt made up a quarter of the world total debt 
(Mbaye, Badia, Chae, 2018: 14-20). 
  
Table 8 U.S. Debt 1970-1979 
Source: Collected from U.S. 
Council of Economic Advisers 
for federal debt and household 
debt, Boards of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System for 
corporate debt and nominal 
GDP from Federal Reserve 
Bank of St Louis. For 
calculating 1970s household 
debt, nonprofit organization 
and household and motor 
vehicle loans data derived 
from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.   
 
          President Reagan had criticized debt and deficit spending before his presidency. However, 
federal budget deficit grew even faster under his administration. In response to serious 
recessions in the early 1980s, President Reagan reduced the taxes and increased government 
spending to stimulate the economy in an attempt to create growth and incite a recovery. 
Government Corporate Household Total GDP
1970 381 352 317 1050 1073
1971 408 382 338 1128 1165
1972 436 417 375 1228 1279
1973 466 472 419 1357 1425
1974 484 534 460 1478 1545
1975 542 565 497 1604 1685
1976 629 595 557 1781 1873
1977 706 659 644 2009 2082
1978 777 738 758 2273 2352




Meanwhile, spiraling cost of programs that were created in previous decades such as Medicare, 
Medicaid, Food Stamp and Social Security continued in the 1980s. Therefore, mandatory 
expenditure increased to over 9 percent of GDP (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2019). 
In addition to these programs, there was a massive military buildup in this period. From 1982 to 
the end of the decade annual defense expenditures remained about 6 percent of GDP (SIPRI, 
2019). From that point, the total of discretionary expenditure stayed around almost 10 percent 
of GDP (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). In order to finance all of these spending 
the U.S. faced with higher interest costs. From beginning to the end of this decade the interest 
payment rose from 1.9 percent of GDP to 3.0 percent of GDP (U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget). President Reagan used several deficit reduction measures; however, to eliminate the 
deficit in this decade was unsuccessful. The average federal budget deficit in the 1980s was 
more than $150 billion each year (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). Government 
budget debt increased from $909 billion in 1980 to $2.868 billion in 1989 (U.S. Department of 
the Treasury, 2013). In other words, throughout the decade government debt tripled. After 
three decades of decline, debt as a percentage of GDP rose due to increases in spending such as 
military and social programs and decreases in tax revenues in Reagan administration. The rise 
was significant that the debt as a percentage of GDP increased by almost 20 percent from 32% 
in 1980 to 51% in 1989. Total federal debt grew by 12.2 percent each year in 1980s. Due to 
president Reagan’s expansionary monetary and fiscal policies Americans felt comfortable to 
borrow in this decade. Therefore, household debt rose from $1.003 billion in 1980 to $2.465 
billion dollars in 1989 (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2019). There was 
9.4 percent growth in household debt each year in the 1980s. Household debt as a percentage 
of GDP increased from 35.1 percent in 1980 to 43.7 percent in 1989. The situation was the same 
for corporate debt. President Reagan believed supply-side economics. Under this approach 
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government cuts taxes, lowers interest rates and uses other easy money policies to encourage 
businesses for more investment and production. That was exactly what happened in the 1980s. 
Due to these policies business debt increased dramatically. The average annual corporate debt 
growth rate was 10.4 percent each year. Corporate debt rose from $891 billion in 1980 to 
$2.390 trillion in 1989 (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). That means 
corporate debt as a percentage of GDP rose from 31.2 percent in 1980 to 42.3 percent in the 
1989. 
 
Figure 22 U.S. Debt 1980-1989 
Source: Collected from Council of Economic Advisers for federal debt; Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System for corporate and household debts. Nominal GDP from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. For calculating 1980s 
household debt, nonprofit organization and household and motor vehicle loans data derived from Federal Reserve 
Bank of St Louis 
In sum, the total debt rose significantly. It was $2.8 trillion in 1980 and it rose to $7.7 trillion in 
ten years. U.S. total debt as a percentage of global debt decreased from 29.5 percent to 25 
percent in this decade (Mbaye, Badia, Chae, 2018: 14-20; World Bank, 2019). Annual total debt 
growth rate was more than 10 percent (10.6%). Due to this massive debt hike total debt as a 
percentage of GDP increased from 98.1 percent in 1980 to 136.9 percent in 1989.   
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          There were two different scenarios in the 1990s. Taxes were raised and extended by the 
Bush administration in the first half of this decade. Despite tax’s hike in this period the federal 
budget deficit rose. The annual federal deficit was 200-250 billion dollars from 1990 to 1995 
(U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). Government dept as a percentage of GDP rose 
from 54 % in 1990 to 64% in 1995. The reasons of this hike were various that included spending 
billions of dollars for military and social programs especially in Reagan administration, bailing 
out a large number of saving and loan institutions due to financial and deregulations problems 
at the end of the 1980s, rising oil prices caused by the Gulf War in Iraq and Kuwait, and using 
expansionary polices in order to protect the economy from serious international financial crises. 
However, in the second half of this decade there was a strong economy and significant budget 
surpluses. Federal government in this period decreased the spending growth for discretionary 
programs. For example, military budget during this period fell from 5.2 percent to 3 percent of 
GDP (SIPRI, 2019). Overall, discretionary expenditures declined from 9 percent to 7 percent of 
GDP (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). Besides that, steady GDP growth and low 
unemployment rate in this period increased government’s revenues. More people had jobs and 
income in this decade that generated more tax revenues for government. On the other hand, 
reliance in certain mandatory programs fell due to rising income of people. That further 
decreased government spending. Due to budget surpluses the level of borrowing decreased in 
the second half of the 1990s which caused interest spending to fell. Net interest spending 
decreased from 3 percent of GDP to 2 percent of GDP in the 1990s (U.S. Office of Management 
and Budget, 2019). High spending cuts, strong GDP growth, high revenue increases and low 
unemployment rates especially in the second half of the 1990s contributed to the reduction in 
the national debt. Government debt as a percentage of GDP fell from 64% in 1995 to 58% ($5.6 
trillion) in 1999 (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2013). Economic policies and prosperity 
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especially in the second half of the decade increased wages and wealth of Americans. Due to 
their rising income, people were able to slow down the speed of their household debt. During 
this decade household debt as a percentage of GDP did not increase. It remained the same (45% 
of GDP). However, its amount rose from $2.705 billion dollars in 1990 to $4.793 billion dollars in 
1999 (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2019). That means throughout 
the decade annual growth rate of household debt was 5.9 percent each year. Corporations on 
the other hand, in this decade heavily invested in technology, particularly in IT. This huge 
investment led a dramatic improvement in IT producing sectors. Meanwhile, government 
supported corporations with its economic and regulatory policies. Corporations increased their 
earnings which made them invest in technology with their resources later in the decade. At the 
end of the decade, corporation debt as a percentage of GDP had increased by just 0.6 percent to 
43.3 percent. The total corporation debt increased from $2.548 in 1990 to $4.173 trillion in 1999 
(U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
 
Figure 23 U.S. Debt 1990-1999 
Source: Collected from Council of Economic Advisers for federal debt; Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System for corporate and household debts. Nominal GDP from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis of St Louis. For 
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calculating 1990s household debt, nonprofit organization and household and motor vehicle loans data derived from 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.   
Total debt rose from $8.459 trillion in 1990 to $14.573 trillion in 1999. During the same period 
the ratio of total debt-to-GDP increased from 141.8 percent to 151.4 percent. Finally, the ratio 
of U.S. total debt-to-world total debt was 24.5 percent at the end of the 1990s (Mbaye, Badia, 
Chae, 2018: 14-20). 
          The period of budget surpluses ended in 2001 and a completely different era started. In 
order to end the recession at the beginning of the decade President Bush used expansionary 
fiscal policies that included cutting the taxes and increasing the spending. These policies caused 
the debt to grow again. Especially household debt increased significantly during this period. 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attack worsened the situation. Due to the attack the economy 
stalled which cost government to receive less revenue. On the other hand, this attack 
dramatically increased the spending for homeland security. After the attack, the U.S. started the 
War on Terror which included wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. All of these significantly pushed 
spending to higher levels. During this period the federal debt grew at a rate of $400- $500 billion 
per year (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). Hurricane Katrina was another tragic 
incident that cost about $180 to $250 billion to U.S. economy in the middle of the 2000s 
(Blanchard, 2008). Hurricane Katrina and international political and economic crises pushed the 
oil prices almost $100 a barrel in the second half of this decade which increased government 
spending substantially (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2018). Government’s 
mandatory spending programs in this period also grew noticeably. Spending on Social Security, 
Medicare and Medicaid was little bit over 7 percent at the beginning of this decade. However, 
less than a decade spending rose over 9 percent of GDP. Total mandatory spending was 14.5 
percent of the GDP (U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2009). From the same point, 
discretionary expenditures significantly increased and reached almost 9 percent of GDP in this 
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decade (U.S. Office of Management and Budget) Toward the end of 2007, the U.S. has entered 
into the worst recession since Great Depression. Due to this recession GDP fell dramatically, 
many businesses went bankrupt and millions of people lost their job. All these factors sharply 
decreased government revenue. On the other hand, federal government used more than $700 
billion federal funds to bail out some of businesses. During the recession in order to encourage 
economic growth, the government created many stimulus packages. Government agencies such 
as Federal Reserve also provided additional programs. On the other hand, spending in existing 
programs like unemployment insurance also increased. The cost of all these programs caused 
national debt to grow at an unprecedented rate. The growth of federal debt was more than $1 
trillion per year at the end of the 2000s which roughly equaled to 10 percent of GDP (U.S. 
Council of Economic Advisers, 2019). Throughout the decade the government debt increased 
from $5.6 trillion in 2000 to almost $12 trillion in 2009 (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers). In 
other words, it more than doubled itself in this decade. From that point, federal debt as a 
percentage of GDP rose dramatically by 27 percentage points from 55% in 2000 to 82% in 2009. 
Annual growth on federal debt was 7.7 percent in the 2000s. On the other hand, household debt 
grew significantly, following the same path that federal debt did. Easy money policies such as 
lowering interest rate and supplying more money to the system made borrowing costs very 
cheap that induced Americans to pick up their borrowing to a record level in this decade. $5.2 
trillion U.S. household debt in 2000 grew by 9 percent each year till the end of decade. 
Household debt rose to $12.3 trillion in 2009 (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 2019). During the same period the ratio of household debt-to-GDP increased more than 
30 points from 50.9% to 85.5%. Corporations in this decade hold their investment due to 
deteriorating economic conditions in the U.S. and also in the world even though government 
used expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. In the middle of the decade the ratio of 
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corporate-debt-to GDP declined from 44.5 percent in 2000 to 39.5 percent. During and after the 
financial crisis government aggressively expanded its incentives. Tax breaks, loans and subsidies 
were effectively used in order to encourage economic activities. Corporate debt increased till 
the end of the decade. It rose to $6.377 trillion at the end of the decade (U.S. Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System). That means business debt grew 1.8 trillion (3.4 
percent each year) in the 2000s. In 2009 corporate debt as a percentage of GDP reached 44 
percent. In total, like in the 1980s there was a massive debt accumulation in this decade. The 
total amount of debt increased from $16.190 trillion in 2000 to $31.607 trillion in 2009. That 
means total debt as a percentage of GDP grew by more than 60 percentage point from 157.9 
percent in 2000 to 218.7 percent in 2009. Finally, the U.S. total debt made up 19 percent of the 
world total debt (Mbaye, Badia, Chae, 2018: 14-20; Adler and O’Sullivan, 2019: 12).  
 
Table 11 U.S. Debt 1970-1979 
Source: Derived from Council of 
Economic Advisers for federal debt; 
Boards of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System for corporate and 
household debts. Nominal GDP 
from Federal Reserve Bank of St 
Louis. For calculating 2000s 
household debt; nonprofit 
organization, household and motor 
vehicle loans data derived from 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. 
Starting from 2001 consumer loans 
added to household debt, and starting from 2006 student loans also added to household debt. Both data are collected 
from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
          Government continued to cut taxes and increase its spending in order to stimulate the 
economy in the early 2010s. These policies kept the federal deficit above $1 trillion till 2013 
(U.S. Office of Management and Budget, 2019). Federal debt as a percentage of GDP increased 
to 99 percent by this time. After 2012, the deficit gradually brought down to $440 billion dollars 
until 2015. Meanwhile, the economy slowly recovered and unemployment declined. The deficit 
Government Corporate Household Total GDP
2000 5629 4565 5224 15418 10252
2001 5770 4748 5997 16515 10582
2002 6198 4809 6687 17694 10936
2003 6760 4809 7548 19117 11458
2004 7355 4926 8543 20824 12214
2005 7905 5148 9627 22680 13037
2006 8451 5500 11206 25157 13815
2007 8951 6071 12077 27099 14452
2008 9986 6557 12443 28986 14713




started to rise again in the second half of this decade due to president Trump’s tax breaks. 
Trump administration, like Reagan administration more than three decades ago, believes that 
the tax cuts would pay for themselves through stronger growth and stronger growth would lead 
the budget deficit to decline. However, until the end of 2018 there was no sign of strong 
economic growth. Besides that, federal debt increased to over 100 percent of GDP. It is 
important that, in the second half of the 2010s President Trump keeps military budget almost 
the same. Therefore, discretionary spending averaged over 7 percent. On the other hand, 
spending for domestic programs such as Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare increased. 
Overall, the mandatory expenditures rose to almost 13 percent of GDP (U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget). It is crucial that all these spending caused interest on the national 
debt to rise which increased the cost of financing the debt. In sum, federal debt increased from 
$13.5 trillion in 2010 to over $21 trillion in 2018 (U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, 2019). In 
other words, the federal debt as a percentage of GDP grew by 15 points from 90 percent in 2010 
to 105 percent in 2019. Average annual debt growth rate was 5.3 percent in the 2010s. On the 
other hand, household in this decade still taking advantages of low-interest rate environment; 
however, total amount of household debt rises slower than in the previous decade. It is clear 
that highly indebted households in previous decade do not spend the way they used to even 
though all interest rates remain historically low. From that point household debt as a 
percentage of GDP decreases 15 points from 82 percent in 2010to 67 percent in 2018. Total 
amount of household debt in this decade grew by 1.2 percent each year. It rose from $12.3 
trillion in 2010 to $13.7 trillion in 2018 (U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
2019). Meanwhile, some economic uncertainties in the previous decade were reduced a few 
years after the financial crises which had a positive effect on business confidence in the 2010s. 
Due to rising business confidence and future expectations, corporations started to invest again 
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in this decade. Ultra-low interest rates, easy borrowing terms and broadly improving economic 
conditions play important role on corporations’ investment decisions. From that point, 
corporations boosted their debt at 5% annual pace in this decade. Total corporation debt 
increased from $6.117 trillion in 2010 to $9.484 trillion in 2018 (U.S. Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System). The ratio of corporation debt-to-GDP rose from 40.8 percent in 2010 
to 46.3 percent in 2018. The total debt increased from $31.923 trillion in 2010 to $44.638 trillion 
in 2018. The ratio of total debt-to-GDP rose from 212.9 percent in 2010 to 217.8 percent in 
2018. In all, U.S. total debt accounted for 18 percent of the world total debt (Adler and 
O’Sullivan, 2019:12).  
 
Figure 24 U.S. Debt 2000-2018 
Source: Derived from Council of Economic Advisers for federal debt; Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System for corporate and household debts. Nominal GDP from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. For calculating 2010s 
household debt; nonprofit organization, household and motor vehicle loans data derived from Federal Reserve Bank of 
St Louis. Starting from 2001 consumer loans added to household debt, and starting from 2006 student loans also 
added to household debt. Both data are collected from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
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Figure 25 U.S. Federal, Household and Corporate Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
Source: Data derived from Council of Economic Advisers for federal debt; Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System for corporate and household debts; Nominal GDP from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis of St Louis. For 
calculating household debt from 1950 to 2001, nonprofit organization, household and motor vehicle loans data are 
used which are derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. Starting from 2001 consumer loans such as credit card 
debt added to household debt. Starting from 2006 student loans added to household debt. Both data are collected 
from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. 
 
  
Table 12 U.S. Debt Growth Rate. Figure 26 U.S. Debt as Percentage of World Debt  
Source: Table 12, the data is collected from Council of Economic Advisers for federal debt; Boards of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System for corporate and household debts. Figure 26, data derived from Michael Roscoe, US Federal 




























































































































U.S. Federal, Household and Corporate Debt as % of GDP 
1950-2018
Government Household Corporate GDP
Government Household Corporate
1950s 1.1 10.7 6.6
1960s 2.3 7 7.8
1970s 8.1 10.9 8.8
1980s 12.2 9.4 10.4
1990s 5.7 5.8 5.1
2000s 7.7 9 3.4
2010s 5.3 1.2 5


















Figure 27 U.S. Total Debt as Percentage of GDP from 1950 to 2018 
Source: Data collected from Council of Economic Advisers for federal debt; Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System for corporate and household debts; Nominal GDP from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis.  
  
          Saving Trends of the United States  
          Two decades from 1950 to 1970, the U.S. was in a period of stability in terms of saving 
rate. The U.S. gross saving rate as a percentage of gross national income (GNI) averaged 22.1 
percent in 1950s and 22.9 percent in 1960s (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2015). The personal 
or household saving made almost 40 percent of the total saving in this period (8.4 percent in 
1950s and 8.6 percent in 1960s) (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019). Households’ accumulation 
of resources during and after the WWII played significant role on high personal or household 
saving rate. Besides that, experiences of serious economic shocks since Great Depression made 
people in the U.S. more likely to save for the future days in the post-WWII period. It is also 
important that, starting from the second half of the 1960s there was a housing boom as baby-
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reason that explained high household saving rates in this period. Finally, rising household 
income in the 1950s and especially in the 1960s substantially increased household saving rates. 
On the other hand, corporations’ saving was also high in this period. Average corporate saving 
rate was 10.3 percent in 1950s and 11.2 percent in the 1960s (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
2015). U.S. corporations in this period were very profitable due to lack of competition from 
corporations in foreign countries. Many potential international competitors of U.S. corporations 
by that time were struggling hard to recover themselves from WWII. Government saving rate 
was 3.5 percent in the 1950 and 3.6 percent in the 1960s (Kliesen, 2005: 6). Government’s 
expansionary economic policies, its military expenses and its spiraling cost of social programs 
from education to health care were the main reasons of this low level of saving. Non-resident 
saving in the 1950s was -0.1 percent and in the 1960s it was -0.6 percent (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 2015). In all, total saving before the non-resident’s contribution was 22.2 percent of 
GNI in 1950s and 23.4 percent of GNI in the 1960s. After non-resident’s contribution total saving 
was 22.1 percent of GNI in the 1950s and 22.8 percent of GNI in the 1960s. In terms of GDP, 
gross saving in the 1950s was 20.8 percent of GDP and in the 1960s it was 21.6 percent of GDP 
(Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2015). 
          Government saving rates declined in the 1970s. The Vietnam War, social welfare 
programs, oil shocks and recession in this decade significantly reduced government saving. It is 
also important that, in the early post-WWII period government branches tended to run budget 
surpluses; however, in the 1970s government’ s tendency toward budget surpluses changed. In 
this period, there was a mood in the government that was okay with having low level of budget 
surpluses or even budget deficit. Therefore, in the 1970s government saving significantly 
declined and averaged 0.5 percent of GNI (Kliesen, 2005: 6). Corporate saving rates which had 
slightly increased past two decades continued to rise moderately in this decade. Corporate 
150 
 
saving contributed 11.6 percent per year to total national saving (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
2015). On the other hand, household saving as a percentage of disposable income increased by 
1 percent to 9.6 percent of GNI per year in the 1970s (Bureau of Economic Analysis). Economic 
conditions and prediction about the future of the economy played important role on household 
saving rates in this period. In addition to that, Kennedy and Johnson administrations’ social 
policies were continued and even increased by Nixon administration that also played positive 
role on household savings in this period. Finally, baby-boomers’ housing boom continued in this 
decade which was another reason of the rise in household saving in the 1970s. In sum, U.S. 
gross saving rate averaged 21.7 percent of GNI in this decade. After non-resident’s contribution 
total saving in the 1970s was 21.6 percent of GNI. Finally, total saving averaged 22.5 percent of 
GDP (World Bank, 2019). 
          Due to government spending policies in the 1980s, the effect of oil shocks and recessions 
in the first half of the decade government saving rates continued to decline. Government saving 
rate turned to negative numbers as deficit rose. On the other hand, after Reagan 
administration’s business friendly policies, corporate saving rates slightly increased and 
averaged 12.4 percent in the 1980s (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2015). It is essential that 
starting from this decade business saving became the main component of gross saving. On the 
other hand, household saving rate increased slightly in the first half of the 1980s and then 
decreased steadily to below 8 percent in the second half of this decade. It is important that 
housing boom in previous decades significantly increased real-estate prices in the U.S. Due to 
rising house prices, many households in the 1980s significantly increased their capital gain from 
their houses. However, later in the decade this situation caused household to reduce their 
saving (Munnell and Cook). People in this decade also reduced their pension saving due to some 
regulatory issues. Overall, household saving averaged 8.4 percent of GNI per year in the 1980s 
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(Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019). After non-resident’s (1.6 percent) contribution total saving 
averaged 22.2 percent of GNI and 22.5 percent of GDP in the 1980s (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis; World Bank, 2019). 
          Government saving rate in the first half of the 1990s continued to decline. However, in the 
second half government saving rate turned into positive numbers and climbed up almost 3% at 
the end of the decade. On the other hand, household saving rate continued to fell sharply. It is 
important that like government’s experience in two decades earlier, the household felt ok with 
having low level of saving in this period. The average 7.4 percent of household saving in the first 
half of the 1990s declined to 5.9 percent in the second half of this decade (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, 2015). The drop in household saving increased the importance of corporate saving 
rates. During this period there was a sharp increase in investment for computer, 
telecommunication and software technologies. Due to these investments, companies 
significantly raised their productivity and then their profitability. In addition to that, 
globalization in this period increased the trade between the U.S. and rest of the world. In sum, 
corporations were able to keep their saving rate around 11-12 percent of GNI (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 2019). After non-residents (1.4 percent) contribution, gross saving rate in the 
1990s averaged 20.4 percent of GNI and 20.3 percent of GDP (Bureau of Economic Analysis; 
World Bank, 2019). 
          Government saving averaged 2% in the early 2000s; however, government monetary and 
fiscal policies and its persistent budget deficit due to Hurricane Katrina and wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan especially in the second half the decade drastically reduce government saving to 
negative 7.7 percent of GNI in 2009. Overall government saving rate was -1.1 percent of GNI in 
the 2000s (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2019). On the other hand, dramatic decline in 
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household saving rates continued in this decade. Gross household saving declined to 5.5 percent 
in the first half of this decade, and rose to 6 percent of GNI in the second half of the decade 
(Bureau of Economic Analysis). It is important that corporate saving was above 12 percent of 
GNI throughout the decade. From that point, corporate saving played a role in this decade that 
offset the reduction in household and government saving. In order words, relatively high level of 
corporate saving somewhat compensated the effect of decrease in government and household 
savings in this period. Overall, after (4.4 percent) non-resident’s contribution total saving was 
21.5 percent of GNI in the 2000s (Bureau of Economic Analysis). In GDP terms total saving was 
17.6 percent in the 2000s (World Bank, 2019). 
          Governments’ generous tax cuts and its various economic recovery packages in the 2010s 
substantially decreased government saving. In addition to that, government’s mandatory and 
discretionary expenditures (over 20 percent of GDP) also played important role on low level of 
government saving in this period. In total, government saving rate averaged -3.6 percent of GNI 
from 2010 to 2018 (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019). Household saving climbed up to almost 
8 percent of GNI in the first half of the decade and then it declined. It is averaged 5.9 percent of 
GNI (Bureau of Economic Analysis). Like previous decades low level of government and 
household saving rates increased the importance of corporate saving. Business or corporate 
saving rate was strong in this decade. It averaged over 15 percent of GNI which is almost 3 
percentage point higher than previous decade’s average (Bureau of Economic Analysis). From 
that point, like previous decade corporate saving in this period significantly helped to balance 
the downward trends of household and government savings. It is important that, this is not the 
case for only the U.S. Many countries, especially developed countries, all around the world have 
shifted their composition of national saving away from household and government savings 
toward corporation saving for more than two decades. For example, most of the industrial 
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counties’ corporate saving rates were around 10 percent of GNI and most of these countries’ 
investment was funded by their household and government savings in the 1980s; however, in 
the 2010s these countries’ corporate saving rates increase over 15 percent and two-thirds of 
their gross investment is funded by their corporate saving (Chen, Karabarbounis and Neiman: 
2017: 1-3). After non-residents (2.5 percent) contribution, gross saving rate in the 2010s 
averaged 20.1 percent of GNI and 17.1 percent of GDP (Bureau of Economic Analysis; World 
Bank, 2019). 
 
Table 13 Household, Government, Corporate and Nonresident Saving Rate in the U.S.  
Source: Household, Government and Corporate savings data collected from various sources of Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Department of Commerce, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Minneapolis, Dallas, San Francisco, Richmond 
and Boston. Gross National Saving data are derived from World Bank and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), White 
House archives and Federal Reserve Banks publications.  
 
 
Figure 28 U.S. Saving as a Percentage of GDP and GNI 
Source: Gross National Saving as % of GDP data are collected from World Bank and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
White House archives and Federal Reserve Banks publications. Gross National Saving as a % of GNI data derived from 
Federal Reserve Bank publications. 
Household Government Corporate Total Nonresident Total 
1950s 8.4 3.5 10.3 22.2 -0.1 22.1
1960s 8.6 3.6 11.2 23.4 -0.6 22.8
1970s 9.6 0.5 11.6 21.7 -0.1 21.6
1980s 8.4 -0.2 12.4 20.6 1.6 22.2
1990s 6.7 0.5 11.8 19 1.4 20.4
2000s 5.8 -1.1 12.4 17.1 4.4 21.5
2010s 5.9 -3.6 15.3 17.6 2.5 20.1




1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
22.3 23.6 22.1 20.8 19.2 17.7 18.2
20.8 21.6 22.5 20.6 19 17.1 17.6
U.S. Saving as % of GNI and GDP




          Fluctuation in U.S. Productivity  
          After the World War II U.S. productivity in the private nonfarm business sector rose 
steadily. Several factors played important role on this expansion. First of all, advances in 
productive knowledge, cost-reducing technological innovation and commercialization of these 
technological innovations increased productivity in the 1950s. It was important that all these 
technological progresses came from organized research and development (R&D) programs. Due 
to these programs many new industries were created such as jet engine, plastic and electronics 
industries. Besides that, there were many newly created consumers appliance products such as 
air conditioning, television, washing machine and dishwasher. All of these created strong 
efficiency gains in the U.S. throughout the decade. Other than efficiency gains, there were also 
capital-deepening. Businesses in this decade invested in more machinery and equipment which 
made employees produce more products in each hour they work. On the other hand, there 
were many changes in quality of labor. Increase in the average education and training of the 
employees raised productivity significantly in this period. Finally investing in public capital also 
improved productivity. During this decade substantial amount of investment in 
telecommunication, electricity and transportation networks such as highways and ports 
increased productivity of the corporations. In sum, total factor productivity grew at 1.4 percent 
(with 2011 constant national prices) per year while labor productivity grew at a 2.8 percent 
(University of Groningen and University of California, Davis, 2019; Sprague, 2014).  
          Productivity growth in the 1960s was the continuation of the previous decade. The growth 
rate fell by almost half percent for total factor productivity in the 1960s (2011 constant national 
prices). Like previous decade a great deal of productivity growth continued to come from 
technological knowledge. Technological knowledge and diffusion of this knowledge to new 
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industries improved productivity remarkably until the mid-1960s. On the other hand, during this 
period corporations reached new local, national and international markets with the investment 
in transportation and telecommunication networks. All of these helped corporations to achieve 
economies of scale. Corporations significantly lowered their cost of production with the 
advantages of economies of scale in the 1960s. It is also important that during his inaugural 
address President Kennedy spoke his famous words, "ask not what your country can do for you, 
ask what you can do for your country” (JFK Presidential Library and Museum, 2020). After this 
speech, President Kennedy was able to put pressure on industries and unions to keep wages 
down. This was another important factor that allowed corporation to lower their cost of 
production. Besides that, corporations in this decade entered into a period of consolidation. 
Many corporations merged and created stronger institutions such as ITT Corporation, Litton 
Industries, Textron, and LTV (Ling Temco-Vough) (Dean, 1970: 17). These institutions increased 
their capital investment which resulted in a growth of the capital-labor ratios. The surge in the 
rate of growth of the capital-labor ratio increased the productivity growth. From 1960 to 1966 
the average annual labor productivity growth rate was 3.1 percent. However, productivity 
slowdown started at the end of 1966 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019). Annual productivity 
growth dropped to 1.87 percent per year from 1967 to 1970 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
Overall labor productivity grew by 2.7 percent and total factor productivity 1.0 percent (with 
2011 prices) per year in the 1960s (University of Groningen and University of California, Davis, 
2019; Sprague, 2014). 
          The productivity slowdown started in the second half of the 1960s and in the 1970s it 
continued to decline. The rate of labor productivity averaged 2.0 percent and total factor 
productivity 0.1 per cent (2011 prices) per year in this decade (University of Groningen and 
University of California, Davis, 2019; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). There were several 
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factors that were responsible for productivity slowdown in this period. First of all, the capital-
labor ratios decreased due to companies’ low rates of investments (Giandrea and Sprague, 
2017). The reduction in the capital-labor ratio reduced the growth of productivity.  Second of all, 
in this period government increased its rules and regulations over businesses. New types of 
environmental and safety regulations were created. In order to meet these rules and 
regulations, companies used more of their resources which resulted in a reduction in 
productivity. The energy crises significantly lowered productivity growth. The price of oil 
quadrupled in this decade. Due to high oil prices, companies delayed their investment and 
slowed down their business’ activities. Research and development (R&D) expenditures 
decreased from 3 percent to almost 2 percent in the middle of this decade (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2005: 3-5). Decrease in R&D spending negatively affected productivity in this 
period. On the other hand, in the 1960s and the 1970s European countries and Japan finished 
reconstructing their economies from World War II. They strongly entered into the world market 
and gained a big share of world trade due to their scientific and technological changes. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. was experiencing an exhaustion of the post-World War II technological 
boom. From that perspective, there was a depletion of investment opportunities in this decade 
in the U.S. Finally, changes in labor demographics also played a significant role on declining 
productivity growth in this era. In the 1970s inexperienced young baby boomers and women 
entered into the labor force, while more productive and highly experienced older generation 
exiting the workforce (Dohm, 2000: 17). All of these factors caused a significant slowdown of 
total factor and labor productivity in the 1970s.   
          Labor productivity growth in the 1980s was not very different from the previous decade. It 
rose by an average of 1.5 percent per year which was just 0.4 percent below the annual average 
of previous decade (Giandrea and Sprague, 2017). Total factor productivity on the other hand, 
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grew by 0.5 percent from previous decade’s rate to 0.6 in the 1980s (2011 prices) (University of 
Groningen and University of California, Davis, 2019; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). The 
first and second oil shocks of previous decade and the recession of 1980-82 were the major 
contributors to low productivity in this decade. Besides that, depletion of investment 
opportunities still had negativity effect on productivity growth. Some industries such as 
telecommunication, electric-utility, automobile and computer, unsuccessfully tried to extend 
the ongoing exploitation of economies of scale (Shackleton, 2013: 11). However, they were not 
successful. Their failed attempts actually led to reduced productivity. In order to increase 
productivity in this decade companies got involved in the process of corporate restructuring, 
downsizing and reengineering. However, predicted outcomes could not be gained in this 
decade. It is also essential to know that depletion of earnings from the expansion of 
transportation and communication networks also played important role on productivity 
slowdown in this decade. Finally, a significant decline in non-military research and development 
programs in the 1980s was another factor that contributed to productivity slowdown (Eiseman, 
Koizumi and Fossum, 2002: 4).  
          There were two completely different periods in the 1990s. The first half of this decade was 
the continuation of previous decade. The labor productivity in the private nonfarm business 
sector grew at a 1.7 percent per year in this period which was not much above the last two 
decades rates (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). However, in the second half productivity 
grew rapidly, averaging 2.4 percent per year (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). Factors such as 
capital deepening, efficiency gains and increase in skill drove a dramatic improvement in 
productivity growth that started in 1996. First of all, there was a massive increase in the quality 
and quantity of capital stock that contributed a lot to productivity growth. This surge was not 
only about an increase in the number of machines that used for production, it was also about 
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large quality improvements. It is important to know that many of these improvements were 
because of the revolution in information technology (IT). In this period there was a rapid 
investment in information technology (IT). The investment for IT increased from 3 percent of 
GDP in 1991 to 5 percent of GDP at the end of the 1990s (Gorman, 2001). This huge investment 
led to rapid improvement in the information-technology-producing sectors. Overall the growth 
of IT improved the efficiency of businesses in production that helped to increase productivity. 
Meanwhile, the prices of IT products fell rapidly. Due to declining prices, producers and sellers 
of IT products had a positive supply shock. This also had positive impact on productivity growth 
in the second half of this decade. On the other hand, companies by that time obtained a lot help 
from their’- reengineering (adopting new techniques such as just-in-time deliveries, and cross-
training of employees), downsizing (laying off unproductive employees), and restructuring 
(improving corporations’ financial, legal and operational structures) attempts that had started in 
the previous decade. With this help in the second half of the 1990s companies used their 
resources better. During this period, it is also important to know that employees who took 
classes and leant how to use computer and IT systems increased their skills which result in 
boosting their productivity. In addition to that, increased rates of college attendance in this 
decade was one of the other sources that raised productivity. Low oil prices on the other hand 
permitted companies to invest heavily in IT which was another factor that accelerate 
productivity in the 1990s. In sum, total factor productivity grew at 0.8 percent while labor 
productivity grew at a 2.1 percent per year in the 1990s (University of Groningen and University 
of California, Davis, 2019; Sprague, 2014; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019). 
          IT fueled productivity growth lasted through the middle of the 2000. In the first half of the 
2000s annual average labor productivity was 3.4 percent and total factor productivity was 1.2 
percent (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019; University of Groningen and University of 
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California, Davis, 2019). After 2004-05 the contribution of information technology to 
productivity growth became much less important. The productivity growth dropped below 2 
percent in the middle of the decade (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019). The financial crisis of 
2007-09 and high oil prices in the second half of the decade discouraged business owners to do 
investment. During this period gross domestic investment as a share of GDP fell its lowest level 
(13.4 percent) since World War II (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). The lack of investment 
first decreased the demand and then productive capacity of the U.S. in the 2000s. Both factors 
in this period were major contributors to low level of productivity. In total, annual productivity 
growth dropped to 1.9 percent per year in the second half of the 2000s. Overall labor 
productivity grew by 2.7 percent annually and total factor productivity 0.7 percent per year in 
this decade. (University of Groningen and University of California, Davis, 2019; Sprague, 2014; 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019).   
          The sluggish economic growth after the recession lowered the productivity growth in 
2010s. The growth rate mostly remained under 1 percent in this decade. Forces that caused 
weak GDP growth (2-3 percent) and low level of investment (16-17 percent) (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2020) were the key factors on low productivity growth in this period. On the 
other hand, recent technological advances could not drive strong productivity growth in the 
2010s. In this era, it is very difficult to improve labors’ skill by increasing their educational 
attainment when most of the workers already have at least a high school or college degrees. 
From the same point, it is also very difficult to boost productivity by expanding transportation 
and communication networks as in the past decades that cannot be repeated. These are mostly 
one-time sources that already boosted productivity in the past decades. Finally, it is important 
that trade and investment increase competition and productivity growth. However, since 
financial crises in 2007-09 the U.S. in many cases shut down its borders and in the Trump 
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administration the U.S. lunched trade wars with many countries. This was another factor that 
slowed down the productivity in this decade. In sum, from 2010 to 2018 the average annual 
labor productivity rate dropped to 1.1 percent from 2.7 in previous decade. During the same 
period total factor productivity rate also dropped to 0.5 percent per year (University of 
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Figure 29 U.S. Labor Productivity Nonfarm Business and Total Factor Productivity from 1950 to 2018 
Source: Labor Productivity Data is collected (various years) from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Total Factor 
Productivity is derived from (various years) from University of Groningen and University of California, Davis, Federal 
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Figure 30 U.S. Real GDP, Labor Productivity and Total Factor Productivity by Decade 
Source: Real GDP data collected from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and BEA database, Labor Productivity data 
collected (various years) from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Total Factor Productivity derived from (various years) 
from University of Groningen and University of California, Davis, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and various years 
from Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
          Conclusion for the Second Part (Economic Power of the U.S.) 
          Before analyzing the findings of this section there are some key points that need to be 
considered. As it was mentioned earlier that U.S. economic power has been hotly debated by 
many intellectuals for decades. In these debates some of intellectuals strongly argue that U.S 
economic power is in decline. However, the reason for the decline of U.S. economic power 
changes for each of these scholars. Massive expenditures in the Kennedy and Johnson 
administration, economic crises in the Nixon and Carter administration, huge debt and deficit in 
the Reagan administration and weak neoliberal economic policies and financial crisis in the Bush 
administration are just some of these reasons that have been used by these scholars 
interchangeably. It is crucial that even though intellectuals use different reasoning in their 
studies, they all conclude their analysis with the statement that says it seems impossible for the 
U.S. to regain its global economic leadership in the world that it had enjoyed in the early post-
war period. However, how accurate can a research study be if any intellectual takes early post-
war period as a base era? In other words, is comparing U.S. economy in the post-war period 
with U.S. economy any time after that the right way of analyzing the question of “is U.S. 
economic power in decline”?   
          It is a well-known fact that WWII was one of the most important events not only in the 
20th century but also in entire human history. WWII was the greatest and deadliest war in the 
history. Around 60 million people were killed through six years of ground battles and aerial 
bombardments. Many cities and towns laid in ruin at the end of the war. Industrial, agricultural 
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and transportation infrastructure (roads, bridges, tunnels, ports, airports, and railways) had 
been destroyed. Millions of people were forced to abandon their houses and to move on to new 
lands. Poverty and hunger became common problems even in Western European countries 
which had once controlled most of the world’s economic resources. European countries 
(potential competitors to U.S.) had spent enormous amount of their money for this war. From 
that point, their gold reserves were quickly depleted. In addition to that, they borrowed heavily 
mainly from the U.S. in order to finance the war. Therefore, at the end of the war they were 
deep in debt. For example, before the war Great Britain was the world’s largest creditor; 
however, at the end of the war it became largest debtor in the world (Burton, 2020). Besides 
that, Britain lost most of its industrial production and more than a quarter of its wealth in this 
period (Broadberry, 2020: 30-31). In all, in the post-war era Britain was in a big economic ruin. 
From the same perspective, the Soviet Union also suffered heavy losses in the war. Over 25 
million people were killed which means that the Soviet Union lost more than 15 percent of its 
population at the end of the WWII (Brainerd, 2007: 1-2). In addition to that, its economy had 
been devastated. The Soviet Union lost almost half of its industrial base and a big share of its 
agricultural output (Kotkin, 2000: 188). Economies in France and Italy were also in ruin after the 
war. In Germany industrial production decreased by about 50 percent (Wunderlich, 2010: 3-29). 
Besides that, Germany like Soviet Union lost about 10-15 percent of its population in the war 
(University of Houston, 2016). Cities and towns, including some of the leading industrial centers, 
all around Germany had been destroyed. Moreover, Germany was divided into many zones after 
the war and forced to pay massive sums of money to many countries particularly in Europe. On 
the other side of the world, China was already in difficult economic condition due to the Sino-
Japanese war before the WWII. During the war Chinese economy was in tatters. After the WWII, 
China started its costly full-scale civil war with Communist forces. Most parts of the country by 
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that time were stalked by famine. At the end of the civil war, China came close to bankruptcy. 
Finally, Japan, like Germany, was mostly devastated. It lost its colonial territories, and one-third 
of industrial production (Okazaki, 2017: 57). Its GNP declined by over 50 percent of its prewar 
level (Okazaki). Besides that, Japan faced with a severe inflation and balance of payment deficit 
crises. Most of its population was near starvation in the early post WWII era. 
          In a nutshell, all previous Great Powers (and potential competitor of the U.S.) were in ruin 
and their economies were seriously devastated by WWII in the post WWII era. However, there 
was a country that came out from the war unscathed even though most of the countries were 
destroyed both physically and financially. It was the United States. The U.S. suffered very little 
physical destruction when it is compared to the destruction that other countries faced. And in 
financial terms the U.S. essentially benefitted the most from the war. This was an extraordinary 
condition in the world history and under this extraordinary condition a strong and steady U.S. 
economic expansion was anticipated in the decades following WWII. However, at the end of 
that exceptional period U.S. economic power was expected to gradually decline as previous 
great powers in Europe and Japan finished reconstructing their economies from the devastation 
of WWII. This is exactly what happened in the post-WWII era. While other countries such as 
Great Britain, France, Soviet Union, Japan and France were struggling to rebuild their 
economies, the U.S., on the other hand, increased its production significantly and raised its GDP 
from $300 billion in 1950 to over $1 trillion at the end of the 1960s. It is important to know that 
under this particular period of time the U.S. benefited a lot from wartime and non-wartime 
production, privileged status in the international monetary system, many direct and indirect 
stimulus and economic recovery programs, infrastructure and social safety programs and the 
advances in science and technology. Overall, the U.S. accounted for 37-38 percent of world 
nominal GDP and 28-30 percent of world real GDP from the early 1950s to the late 1960s. 
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However, this started to change when previous big powers finished rebuilding their economies 
from the WWII and caught up with American economy. At the end of the 1960s these countries 
strongly entered into the world market and gained a big share of the world market from the U.S. 
Meanwhile, due to the fierce competition from Europe and Asia and also drastic changes in the 
international economic system, the U.S. lost many of its advantages that it had enjoyed since 
WWII. Therefore, at the end of the 1960s economic growth of the U.S. began to wane for the 
first time since WWII. The pace of decline accelerated in the next decade. Factors such as social 
welfare spending, the war in Vietnam, the OPEC oil embargo, government’s monetary and fiscal 
policies and a series of international economic and political turmoil in the world created severe 
economic problems for the U.S. in the 1970s. Due to these problems, U.S. economic growth 
slowed down significantly. At the end of the decade U.S. GDP as a percentage of world GDP 
declined from 36-37 percent to 26 percent. However, in the following two decades the U.S. 
economy rebounded and grew considerably till the new century. The major factors that 
stimulated the economic expansion of the U.S. in this period were supply-side economic 
policies, low oil prices, stock market boom, scientific and technological development, 
globalization and rising trade between countries, appropriate monetary and fiscal policies and 
relatively peaceful international environment especially after the fall of the Soviet Union. From 
that point, U.S. economy increased from $2.8 trillion at the beginning of the 1980s to almost 
$10 trillion at the end of the century. During the same period U.S. GDP as a percentage of world 
GDP raised from 25 percent to almost 30 percent. Nevertheless, in the first decade of the new 
century the U.S. economy was in decline once again. It is important that the decline of U.S. 
economy during the 2000s was more severe than the one that U.S. had suffered few decades 
earlier. The first recession of the decade started in 2001 when many software firms went to 
bankrupt. In the same year terrorist attacks of September 11 worsened economic downturn. 
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Afghanistan and Iraq wars, Hurricane Katrina, high oil prices, inappropriate and ineffective 
monetary and fiscal policies and finally the financial crisis of 2007-09 were the other factors that 
adversely influenced economic growth in this decade. In short, the U.S. faced many serious 
economic and political problems from beginning to the end of this decade which made it one of 
the most tumultuous decades in the U.S. history. In all, throughout the decade the U.S economy 
grew only 15.8 percent. The U.S. GDP as a share of world GDP decreased from about 30 percent 
to 23-24 percent in the 2000s. The financial crisis in the second half of the decade had especially 
serious long-term effects on U.S. economy. From that point, early in the 2010s U.S.’s households 
and businesses were not confident for the future of the country. Therefore, they cut their 
spending and investment plans. Besides that, inappropriate monetary and fiscal policies caused 
the U.S. to have a slow recovery in the first half of the 2010s. On the other hand, high oil prices 
and the crises in Europe and elsewhere lowered the demand for U.S. products remarkable. 
However, consumer/business confidence and economic optimism expanded in the second half 
of the decade. The new administration launched various new tax and stimulus programs in 
order to increase consumer demand and economic capacity. Meanwhile, there was a sharp drop 
in oil prices which had positive impact on increasing economic activities in the U.S. On the other 
hand, Europe and many other parts of the world started to recovery from the financial crises. 
This also had positive impact on the U.S. economic expansion. The GDP growth rate slowly and 
gradually increased. At the end of the 2018 it reached almost 3 percent and the U.S. economy 
passed $20 trillion in nominal terms. The U.S. share of world GDP dropped 21 percent in the first 
half of the decade and then gradually increased to almost 24 percent. In terms of real GDP, the 
U.S. share of world GDP held stable at about 21-22 percent of world total.  
          Ultimately, it is crucial that if one looks beyond any particular short-term period and see 
overall picture by looking at the long-term period, he or she will find out that there is no 
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permanent and disastrous decline trend that has appeared in the U.S. It is certain that the 
power of the U.S. that measured by economic expansion (GDP growth) and the U.S. share of the 
world output has relatively decreased. However, this decline is not long-term and irreversible. 
American share of world output has only decreased from 29-30 percent to around a quarter of 
the world output. From the same perspective, there is no permanent and fundamental decline 
seen in the U.S. growth rate. It is clear that the U.S. has experienced a slower economic growth 
(2-3 percent GDP growth) since the financial crisis of 2007-09. However, this drop, like the U.S. 
share of the world output, is not significant and permanent. It is important to know that the 
average long-term economic growth in the U.S. was 3.4 percent from 1950 to 1999, and 3.1 
percent from 1979 to 1999. From that point, 2-3 percent of growth since GFC is hardly a sign of 
economic stagnation of any kind. Besides that, 2-3 percent of GDP growth would not be high 
enough for a developing country; however, it is a fair growth rate for a country that has massive, 
mature and developed economy like the U.S. In addition to that, even 2-3 percent GDP growth 
rate of the U.S. is higher than that of other developed countries such as in Europe and Japan 
whose growth rates have been hovering around 1-2 percent for decades. Therefore, it is crucial 
that if scholars used a more appropriate and representative base year (the late 1960s or the 
early 1970), they would find out that the American share of world output and its GDP growth 
rate were about the same then as it is now. There is no any kind of long-term, significant, 
disastrous and absolute decline. 
          The same can be said for the CPI. Many intellectuals worry about inflation, deflation, 
hyperinflation, or stagnation in U.S. economy by focusing on particular short-term period. For 
example, policymakers and Fed’s officials had experienced serious price changes in the 1930s 
and 1940s, which made them very fearful to any kind of inflationary rise in the post-war period. 
Due to this idea they used restricted monetary and fiscal policies that caused several recessions 
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in the 1950s. However, in the next decade, Keynesian economics dominated economic theories 
and policies in the U.S. This theory argues that during chronic economic uncertainties, countries 
face inadequate private investment and spending. Due to a lack of private investment and 
spending, supply and demand balanced each other out at a point that does not support full 
employment and high growth in countries. For the solution to this problem, the Keynesian 
economics support the idea of government involvement. That means in order to substitute the 
missing private investment and spending; governments step in, borrow money and spends on 
goods and services that increase employment and expand economic growth. This is what 
happened in the 1960s. Kennedy’s Twelve Measurement Package, Johnson’s Great Society 
Programs, and all other federal expansionary fiscal (intensively) and monetary policies boosted 
the economy and employment on one hand and created a huge deficit and inflationary pressure 
on the other. During this period, contrary to previous decades’ ideology, restraining inflation 
was not a high priority. Domestic and foreign policy objectives were more important than 
curbing debt and inflationary pressures by that time. Other than that, Keynesian economics’ 
solution for the high inflation was seemingly simple. In order to curb inflation, governments 
needed to cut the spending and raised taxes and interest rates. It was widely believed that these 
actions would bring down the prices. From that point, in the next decade social and economic 
programs of previous decades were extended. This increased the budget debt and also 
inflationary pressure even higher. It was crucial that Nixon administration had expected lower 
prices when they increased interest rates and cut some of the federal spending. However, that 
didn’t happen. This was something that cannot be explained by Keynesian economic principles. 
There was high inflation, high interest rate, low employment and low growth rate. The overall 
situation worsened with many domestic and foreign events. Prices continued to increase in the 
second half of this decade. At the beginning of the 1980s, policymakers and the Federal Reserve 
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officials drastically shifted their policies for inflation. They took inflation as government’s top 
priority and used severe restricted monetary policies for a long time to curb inflation and 
inflation expectation. This persistency paid off and the inflation rate got down dramatically. 
Around the same time, the Reagan administration displaced some Keynesian mixed economic 
principles and leaned toward free-market principles that include free trade, deregulation, and 
smaller government. For economic growth, President Reagan supported the supply-side 
economic theory. Under this theory large tax cuts and expansionary monetary policies were 
used for stimulating economic growth. However, this theory has repeatedly caused economic 
cycle since 1980s. In this cycle, expansionary economic policies that government officials have 
used, raised expectations, raised expectations encouraged excesses, these excesses caused 
bubbles and at the end bubbles turned into crisis such as in the late 1980s stock market crisis, in 
the early 2000s dot-com crisis and finally in the late 2000s housing crisis. Business or economic 
cycles that have continually happening from 1980s to late 2000s is not a high priority for 
government officials. It is clear that when government officials shift their policies and take this 
issue as a top priority, they will take necessary actions to avoid the next economic cycles. 
However, it is important that despite the fear of another possible economic cycle or inflationary 
pressure due to the economic policies used during and after the GFC, the predicted inflation or 
the chance of another economic cycle has not emerged. There are some reasons behind that 
include investors’ expectation for the future of the economy and the lack of incentive for 
investment and spending, diminishing marginal returns in businesses, shifting from 
manufacturing economy to more financial and service economy and demographic reasons such 
as ageing population. From that point, it seems that the inflation and inflation expectation will 
not be the policymakers and Fed’s top priority, even though there is more spending on 
economic stimulus programs. 
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          Like the decline in U.S. share of world production, rising U.S. debt is a serious concern for 
many intellectuals. Starting from the 1980s and especially in the new century, many scholars 
repeatedly discuss fears of the growing U.S. debt and its possible effects on the future economy. 
It is a valid concern that raising debt indicates serious challenges for U.S. economy over the long 
term. However, in order to correctly analyze the questions of how serious the U.S. debt is and 
how it affects U.S. economy; a researcher has to look beyond any particular indicator and short-
term data, focus on aggregate data and see the big picture of the story. From that point, it is 
important to know that the U.S. debt is not something new or something recent. For many 
decades since WWII, the U.S. has been holding a large debt (which is measured with nominal 
terms) that included the 1950s when the U.S. made up over 40 percent of world debt and the 
1960s when U.S. debt was 36 percent of world debt. It is crucial that most of the scholars pay 
specific attention to U.S. share of world GDP when they compare the health of the economy 
now and then or two different periods of time; however, they do not do the same analysis for 
U.S. share of world debt. From that point, if they take U.S. share of world debt into 
consideration, (contrary to their argument) they will see that U.S. share of global debt is steady 
and gradually declining from over 40 percent in 1950s to below 30 percent in the 1980s to 18 
percent in the late 2010s.  
          Besides that, it is also crucial that most of the same scholars take federal or government 
debt as the most important indicator and interpret U.S. debt concerns based on this indicator. 
Thus, very few intellectuals worried about U.S. debt when the rise in government debt was low 
in the 1950s (12 percent) and 1960s (24 percent). Started from 1980s intellectuals placed 
specific emphasis on debt due to a huge hike in government debt. However, total debt consists 
of three components; government, household and corporation debt. Household and 
corporation debts are as important as government debt. For example, household and 
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corporation debts played a major role in creating the financial crisis of 2007-09. It is crucial that 
when many households and corporations declared bankruptcy in 2007-09, government stepped 
in and used billions of dollars to bail out households and corporations. By that time household 
and corporation debts were largely added to government debt and government debt increased 
fundamentally (over 100 percent of GDP) in this period. From that point, if scholars pay 
attention to household and corporation debt they will see that the U.S. had a serious debt issue 
even in the 1950s and 1960s since its household and corporation debts by that time increased 
by over 100 percent.  
          Another important point is about GDP growth rate and its linear negative impact on total 
debt-to-GDP ratio. In other words, a strong rise in GDP rate plays important role on decline in 
total debt-to-GDP ratio, or vice versa. From that point, strong GDP growth rate in the decades 
after the early post-WWII period (as this study mentioned earlier that this robust growth was 
because of the extraordinary conditions of that period) was associated with a significant 
decrease in the total debt-to-GDP ratio. From the same perspective, relatively slow GDP growth 
rate in last two decades plays crucial role on the rise in the total debt-to-GDP ratio. For example, 
in both decades (1950s and 2010s) the total debt increased around the same level (44-48 
percent); however, in 1950s total debt as a percentage of GDP decreased from 126 percent to 
107 percent and in 2010s it increased from 213 to 218 percent. For another example, in the 
1960s total debt rose by almost 70 percent and in the 2000s it rose by over 90 percent. 
However, total debt-to-GDP ratio in the 1960s diminished by more than 10 percent (from 107 




          In sum, contrary to many intellectuals’ popular belief, the U.S. has run a big total debt not 
only in last few decades, but also in every decade since WWII. Another point, which is contrary 
to theory (that says high debt level causes interest rates and inflation to increase), there is no 
need to fret about high U.S. debt in the recent period since historic low interest rate in the last 
few decades allow the U.S. to shoulder high debt burden. It is noticeable that interest rates and 
inflation are declining steadily even though the U.S. continues to hold a high level of debt.  
          As in the debt issue, many researchers and intellectuals have been deeply concerned 
about the low savings rate of the U.S. for decades. However, it is crucial to note that most of 
these scholars focus on one side of the story by analyzing household and government savings, 
and overlooking corporate savings which is one of the major components of gross savings. In 
that respect, in the early post-WWII era, U.S. savings rate was relatively high. Extraordinary 
conditions in this period played an important role on household savings. Factors such as massive 
housing booms, strong economic growth, rising household income, growing social and economic 
programs and prediction about the future of the economy encourages household during this 
period to raise their saving. It is also important that experiences of serious economic shocks 
since the Great Depressions made household in this period much more prone to save for the 
future days. In addition to that, by this time there was a perception in the government that 
admire budget surpluses and high savings. However, the U.S. government’s tendency toward 
savings and budget surpluses dramatically shifted after the second half of the 1960s. Their new 
perception argued that it was fine with having low level of savings and budget deficit. A decade 
later, the same perception moved to households. Since then, there has been a steady and 
gradual decline in household savings. However, it is important that the decline in government 
savings first and household savings later increased the importance of corporate savings. 
Meanwhile, corporations significantly boosted their productivity and their profitability with 
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President Reagan’s business friendly policies. Due to this, corporations increased their savings 
considerably. Starting from the 1980s, corporate savings became the major component of gross 
savings. Corporations’ high savings play an important role for compensating the effect of 
decreases in government and household savings. The importance of corporate savings increased 
over the last few decades not only in the U.S. but also most of the other developed countries. It 
is important to know that most of the investment were funded with government and household 
savings before the 1980s and the share of corporate savings were around 10 percent of GNI in 
developed countries. However, after the GFC corporate saving rate increased to 15 percent of 
GNI and two-thirds of gross investment started to fund by corporate savings. 
          Scholars have also raised many concerns about U.S. productivity slowdown when they 
compare U.S. productivity growth in two different periods of time. In their argument they 
usually focus on the declining U.S. productivity without addressing the root causes. It is 
important to know that there were many factors that boosted productivity in the previous 
decades; however, their contribution to productivity growth eventually slowed down and faded 
away as time passed. For example, in the early post-WWII era (which was an exceptional period 
for the U.S.) technological innovations and commercialization of this new technology played a 
significant role on productivity growth. In addition, during this time there were rooms for 
increasing productivity by expanding capital deepening (i.e. investing in more machinery and 
equipment), improving labor quality (i.e. increasing education and training of the employees) 
and raising public capital (i.e. spending on telecommunication, electricity and transportation 
networks). The same factors continued to promote productivity in the 1960s. There was 
especially dramatic improvement in (public capital) transportation and telecommunication 
networks allowed corporations to reach many new local, national, and international markets. 
Moving forward, corporations during this period significantly boosted their production and 
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lowered their production cost. All these factors helped corporations to achieve economy of 
scale. It is also important to note that, in this decade corporations entered into a consolidation 
period. Many companies joined together and created even stronger institutions which helped 
them to raise their capital investment substantially. However, it is crucial that after they finished 
reconstructing their economies from WWII, previous big powers in Europe and Japan strongly 
entered into the world market and quickly grabbed a big share of world trade at the expense of 
the U.S. in the late 1960s and 1970s (which was the end of the exceptional period). Meanwhile, 
the U.S. was experiencing the exhaustion of post WWII technological boom and depletion of 
investment opportunities. There were many historic events in the 1960s that significantly 
changed U.S. politics, economics, and social environments in the following decades. These 
changes also had a big impact on productivity. For example, rules and regulations over 
corporations increased. New type of environmental, safety, and gender requirements were 
imposed on corporations. Corporations used more of their limited resources for meeting with 
these requirements, which resulted in significant reduction in corporate productivity. Besides 
that, due to gender equality requirements many inexperienced and less productive women 
entered into the labor market while highly productive and experienced labors was exiting the 
workforce. Depletion of investment opportunities continued in the 1980s. Contrary to previous 
decades, investing in public capital or the expansion of transportation and communication 
networks did not bring the expected outcomes. In addition to that, the process of extending the 
exploitation of economy of scale was not successful like in previous decades. However, in the 
1990s the revolution in IT improve the efficiency and profitability of corporations. As in the early 
post WWII era there was an increase in the quantity and quality of capital stock which played a 
major role on increasing productivity. In addition to that employees increased their education 
(by attending high schools and colleges) and learnt how to use IT system. In sum, capital 
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deepening, efficiency gains and increase in skill improved U.S. productivity remarkably in the 
1990s. The contribution of IT to productivity lasted through the middle of the 2000s. Since then 
its effect gradually slowed down. It is important that competitive environment in this period 
positively affected productivity. However, GFC and its long-lasting effect dissuaded business 
owners to do investment in the 2010s. Factors that increased productivity in the previous 
decades became much less important in the 2010s. For example, there is no rooms for 
increasing productivity by expanding (public capital) transportation and communication 
networks which already boosted productivity in the early post WWII era. From the same point, it 
is hard to increase labor productivity by increasing workers’ education attainment when most of 
the workers already have at least a high school degree. These are mostly one-time sources that 
already boosted U.S. productivity in the past. In the 2010s, their contribution margins to 
productivity were low. It is also important that starting from the GFC and especially after second 
half of the 2010s the U.S. closed its borders and launched trade wars with many countries that 
lessen competition substantially. This could be another factor that negatively affect productivity. 
Finally, the lower productivity growth rate in service industry (which accounted for two-thirds of 
GDP and over 70 percent of jobs in the U.S.) also played important role on decreasing U.S. 
productivity in this period.  
          In all, it is important that the U.S. underwent an important productivity growth in the 
decades following WWII. However, this growth was because of the extraordinary conditions the 
U.S. was experiencing by that time. From that point, factors that boosted the productivity in the 
early WWII era could not bring the same productivity growth in recent decades. Therefore, the 
low level of productivity growth (like low level of GDP growth) is the new normal until the U.S. 
raise its productivity again with another IT kind of revolution. Finally, it is important to note that 
low level of productivity is not a concern only for the U.S., but for almost all other developed 
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countries. For decades developed countries in Europe and Japan have been experiencing low 
level of productivity. From that point, the U.S.’s productivity level is much higher than that of 
most of the other developed countries.  
          In conclusion, the overall findings in this section of the paper conflict with the argument of 
scholars that support the view that U.S. power is in absolute and irreversible decline. This paper 
asserts that under the extraordinary conditions in the decades following WWII, the U.S. 
experienced a steady and strong economic expansion. This exceptional period of time came to 
an end after previous great powers finished reconstructing their economies from the ruinous 
consequences of WWII. Since then, the abnormal increase in the U.S. economic power has 
returned to normal. Therefore, if scholars, who scrutinize this topic, take a more appropriate 
and representative base year for their research, they will see that U.S. economic power is not in 
a continuous, long-term and disastrous decline. For example, the decline of American economic 
power in the 1970s rebounded in the next decade, and the U.S. experienced a steady economic 
growth until the new century. From the same perspective, after the sharp economic decline in 
the 2000s, which made many scholars believe that the U.S. economic power was in permanent 
and absolute decline, U.S. economy has slowly but gradually been growing again. It is important 
to note that the growth is lower than the potential; however, it is inaccurate to describe this as 








Economic Power of China 
          Introduction 
 
          As this paper mentioned earlier, since the early 2000s, many scholars have passionately 
debated about the rise of China as the world’s next economic superpower. This debate gained a 
lot of attention after the GFC. On one side of the debate, some scholars think that China has 
proved its economic power in the world by growing around 10 percent for over three decades 
and emerging from the GFC undamaged while other countries were seriously affected. These 
scholars believe that China is different that previous U.S. economic challengers, and will become 
the next economic superpower in the near future. On the other side of the debate, there are 
scholars who think the first group of scholars are exaggerating China’s economic achievement. 
They agree that China experienced an extraordinary economic growth over the last few 
decades. However, they argue China will face serious financial and economic problems that limit 
the country’s ability to maintain its high growth rate in the future. In that respect, these scholars 
believe that China is not likely to become a rival to the U.S. on the global basis; however, it could 
be a big economic rival to the U.S. on regional basis. This overall discussion made it necessary to 
re-examine the question of “will China become the world’s next economic superpower?” In 
order to answer that question correctly, and efficiently, this research study collects and 








          The Myth and Reality of Chinese GDP 
          At the end of the 1970s, China was still in the chaos due to its tragic Cultural Revolution 
that had begun in the 1960s. China’s GDP was below 200 billion dollars and its income per capita 
was not even $200 in a year (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). China was one of the 
poorest countries in the world with its almost a billion populations. However, after the death of 
Chairman Mao in 1976 Chinese government decided to change its Soviet style centrally 
controlled economic policies with more market-driven western style economic policies that 
included opening up trade and investment with some western countries that had no 
relationship before (Morrison, 2019: 4). The aim of this policy change was to increase economic 
growth and raise its people’s living standard. The economic transformation began in the late 
1970s and continued in the early 1980s with various reforms. During this period government 
authorities used expansionary monetary policies in order to support reforms financially. 
Government launched its economic reforms in agricultural sector. First of all, government 
increased prices of agricultural goods. In addition to that government gave relative autonomy to 
farmers over the land use and crop selection decisions (Lohmar, Gale, Tuan, et. al., 2009: 3-5). 
The new system created incentive among the farmers to increase their productivity. Increased 
agricultural productivity reduced China’s food constraints which freeing millions of agricultural 
workers to pursue employment in more productive sectors such as township and village 
enterprises (TVEs) (Harvie, 1999: 4). It is crucial that the success of the agricultural reforms 
motivated Chinese government to launch the same kind of reforms in the nonagricultural sector. 
From that point, Chinese government started its reform on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) by 
allowing these institutions to buy and sell output at market prices after they succeed in 
producing assigned quotas of production that transacted at official prices (Wang, 2018: 171-
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173). In addition, moderate autonomy was given to these enterprises in decision regarding of 
production, investment, supply, and marketing (Putterman and Dong, 2000: 413-414). On the 
other hand, economic control of these entities assigned to regional governments. These 
governments were permitted to operate SOEs on free market principles, rather than under the 
direction of central state planning. After all of these reforms, SOEs production increased 
significantly which result in a boost in gross production in the country. It is important that like in 
the SOEs case, central government gave provincial and local governments a greater autonomy in 
order to engage in foreign trade. After gaining autonomy, these governments created their own 
trade agencies in order to engage in direct trading of their products. The number of trade 
agencies in these provinces increased from 12 at the end of the 1970s to over 5 thousand at the 
end of the 1980s and the amount of trade rose from $30 billion to over $80 billion in the same 
period (Lardy, 1992 :694; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). Another important policy 
that Chinese government took at the beginning of China’s economic reform period was to 
creation of special economic zones (SEZs) in four coastal cities where central government 
offered tax and trade incentives in order to attract foreign investment. In these zones non-state-
owned enterprises including foreign firms were allowed to enter in industries which had 
forbidden in earlier periods. In total, these reforms had positive effect on China’s economic 
growth in the first half of the 1980s. From 1979 to 1985 China’s annual GDP averaged 9 percent 
(World Bank, 2019). In 1985, China’s GDP grew from 178 billion dollars in 1979 to 300 billion 
dollars (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). In terms of real GDP (2010 U.S. constant 
prices), Chinese economy in this period increased from $341 billion in 1980 to $565 billion in 
1985 (World Bank, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). The massive reform 
movement continued in the second half of this decade. It is important to know that China 
implemented these reforms gradually. During the 1980s government officials tried to figure out 
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which reform policies created positive outcomes and which policies did not. If there was a 
positive economic outcome of a policy then government could extend and use this policy in 
other regions of the country. From that perspective, Chinese government increased the number 
of SEZs from 4 to 14 coastal cities at first and then opened the entire coastal area as SEZs in the 
second half of the 1980s (Chen, 2018: 597). Deng Xiaoping’s decision of “Open-door” policy in 
the middle of decade played important role on extending SEZs. With this policy China drew 
more foreign direct investment (FDI) due to liberalization of the country’s economic system. 
Especially in the second half of the decade, Chinese government was very eager to attract more 
FDI; however, by that time foreign investors were still cautious about investing in China. 
Therefore, throughout the decade the annual average FDI was around $1.8 billion (Chen, 2018; 
People Republic of China Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), 2019: Amirahmadi and Wu, 1994: 
171-174). On the other hand, in order to increase trade, China enhanced its diplomatic and 
economic relationships with the U.S., Japan, and some industrialized European countries like 
France in the 1980s. Meanwhile, TVEs flourished in many parts of the country. There was also a 
significant growth in non-state sector. All these factors raised people’s income that increased 
Chinese households’ capacity to save more. High households’ savings and rising foreign capital 
inflows through FDI were used for investment. Investment mainly boosted economic growth till 
1989. It is important to know that during all these reforms periods Chinese authorities used 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies except for some short periods between 1980-83, 
1985-86, and 1989-91 (China Financial Yearbook Magazine, 2017; Laurenceson and Chai, 1998: 
396-399). In these excluding periods authorities used restrictive monetary and fiscal policies in 
order to slow down the growth and inflation. In total, China’s GDP rose from $260 billion in the 
middle of the decade to almost $350 billion dollars in 1989 (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 2018; World Bank, 2019). That means China’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 11 
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percent from 1984 to 1989. During the same period real GDP rose from $565 billion to almost 
$800 billion dollars ($797) (World Bank, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 2019). However, 
it is important to know that despite overall economic progress, some people wealth in China did 
not rise accordingly in this decade. That made a lot of people unhappy with overall situation. For 
example, agricultural reforms in the second half of the 1980s could not increase the productivity 
as in the first half of this decade. Farmers’ income drastically decreased. Besides that, Deng 
Xiaoping’s economic reforms in non-agricultural sector caused many corruption cases at the end 
of this decade. In addition, newly created Central bank in this decade took many poor decisions 
due to its lack of experience. For example, central bank in the 1980s validated so many loans 
that included bad loans in order to keep all banks in business (Bank for International Settlement, 
1999: 18-32). However, this situation created a balance of payment deficit and a serious 
inflation issues later in the decade that eventually result in an important crisis that plagued 
China in the late 1980s. Growing economic difficulties and widespread corruption motivated 
many people such as students, intellectuals, and many urban dwellers to start their protest 
movements. Their protests ended with Tiananmen Square massacre. Aftermath of the 
Tiananmen Square case, economic reforms were slowed down. Some western countries issued 
economic embargoes against China. Meanwhile, for decreasing inflation and soothing the 
economy, Chinese authorities used restrictive monetary and fiscal policies (China Financial 
Yearbook Magazine; Laurenceson and Chai, 397). In addition, Chinese government launched a 
serious austerity measurement that controlled FDI and restricted monetary flows. Therefore, 
the growth rate dropped from 11 percent in 1988 to 4 percent in 1989 (World Bank, 2019). It 
was tragic that the growth rate was even below 4 percent in 1990. Overall, in this decade 
Chinese economy grew from $191 billion in 1980 to $349 billion in 1989 (National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2018). In other word, China’s GDP increased by 82.2 percent. In relation to 
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real GDP, China’s GDP rose from $341 billion in 1980 to $797 billion in 1989 (World Bank, 2019; 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis) which means Chinese GDP increased 134 percent throughout 
this decade. The average growth rate was 8.9 percent each year in the 1980s. In nominal terms 
Chinese economy in this decade remained 6-7 percent of U.S. economy. However, in real term, 
Chinese GDP rose from 5.2 percent of U.S. GDP in 1980 to 9 percent of the U.S. GDP in 1989. 
Finally, China’s share of world GDP increased by 1 percentage point, from 1.2 percent in 1980 to 
2.2 percent in 1989 (World Bank, 2019).  
 
Table 14 China – U.S. – World Nominal and Real GDP (2012) from 1980 to 1989 
Source: Data (world current GDP) from 1980 to 1989 collected from World Bank and IMF; U.S. current and real GDP 
derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank and 
BEA database, China’s nominal GDP collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 
and real GDP derived from World Bank, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and National Bureau of Statistics of China.  
          After Tiananmen massacre, some conservatives tried to obstruct market-oriented reforms 
and recentralized the authority. These efforts generated dissatisfaction among public and 
government officials. Meanwhile, Deng Xiaoping retired from public view. As the final political 
act in his career, he made his famous southern tour in 1992 and delivered a warning speech 
about the continuation of reforms. A year later, Jiang Zemin who earned his popularity during 
the Tiananmen Square events for taking a hard-line stance against protesters, became the next 
N. GDP China N. GDP U.S. N. GDP World % of U.S. GDP % of W. GDP R. GDP China R. GDP U.S. R. GDP World % of U.S. GDP % of W. GDP
1980 191 2857 11228 6.7 1.7 341 6496 27871 5.2 1.2
1981 196 3207 11624 6.1 1.7 358 6661 28406 5.4 1.3
1982 205 3344 11514 6.1 1.8 390 6541 28529 6 1.4
1983 231 3634 11747 6.4 2 432 6841 29217 6.3 1.5
1984 260 4038 12180 6.4 2.1 498 7336 30533 6.8 1.6
1985 309 4339 12793 7.1 2.4 565 7642 31666 7.4 1.8
1986 301 4580 15119 6.6 2 615 7906 32742 7.8 1.9
1987 273 4855 17201 5.6 1.6 687 8180 33956 8.4 2
1988 312 5236 19244 6 1.6 765 8522 35525 9 2.1
1989 348 5642 20087 6.2 1.7 797 8835 36831 9 2.2
China - U.S. - World Nominal and Real GDP (2010 Prices) 1980-1989
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president of China. Despite western countries trade embargoes, under his administration 
economic growth was accelerated with his macro-economic reforms. These reforms led to a 
significant growth in Chinese household and corporate income. These large levels of income 
made it possible for China to support high level of investment. At the end, high level of 
investment boosted China’s economic growth like in the previous decade. It is crucial to know 
that most of the investment had been made on state sector in the previous decade. In the 
1990s, the resources to support SOEs gradually increased. However, even though there was a 
relative improvement on SOEs’ performance from the previous decade, they were still lagged 
behind other enterprises, particularly private enterprises. From that point, financial institutions 
raised its loans for SOEs to cover their expenses. Nevertheless, it became clear that most of 
these loans were non-performing loans which eventually created serious deficit and chronic high 
inflation around the middle of this decade. In 1994 the inflation rate even reached 25 percent 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2019). President Zemin realized that this could no longer 
be sustained before the middle of the 1990s. From that point, Chinese government reduced its 
commitment to SOEs. Government authorities closed down many unprofitable SOEs or let them 
to go bankrupt in order to make rest of these enterprises more competitive and productive. 
Besides that, some SOEs were sold to their workers at privileged low rates and some other SOEs 
were privatized. On the other hand, private investment sharply increased in this decade. Its 
share in the economy rose from 3-4 percent in 1990 to over 14 percent at the end of the 1990s 
(Lardy, 2014: 83). From the same point, the share of the private enterprises in industry sector 
rose from 30 percent in the middle of the decade to around 70 percent at the end of the decade 
(Hofman, 2018: 55, 63). Like in the previous decade, structural shift in resources such as moving 
employment from agricultural sector to non-agricultural sectors continued in this decade that 
also had positive effect on economic growth. In addition to that, China’s economy benefited a 
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lot by integrating with the world economy in this decade. Chinese authorities in the 1990s 
changed its model of growth to an export-oriented philosophy. From that perspective, Chinese 
government adopted market-oriented macroeconomic policies. At the end of the first half of 
this decade Chinese government severely devalued the currency (the dollar to yuan exchange 
rate drastically increased from 5.8 in 1993 to 8.6 in 1994), and used extremely favorable 
monetary policies in order to boost export (World Bank, 2018). China became the workshop of 
the world with these and other aggressive growth-oriented policies. Chinese exports growth 
rapidly accelerated which made China to acquire a special place in the global production chain. 
The value of export of goods and services increased from almost $50 billion in 1990 to almost 
$200 billion in 1999 (World Bank, 2019; National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2019). From that 
point, export as percentage of GDP rose from 13.6 percent in 1990 to 18.2 percent in 1999 
(World Bank). In addition, trade-investment reforms, cheap workforce and stable and repressive 
labor laws created a huge surge in FDIs inflow in this decade. It is important that, in previous 
decade Chinese government already experienced some FDI inflows that significantly contributed 
to China’s economy growth in terms of employment creation, export accumulation and 
technology transfer. From that perspective, Chinese government decided to launch new policies 
and regulations that liberalized its FDI regime in order to attract more FDI in the 1990s. In 
addition to that, in this decade Chinese policymakers opened more SEZs in cities particularly in 
inland and border areas. In sum, throughout the decade the FDI increased significantly from $4 
billion in 1990 to over $40 billion in 1999 even though there was serious financial crisis in the 
region at the end of the decade (Zebregs, and Tseng, 2002: 3). Due to this surge, China’s 
productivity and overall economy grew substantially. It is important that during the 1990s 
Chinese government launched a program that aimed to sell off collective housings to their 
occupiers. That program also had positive effect on GDP growth. Finally, after Central Bank’s 
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inexperienced policies many banks were technically insolvent in previous decade. In the 1990s 
Central Bank of China used growth-oriented monetary policies that significantly accelerated GDP 
growth. However, it was an exception that from 1993 to 1996 there was a high level of price 
instability in China. In this period average annual prices grew more than 18 percent (National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2019). However, after few years of restrictive monetary and fiscal 
policies, the inflation rate dropped to 2 percent (National Bureau of Statistics of China). The 
economy started to grow over 10 percent in this decade. This time the growth was stronger 
than the one in the previous decade. From 1991 to 1997 China’s grew at an average annual rate 
of 11.5 percent. The GDP increased from 383 billion dollars to almost 1 trillion dollars (961 
billion dollars) (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). In order words, this growth enabled 
China to more than double the size of its economy in 7 years. However, China’s economic 
growth rate slowed down to 7 percent in 1998 and 1999 due to the impact of Asian financial 
crisis. The Asian financial crisis affected China through decline in the growth rate of export 
volume, and decline in FDI. However, factors such as holding significant amount of foreign 
reserves, having a currency that was not freely convertible, boosting public spending, using 
proactive monetary policies and receiving capital inflows for long time investment protected 
China from the worst effects of the crisis. At the end of the decade, two foreign colonies 
returned to China, Hong Kong from Britain in 1997 and Macau from Portugal in 1999, which also 
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created a positive effect for the economy. 
 
Table 15 China – U.S. – World Nominal and Real GDP (2012) from 1980 to 1989 
Source: China’s nominal GDP collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook and real 
GDP derived from World Bank, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and National Bureau of Statistics of China. World 
nominal GDP derived from World Bank and IMF; U.S. current and real GDP derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St 
Louis Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank and BEA database. 
In total, at the end of the 1990s China’s nominal GDP rose from $361 billion in 1990 to over 1 
trillion dollars ($1.093 trillion) (National Bureau of Statistics of China; World Bank, 2019). In 
terms of real GDP, Chinese economy overall increased from $828 billion in 1990 to $2.057 
trillion in 1999 which means China’s GDP rose by 148.4 percent in this decade (World Bank, 
2019; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). The average growth rate was 10 percent each 
year in the 1990s. China’s GDP increased from 6.05 percent of U.S. in 1990 to 11.4 percent of 
U.S. GDP in 1999. In real terms, China’s GDP rose from 9.2 percent of U.S. GDP to 17 percent of 
U.S. GDP during the same period. Finally, China’s share of world GDP increased from 1.6 percent 
in 1990 to 3.4 percent in 1999 (World Bank, 2019). 
          After a decade of Jiang Zemin presidency, Hu Jintao became general secretary of the 
Communist Party and then the president of China in 2002. Under his administration China 
experienced a rapid and robust economic growth. However, most of the causes of this economic 
N. GDP China N. GDP U.S. N. GDP World % of U.S. GDP % of W. GDP R. GDP China R. GDP U.S. R. GDP World % of U.S. GDP % of W. GDP
1990 361 5963 22626 6 1.6 828 9001 37905 9.2 2.2
1991 383 6158 23967 6.2 1.6 905 8991 38447 10.1 2.3
1992 427 6520 25453 6.5 1.7 1033 9308 39126 11.1 2.6
1993 445 6859 25858 6.5 1.7 1177 9564 39725 12.3 3
1994 564 7287 27771 7.7 2 1330 9950 40917 13.4 3.2
1995 734 7640 30887 9.6 2.4 1476 10217 42153 14.4 3.5
1996 864 8073 31573 10.7 2.7 1622 10602 43582 15.3 3.7
1997 962 8577 31458 11.2 3.1 1772 11074 45183 16 3.9
1998 1029 9063 31393 11.3 3.3 1911 11570 46338 16.5 4.1
1999 1094 9631 32562 11.4 3.4 2057 12120 47843 17 4.3
China - U.S. - World Nominal and Real GDP (2010 Prices) 1990-1999
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growth were because of his predecessor Jiang Zemin’s implementation of reforms in the 1990s. 
Like in the previous decade, factors such as large-scale capital investment, urbanization and 
productivity growth were the main drivers of economic development in this decade. Integration 
with the world economy continued in the 2000s. The process started with four SEZs in the early 
1980s, expanded to 14 zones first and whole coastal economic zones later. Riparian and inland 
regions were followed that. Finally, this trend reached its peak in 2001 by joining the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Besides that, China signed economic treaties with many Asian, 
European, African and American countries such as Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 
China-ASEAN, China-Chile, Chine-Iceland, China-Switzerland, and China-Korea Free Trade 
Agreements. All of these turned out to boost Chinese export during this period. China’s average 
annual export growth was almost 30 percent from 2001 to 2008 (Yao, 2018: 76). The value of 
export rose from $250 billion in 2000 to $1.262 billion in 2009 (World Bank, 2018; National 
Bureau of National Statistics of China Statistical Yearbook, 2018). Export as a percentage of GDP 
during the same period grew significantly. It was 20.9 percent of GDP in 2000, 36 percent of GDP 
in 2006 (World Bank, 2018). Due to global financial crisis at the end of the 2000s it dropped to 
24.7 percent of GDP in 2009 (World Bank). However, even though serious financial crisis in the 
world China became the largest exporter in the world at the end of this decade. It is important 
that in previous decade Jiang Zemin reduced legal barriers for acquiring private enterprises. On 
the other hand, Zemin shut down many unproductive state enterprises which created space for 
productive private enterprises in the 2000s. After experiencing high productivity and high GDP 
growth because of these policies, Hu Jintao in this decade accelerated privatization of SOEs and 
TVEs in order to boost the economy further. These newly privatized enterprises pursued more 
productive activities than SOEs and TVEs. On the other hand, some of SOEs and TVEs gained 
back. In 2003 Chinese government established the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
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Administration Commission (SASAC) for overseeing some of SOEs’ (large size SOEs) investment, 
profits and growth projects (Song, 2018: 356). In addition to that, central government specified 
some critical (strategic and pillar) industries and used SOEs to retain the control of these 
industries (Lardy, 2018: 335). Meanwhile, central government also launched many financial and 
industrial policies that in favor of SOEs. As a result of these policies, at the end of the decade 
many SOEs become among the largest corporations in the world (Mourdoukoutas, 2019). Their 
assets and output increased while their number and the share of contribution to the economy 
continued to fall. In this decade China’s economy benefited from additions to labor force. Tens 
of millions of people from rural regions moved to coastal provinces to find job in manufacturing 
and service sectors (Gregory and Meng, 2018: 398-399). This created a situation that kept wages 
and also cost of production low. In the second half of the 1990s, due to China’s trade and 
investment reforms foreign investment in China rose. In the 2000s the extension of economic 
reforms and the membership of the WTO accelerated foreign direct investment (FDI). It was 
essential to know that due to lack of free market principles in the 1980s and in the early 1990s 
FDI inflows increased moderately in China. By that time, total flow of FDI was lower than $10 
billion (Davies, 2013: 10-11). However, the amount rose over 40 billion in the second half of the 
1990s, $50 billion in the early 2000s, $70 billion in the middle of 2000s (10 percent of world FDI) 
and finally over $100 billion dollar (20 percent of the world FDI) at the end of the 2000s (Davies, 
10-13). Rising FDI inflows in China increased demand for labor, capital formation, technology 
transfer and human capital accumulation which significantly contributed to economic 
development of the country in the 2000s. GDP average growth rate in China was 10.5 percent 
from 2000 to 2007. China’s GDP rose from $1.211 trillion in 2000 to $3.550 trillion in 2007 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2019). However, the Great Recession of 2007-09 slowed 
down China’s economic growth. Chinese export dropped down more than 10 percent of GDP to 
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around 24 percent of GDP (World Bank, 2019). GDP fell from over 14 percent annual growth in 
2007 to around 9 percent in 2008 (National Bureau of National Statistics of China, China 
Statistical Yearbook, 2019). Nevertheless, Chinese government quickly reacted to this downfall 
by injecting $600 billion, over 12 percent of GDP, in various sectors of the economy (Bradsher, 
2009). Regional and local governments launched to build roads, bridges, dams, rails and all other 
infrastructure works in order to keep the economy afloat. Financial institutions gave out millions 
of renminbi (RMB) mainly to SOEs and private companies for financing their investments. It is 
important to know that even during the Great Recession Chinese government did not aim to 
increase domestic consumption that much because this would have caused a wage hike. A wage 
hike would have increased the cost of productions and a higher cost of productions would have 
slowed down Chinese exports that China’s economy was not ready to face. That policy worked 
out well. After a few years from the crisis Chinese investment and production increased as fast 
on average as in the early years of decade. Growth rate returned to over 10 percent in 2010. 
Overall, from 2000 to 2009, China’s GDP rose from $1.211 trillion in 2000 to $5.102 trillion in 
2009 (National Bureau of Statistics of China; World Bank, 2019). During the same period real 
GDP increased from $2.232 trillion to $5.502 trillion (World Bank, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of 
St Louis 2019). Real GDP grew by 146.5 percent in this decade. The average GDP growth rate 
was 10.3 percent each year in the 2000s. China’s GDP increased from 11.8 percent of U.S. GDP 
in 2000 to 35.3 percent of U.S. GDP in 2009. In real terms, China’s GDP rose from 17.7 percent of 
U.S. GDP to 37.6 percent of U.S. GDP during the same period. Finally, China’s share of world GDP 





Figure 31 and 32 China, U.S. and World Nominal and Real GDP (2010 Prices) from 2000 to 2009 
Source:  World current and constant price GDP database derived from World Bank, IMF and Federal Bank of St Louis; 
U.S. current and real GDP derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ 
Economist / World Bank and BEA database, China’s nominal GDP collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
China Statistical Yearbook and real GDP derived from World Bank, IMF, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and National 
Bureau of Statistics of China.  
          Few years after the global economic slowdown, the rate of GDP growth in China started to 
decline again. It is crucial that, this economic slowdown is not a cyclical downturn that China had 
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which seems very different than previous economic downturns. In 2018 the GDP growth rate of 
China gradually dropped from 10.6 percent at the beginning of the decade to 6.6 percent. 
Causes of this downturn are various. First of all, productivity which was one of the main drivers 
of economic growth in earlier periods has started to decline in the 2010s. Factors such as 
increasing quality and quantity of the labor force, transition to market driven prices, allocating 
resources more efficiently, foreign direct investment and their technology transfer continue to 
contribute productivity growth; however, in the 2010s their contribution to productivity is not 
the same pace of the past. It is much smaller. For example, the value of FDI grew by 100 percent 

















China (MOFCOM) various years. 
The value of FDI in this decade increased from $110 billion in 2010 to around $135 billion in 
2017 which means FDI increased by 22.7 percent (People’s Republic of China, Ministry of 
Commerce (MOFCOM) 2019; Chen, 596; Kroeber, 2016: 53).  From the same perspective, the 
pace of China’s export of goods and services also slowed down in the 2010s due to serious 
economic crises and financial uncertainties in the world. The export growth rate was over 400 
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2018; National Bureau of National Statistics of China Statistical Yearbook, 2018); however, in 
2010s the rate dropped to 60.5 percent. China’s export increased from $1.654 trillion in 2010 to 








Figure 34 China’s Exports of goods and services (current US$) and Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
Source: Data derived from World Bank and IMF 2018, China Statistical Yearbook and Ministry of Commerce, People’s 
Republic of China (MOFCOM) various years. 
Therefore, it became clear that it would be hard for China to continue its economic growth with 
Deng Xiaoping’s era economic model which featured labor-intensive, low-wage manufacturing 
for export, and high level of government investment. Therefore, when Xi Jinping was elected as 
President of China, he decided to adopt a new economic model that included principles such as 
strong domestic consumption, high value-added production, low level of SOEs and high level of 
private sector roles (Garnaut, Song and Fang, 2018: 18-21). However, there are many challenges 
on the way to shifting the model of economic growth. For example, Chinese government 
started an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign in order to fight income inequalities and 
increase the legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (Wang, 183; Naughton, 2018: 383). 
Besides that, in the middle of the 2010s China had its financial crisis. During the crisis, officials 
fought hard to control price bubble which had been generated by excessive liquidity of financial 
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price bubble. From that point, government limited unofficial lending institutions which are 
called shadow banking institutions (Financial Times, 2014; Kroeber, 140). However, private 
sector very much depended on these financial institutions. Thus, government’s deleveraging 
campaign had serious negative effect on private sector. In addition, after the closure of many 
shadow-banking sectors, regular financial institutions became more reluctant to lend to smaller 
private companies (Elliott, Kroeber and Qiao, 2015: 12-13). Millions of Chinese citizens and 
investors lost their savings during this period which created an atmosphere among the people 
for curbing additional market reforms. Meanwhile SOEs had easy access to credit, and they were 
protected from the impact of deleveraging campaigns. At the end of the decade, uncertainties 
of trade wars between the U.S. and China create additional negative effect on China’s GDP 
growth. In sum, China’s GDP growth rate slowed down considerably in the second half of the 
2010s. However, that does not mean the Chinese economy is shrinking. It just means the growth 
rate is not the same pace of the previous periods. China’s GDP rose from $6.087 trillion in 2010 
to $13.608 trillion in 2018 which means China more than doubled the size of its economy in this 
period (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018; World Bank, 2019). In terms of real GDP, 
China’s GDP increased from $7.147 trillion in 2010 to $12.766 trillion in 2018 which means 
China’s real GDP grew by 78.6 percent (World Bank, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 
2019). The average GDP growth rate was 7.8 percent each year in this decade. In nominal term 
Chinese economy in this decade rose from 40.6 percent of U.S. GDP in 2010 to 66.1 percent of 
U.S. GDP in 2018. In real term, China’s GDP grew from 40.6 percent of U.S. GDP in 2010 to 60.9 
percent of the U.S. GDP in 2018. Finally, China’s share of world GDP rose from 9.2 percent to 





Figure 35 and Table 16 China, U.S. and World Nominal and Real GDP (2010) from 2000-2009 
Source: Current world GDP database derived from World Bank and Federal Bank of St Louis, U.S. current and real GDP 
derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / World Bank and 
BEA database, China’s nominal GDP collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 












































































































































































China - U.S. - World Nominal GDP 2010-2018
N. GDP China N. GDP U.S. N. GDP World % of U.S. GDP % of W. GDP
R. GDP China R. GDP U.S. R. GDP World % of U.S. GDP % of W. GDP
2010 6087 14992 66113 40.6 9.2
2011 6668 15224 68189 43.8 9.8
2012 7193 15567 69905 46.2 10.3
2013 7751 15854 71767 48.9 10.8
2014 8327 16242 73811 51.3 11.3
2015 8913 16710 75936 53.3 11.7
2016 9524 16972 77904 56.1 12.2
2017 10185 17349 80445 58.7 12.7
2018 10873 17856 82893 60.9 13.1




Figure 36 and 37 China Economic Growth by Decade and Average GDP Growth Rate 
Source: China’s nominal GDP collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook and real 



























China Average GDP Growth 
Rate 
% of U.S. % of W. % of (R)U.S. % of (R)W. % of U.S. % of W. % of (R)U.S. % of (R)W. 
1980 6.7 1.7 5.2 1.2 2000 11.8 3.6 17.7 4.5
1981 6.1 1.7 5.4 1.3 2001 12.6 4 19 4.7
1982 6.1 1.8 6 1.4 2002 13.4 4.2 20.3 5.1
1983 6.4 2 6.3 1.5 2003 14.5 4.3 21.8 5.4
1984 6.4 2.1 6.8 1.6 2004 16 4.5 23.1 5.7
1985 7.1 2.4 7.4 1.8 2005 17.5 4.8 24.8 6.1
1986 6.6 2 7.8 1.9 2006 19.9 5.3 27.2 6.6
1987 5.6 1.6 8.4 2 2007 24.6 6.1 30.5 7.2
1988 6 1.6 9 2.1 2008 31.2 7.2 33.5 7.8
1989 6.2 1.7 9 2.2 2009 35.3 8.4 37.6 8.7
1990 6 1.6 9.2 2.2 2010 40.6 9.2 40.6 9.2
1991 6.2 1.6 10.1 2.3 2011 48.6 10.3 43.8 9.8
1992 6.5 1.7 11.1 2.6 2012 52.3 11.3 46.2 10.3
1993 6.5 1.7 12.3 3 2013 57 12.4 48.9 10.8
1994 7.7 2 13.4 3.2 2014 59.5 13.1 51.3 11.3
1995 9.6 2.4 14.4 3.5 2015 60.4 14.7 53.3 11.7
1996 10.7 2.7 15.3 3.7 2016 59.5 14.6 56.1 12.2
1997 11.2 3.1 16 3.9 2017 62.2 14.9 58.7 12.7
1998 11.3 3.3 16.5 4.1 2018 66.1 15.8 60.9 13.1
1999 11.4 3.4 17 4.3




Figure 38 China and U.S. Nominal GDP and Growth Rate; Table 17 China’s Share as a Percentage of U.S. and World 
Nominal and Real GDP.  
Source: U.S. GDP derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Michael Roscoe, US Federal Reserve / BIS/ Economist / 
World Bank and BEA database, China’s nominal GDP collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China, Statistical 
Yearbook, IMF, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and World Bank. China’s real GDP derived from World Bank, IMF, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and National Bureau of Statistics of China; Current world GDP database derived from 
World Bank and Federal Bank of St Louis, World real GDP collected from World Bank, Federal Reserve Bank, and IMF 
 
          China’s Inflation (CPI) Dilemma 
          It is important that consumer price index (CPI) or inflation affects all parts of the economy 
from investment, unemployment and interest rates to government fiscal and monetary policies. 
In that respect, officials usually try hard to keep inflation under control. Nevertheless, it is 
usually the case that when a country transitions from central planning economy to a free-
market economy, severe imbalances between supply and demand occur. China was not an 
exception. During the period of early reforms in the late 1970s, Chinese authorities aimed to 
decrease price controls on goods and services. From that perspective, Chinese government 
allowed farmers to sell some of their products in the market with market prices. Due to that, 
prices of agricultural goods fluctuated more freely than before as part of the process of enabling 
free-market forces to play a bigger role in Chinese economy. On the other hand, government 












China - U.S. GDP and Growth Rate 
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income (Naughton, 1991: 207-209). However, shortly afterwards deficit in the government 
budget increased due to the surge in procurement prices. In order to finance this deficit 
government increased monetary supply at the beginning of the 1980s. Economic situation 
started to deteriorate. Inflation reached 6 percent in 1980 (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, China Statistical Yearbook, 2006). Factors such as farmers’ rising income, government 
subsidies and then its deficit, and price liberalization were the main players of this first inflation 
hike. In the following year Chinese government used restrictive monetary policies by increasing 
interest rates, tightening credit controls and cutting its expenditures in order to restrain the 
expansion of aggregate demand. This caused inflation to fell 2 percent in 1981. Conservative 
fiscal-monetary policy was followed few years which kept the inflation around 2 percent 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook). However, this policy slowed 
down the economic growth. After its agricultural reforms, Chinese government started to give 
its main focus on urban reforms. From that point, Chinese government used the initial 
(agricultural) reforms for SOEs and allowed them to sell some of their products in the market at 
market prices. Authorities also allowed SOEs to make some of their expenditures and 
investments decisions on their own such as setting up their wage levels, financing their 
investment, recruiting and staffing (Song, 349). Besides that, much of the supervisory and 
regulatory power over SOEs was transferred to provincial and local governments. SOEs gave 
generous wage increases and bonuses to its employees. At the same time, they invested as 
much as they could for grabbing maximum share from the market. Provincial and local 
governments which were the supervisory and regulatory branches of SOEs supported these 
enterprises for their investment decisions in order to promote industrial development in their 
provinces or regions. They pressured state-owned financial institutions to give or extend credit 
to SOEs. Therefore, SOEs borrowed heavily from state-owned banks to finance investment and 
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higher wage increases without the fear of bankruptcy. From that point, government’s fiscal and 
monetary liabilities to industrial SOEs gradually increased from 1.4 percent of gross national 
product (GNP) in 1980 to almost 10 percent of GNP at the end of the decade (Huang, 1999: 
113). On the other hand, in the middle of the decade the economy was overheated. GDP growth 
rate was around 13-15 percent in that period. There was a strong increase in aggregate demand. 
Due to that, import increased significantly from $20 billion in 1983 to $40 billion in 1985 (World 
Bank, 2017). In total, this and all other factors such as raised wages, increased bank credits, 
investment and import had a serious effect on consumer prices that pushed inflation rate to 
over 9 percent in the middle of the decade (National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 
Statistical Yearbook). Central government responded inflation by decreasing government 
expenditures, raising interest rates and enforcing credit controls on provincial and local 
branches of banks. These policies worked out well and inflation dropped 6.5 percent in 1986 
(IMF, Oppers, 2017: 25). However, unlike in the first half of the decade Chinese government this 
time quickly loosened its restrictive policies again. Government adopted loose monetary and 
fiscal policies in order to finance investment, accelerate economic growth, and subsidize 
provincial and local governments and SOEs. Eventually, inflation quickly started to increase 
again with these policies in the second half of the 1980s. In addition, in the midst of this rising 
inflation period, government implemented some price adjustment and further price adjustment 
were announced for the following years. This made public believe that government would set all 
price higher in 1989 which led to speculative buying and hoarding that additionally increased 
aggregate demands (Naughton, 2009). The inflation increased over 18 percent in 1988 and 1989 
(World Bank, 2019). Rising inflation was one of the main reasons of domestic unrests at the end 
of the 1980s which ended with Tiananmen Square massacre. Chinese government’s response to 
rising inflation was similar to that in the previous cycle such as raising interest rates, cutting 
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investment growth, tightening credit control, reducing provinces’ control over administrated 
prices and re-imposing price controls. However, the intensity of policies that used for this 
macroeconomic instability was much stronger than the previous cases. Economic growth and 
inflation significantly dropped. Inflation rate dropped from 18 percent in 1989 to 3 percent in 
1990 (World Bank). GDP growth decreased from 11 percent in 1988 to 3-4 percent in 1989 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2018). Throughout the 1980s average CPI rate was at 7.5 
percent.  
          After two years of low economic growth and relative stability of the overall price level, 
government decided to adopt policies that accelerate the growth. Deng Xiaoping’s southern 
tour and his strong message for the growth and reform played important role on that decision. 
With its growth-oriented policies Chinese economy drastically increased in this period (GDP 
growth rate was over 13 percent). However, these policies reinvigorated inflation again in 1993. 
Most of the forces that increased prices from 1993 to 1996 were essentially similar to that in the 
previous decade. In addition to that, government significantly reduced the price controls in 1992 
(IMF, 1993: 27-28). That caused administered prices to rise to market level prices. Besides that, 
prices and wages in this period were also on rise. It is important that in the second half of the 
previous decade, Chinese government gave greater autonomy to provincial and local 
governments and SOEs to set their wages and allocated their resources. From that point, most 
of these institutions connected their employees’ wages to the price levels of country (Zhang, 
2016: 9). That means rising prices of goods and services drove wages high. Therefore, it is easy 
to predict that high wages in turn caused even higher prices of goods and services. This 
mechanism by itself contributed to high inflation in this period which forced Chinese 
government to implement wage reform in the middle of the 1990s for breaking the link 
between wage rate and inflation. It is important that, while prices and wages kept on rising in 
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1992, government loosened its control on credits. In addition to that, government in this period 
licensed many financial institutions (Okazaki, 2007: 10). With these new institutions, 
government aimed to accelerate credit growth in order to boost investment and economic 
growth. From that point, central government heavily financed thousands of SEZs that founded in 
the first half of this decade. Moreover, in this period government continued to provide funds to 
SOEs for their expenditures despite its previous decision of restructuring these institutions. 
Thus, GDP growth rate in this period reached over 13 percent; however, factors that boosted 
GDP rate also pushed inflation rate record high. Average annual prices grew more than 18 
percent from 1993 to 1996 and in 1994 the inflation reached nearly 25 percent (National Bureau 
of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 2006; World Bank, 2019). Chinese government 
decided to implement some structural changes after the dramatic price hikes in 1993-1996. First 
of all, government cut the link between price level and wage rate. In other words, wages will not 
increase automatically when prices of goods and services rise. Wages only increased if workers’ 
skill and productivity increased (Chow, 2018: 98). In addition, government started to restructure 
SOEs which had been the cause of many credit-fueled spending in the previous period. Besides 
that, government implemented many actions that aimed to slow down the economy such as 
raising interest rates, tightening credit control, decreasing investment growth and moderating 
GDP growth. From 1995 to end of 1996 inflation came down significantly. Inflation dropped to 2 
percent in 1997, meanwhile GDP growth rate declined to 7 percent (World Bank, 2019). During 
and after the Asian Financial Crises in 1997, China changed its macroeconomic policy from tight 
financial and monetary policy to expansionary fiscal and monetary policy. With this policy China 
maintained a high level of production. However, it is important that at the end of the 1990s, 
China overfilled foreign and domestic markets with its goods. Oversupplying goods in this period 
was one of the main factors in China that put downward pressure on consumer prices. On the 
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other hand, consumer demand remained relatively low in this period. People in China like in the 
past preferred to save their income rather than spend. Combination of constantly rising supply 
and weakly growing demand drove prices of goods and services down after the Asian financial 
crisis. From that point, China experienced deflation or insufficient demand problems in 1998, 
1999 and 2002. In order to stimulate domestic demand Chinese government issued billions of 
RMB. In addition, interest rates lowered and expansionary financial policies enforced (National 
Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 2005). After these policies the 
domestic demand increased and China’s economy came out from deflation. Average inflation 
rate remained around 7 percent (7.7%) in the 1990s.  
          Like in previous decade, oversupplying and overproducing of Chinese goods were the 
major factors that keep consumer prices relatively low in the 2000s. Due to massive production 
of goods, China once again fell into deflation at the beginning of the 2000s. Government by that 
time used expansionist monetary policies for invigorating domestic demand. However, domestic 
demand remained low for a variety of reasons. It is important that, this situation didn’t create a 
serious problem for China till the global financial crisis. China during this period was able to 
export its products to the world. However, China’s export fell substantially when the recession 
hit the U.S. and then the world at the end of the 2000s. Global financial crisis and economic 
downturns in many countries significantly reduced foreign demand for Chinese goods. In 
addition to that, Chinese consumption declined along with the demand of Chinese goods in the 
world which made China to fell into deflation for the second time in the 2000s and third times in 
last ten years. This situation encouraged Chinese authorities to adopt more aggressive 
expansionist fiscal and monetary policies in order to increase domestic consumption and 
economic growth. Expansionary policies increased investment and GDP till the end of the 
decade (above 10%); however, domestic consumption still remained low. Meanwhile, Chinese 
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authorities took stabilizing the price level as one of the top priorities of government policy 
(China Daily, 2012). Since then the annual inflation rate in China has barely transcended 5 
percent even though government uses massive amount of liquidity in the market as part of 
government stimulus efforts. In 2000s the average annual inflation rate was 1.8 percent and in 
2010s it was 2.3 percent. It is essential that there was a strong correlation between oil prices 
and consumer prices especially for a country such as China that very much depends on foreign 
oil. However, Chinese government uses price controls in order to keep oil and also some other 
commodities’ (coal, pork, corn and wheat) prices within socially reasonable ranges. The reason 
is that central government thinks that rising prices especially some important commodity prices 
can cause serious social unrests in China which it was experienced in Tiananmen Square at the 
end of the 1980s (Bradsher, 2011). From that perspective, rising or decreasing these 
commodities’ prices have no strong effect on consumer prices goods and services. Nevertheless, 
it is important to know that price control of oil and other commodities hide the true costs of 
many economic processes in China and just transferring these costs to the government budget 
in some ways that affects the overall economy at the end.  
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Source: China’s GDP collected from (various years) National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), Statistical Yearbook, 
IMF, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and World Bank; Consumer Price Index derived from National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook (various years), IMF and World Bank database 
  
Figure 40 and 41 China – U.S. CPI and CPI Increase by Decade 
Source: Chinese data derived from World Bank, IMF, NBS various years, U.S. data derived from Federal Reserve Bank 
of St Louis, World Bank, BEA various years 
 
          China’s Debt Bomb 
          High national (total) debt causes a number of serious economic difficulties in an economy 
such as reducing investment and income, increasing interest rates, and decreasing governments’ 
ability to respond future economic crisis. In that respect, for a long time after its establishment, 
People’s Republic of China had adopted a balanced budget fiscal policy. However, when 
government launched its economic reforms programs at the end of the 1970s, it began to run 
budget deficit and issue limited debt. Most of these deficits in the first half of the 1980s arose 
because of the rising procurement prices of farms products. Procurement price was an 
established price to farmers for their products. Government in this period aimed to increase 
farmers’ income by raising procurement prices (Huang and Rozelle, 2018: 488). In order to 
finance that government borrowed from the central bank and also issued several government 






























































































first half of the 1980s (World Bank, 1997: 131-133). In the middle of the decade Chinese 
government started to implement its urban reforms. From that point, government gave some 
autonomy to SOEs for managing their affairs, pricing their products and funding their 
investments. It is important to know that even though these early decentralization reforms, 
SOEs were still very much financially dependent to the central government. During this period 
other than direct financing, central government used subsidies, tax exemptions and soft credits 
to help these firms overcome their budget constraints. Under the reforms programs in order to 
boost the productivity, central government allowed SOEs to give generous bonuses, wages and 
all kind of amenities to their employees (Fang, Garnaut and Song, 2018: 11-12). Besides that, 
SOEs also invested heavily for gaining a bigger share in the markets and creating more jobs in 
provinces and cities where they located. All of these had positive effect on growth and 
productivity; however, that created a massive debt for central government. It is crucial that 
during this period total of all monetary and fiscal subsidies, incentives and expenditures of SOEs 
to GDP grew substantially from 1.4 percent in 1980 to over 10 percent in 1989 (Zengxian, 1997: 
1254). In sum, the national debt increased over 80 percent of GDP ($280 billion) at the end of 
the 1980s (IMF, 2019). Government debt accounted for 6-7 percent of the total debt (National 
Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 1999). Corporate debt made 
up almost 90 percent of China’s total debt at the end of the 1980s (over 75 percent of the GDP) 
(IMF). SOEs debt made the major share of it with 45 percent. Private business debt was around 
30 percent of GDP (IMF). Finally, China’s debt as a percentage of U.S.’ debt averaged 3.8 percent 
in this decade and in terms of world’s debt, China’s debt made up 1.1 percent of the world debt 
(Mbaye, Badia, Chae: 14-20; World Bank, 2019; Council of Economic Advisers, Boards of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). 
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          The inflation and corruption scandals created a serious domestic unrest in the late 1980s. 
After the Tiananmen Square crackdown Chinese government suppressed reforms and used 
restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. Debt and deficit decreased. Nevertheless, the mounting 
losses of SOEs continued in the first half of this decade. In order to finance SOEs debt, central 
government launched a banking reform. Chinese government also enacted a law in 1993 that 
forcing the Ministry Finance to fund its total budget deficit by issuing bonds (Lin, 2002: 78). With 
these laws total debt started to increase moderately until the Asian Financial Crisis. However, 
during and after the Asian Financial Crisis government drastically changed its macroeconomic 
policies from tight to expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. As a result of these policies total 
debt increased significantly. In this decade China’s debt as a percentage of GDP passed 100 
percent which means total debt moved beyond $1 trillion (World Bank, IMF, 2019). Government 
debt increased to 22 percent of GDP at the end of the decade ($236 billion) (World Bank, IMF; 
National Bureau of National Statistics of China, 2000). Like previous decade SOEs and private 
firms (corporate) debt made the major share of the total debt. During the 1990s corporate debt 
increased from 75 percent of GDP to 100 percent of GDP (Over $1 trillion). Finally, household 
debt first time in this decade appeared on the debt list. Government authorities’ expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies especially during the Asian financial crisis played important role on 
creating household debt at the end of the 1990s. In all, the total debt reached almost 130 
percent of GDP (over $1.4 trillion) (World Bank, IMF). In this decade the ratio of China’s total 
debt-to-U.S. total debt was 6.6 percent. From the same point, China’s overall debt accounted for 
1.6 percent of the world total debt (IMF; Mbaye, Badia, Chae; World Bank, 2019; Boards of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019). 
          There was a global economic prosperity from early 2000s to the Global Financial Crisis. 
Thus, Chinese government continued to use expansionary monetary policies for accelerating its 
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export. During this period, China heavily invested in some sectors such as steel, cement and 
aluminum (European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, 2016: 1). Total debt as a 
percentage of GDP rose almost 150 percent before the middle of the decade. In other words, 
China’s total debt was more than $3 trillion around the middle of the 2000s (IMF, World Bank, 
2019). The tragic event which was the origin of China’s debt problem was the U.S. and then 
Global Financial Crises. Before the financial crisis, China’s total debt was around $4-4.5 trillion 
and about 150 percent of GDP. During this time government debt was 25 percent of GDP, 
household debt 15 percent and corporate debt was almost 110 percent of the GDP (National 
Bureau of National Statistics of China, 2011; World Bank, IMF, 2019). Just a decade after the 
Financial Crisis, the total debt of China skyrocketed to $34 trillion which was equal to 255 
percent of GDP in 2018 (IMF; World Bank). In other words, China built up a massive debt 
(around $30 trillion) in a decade. It is important to know that China’s rising debt issue was the 
result of a deliberate self-chosen decision that was taken by Chinese government during and 
after the financial crisis. The reasons of why Chinese government took decision that increase 
China’s debt burden suddenly and extremely were various. First of all, Global Financial Crisis 
dropped global demand for goods. Due to that, Chinese exports plummeted sharply from 35 
percent of GDP in 2007 to 25 percent of GDP in 2009 (World Bank, 2019). During the same 
period account surplus fell more than 5 percent of GDP (Kroeber, 217; National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, 2019). As a result of these, hundreds of factories shut down and millions of 
workers lost their jobs in China. For keeping the economy functioning and creating hundreds of 
thousands of jobs in an effort to reduce unemployment, Chinese government announced its 
huge stimulus package in the middle of crisis. The first package was almost $600 billion and 
Chinese government gave authority to local governments and some investors for carrying out 
much of the implementation of this package (Batson, 2008). It is important that in order to get 
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highest return local government and investors invested heavily in real estate sector which 
resulted in big property bubbles in many cities (Anderlini, 2014). This process kept the GDP 
growth steady on the one hand, but on the other hand, it created a record amount of debt.  
          With its huge stimulus package Chinese government also aimed to make a transition from 
an export and investment driven growth model to a model that relies more on domestic 
consumption and service industry. However, it is important that government stimulus package 
could not accelerate domestic consumption immediately in the real economy. Most of the 
stimulus went to real estate and some infrastructure projects that generated low investment 
returns. Low investment returns increased country’s total debt gradually. Meanwhile, China 
failed to implement structural reforms (such as strengthening economic and legal infrastructure, 
increasing competition, encouraging innovation, improving public sector governance and 
liberalizing labor, capital and product market) that make enterprises particularly SOEs more 
productive. With the stimulus support SOEs maintained even increased their employment and 
production even though the world trade slowed down drastically in this period (Morrison, 25-
27). This worsened overcapacity and overproduction problems of SOEs that had already 
seriously damaged the efficiency of these enterprises. In addition to that, when Xi Jinping 
elected as president of China in 2013 he has promoted the role of SOEs at the expense of private 
domestic and foreign firms. SOEs relatively increased their productivity and profits in some 
fields; however, most of the other fields SOEs were still quite inefficient and they continued to 
operate with huge loses (Song, 356-361). Contrary to the previous decade, central government 
rarely allowed these enterprises to go bankrupt or let very few of them taken over through 
merger and acquisition. From that point, the only way these enterprises survive was to increase 
borrowing from state-owned banks to cover a substantial portion of their financial losses. They 
borrowed heavily and after a decade from the GFC, their debt reached over $13 trillion (Molnar 
207 
 
and Lu, 2019: 16). This was an increase almost four folds compared to their debt amount in the 
GFC period. It is crucial that during the same period SOEs revenue rose only 1.5 times and their 
profit grew by 60 percent (Molnar and Lu). In addition to that, during this period government’s 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policies drove not only SOEs but also some private enterprises 
to produce more goods than market demanded. Due to overcapacity, overproduction and 
structural problems, these enterprises’ efficiency declined seriously which created many 
difficulties for them to repay their debts. In order to repay their debts, they borrowed more that 
eventually created even greater problems for these enterprises.  
          Under the new growth model central government launched some programs that aimed to 
improve social services and expand public safety net especially in the rural regions of China. The 
size of these programs was massive that covered hundreds of millions of people. For example, 
providing free rural education covered around 150 million students, producing health care 
services covered more than 800 million people and supplying basic pension coverage covered 
400 million people (Kroeber, 33; Bloomberg News, 2019; Yu, 2015: 1148). After these and all 
other programs, the spending on education increased from 3 to 4 percent of GDP, on health 
care from 4 to 5 percent of GDP, on welfare from 6 to 9 percent of GDP, on pension from 0.5 to 
1.5 percent of GDP and on social security from 2 to 3 percent of GDP in a decade (The State 
Council, PRC, 2019; World Bank, 2019; OECD, 2019; World Bank Trading Economics, 2019; 
Zhang, L., et al, 12, 20). It is important that the majority of these programs were implemented 
by regional and local governments. These programs added enormous costs to the budgets of 
these governments. In order to finance these social service programs and all other programs 
including especially infrastructure programs regional and local governments started to rely 
overwhelmingly on extra-budgetary resources- mainly off budget borrowing. It is crucial that 
regional and local governments operated their off-budget borrowing practices beyond the 
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central government fiscal surveillance. From that point, these governments’ debt increased 
drastically. Due to that many regional and local governments were in unsustainable level of 
debt.  
          On the other hand, central government highly concerned that, expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policies could cause a price hike in the economy that eventually could lead to a social 
unrest like the one in the late 1980s. From that point, Chinese government used price control by 
setting prices below market prices in some critical areas such as real estate, food and energy. 
For example, in order to hold energy prices (oil, natural gas, coal and electricity) within socially 
acceptable ranges, central government heavily subsidized SOEs to sell its goods and services at 
low prices. However, such funding disguised the true cost of many economic activities in China. 
On the other hand, it created a massive debt burden for the country in this decade. From the 
same perspective, for easing the pressure of rising real-estate prices over families, central 
government launched many projects such as building enormous number of residential houses in 
hundreds of cities across the country in order to pull property prices down. Finally, central 
government also used its policies for controlling the food prices (pork, wheat, corn) in 
reasonable level. In sum, Chinese government reduced the risks of price inflation and the 
potential of social unrest by using various policies that hold the prices of critical sectors’ goods 
and services in socially acceptable ranges. However, on the other hand, these policies caused 
massive economic disruption and led to a surge in government debt.  
          Currency appreciation was another factor that significantly increased budget debt in this 
period. It is important that Chinese currency gradually appreciated from 8 yuan per U.S. dollar in 
2005 to 6 yuan per U.S. dollar in 2014 (World Bank, 2018). Many investors in China expected 
that the RMB would appreciate even more due to other countries’ (particularly the U.S.) 
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pressure on China for manipulating and lowering the value of its currency against other 
currencies in order to increase export to grow the economy by over 10 percent each year. This 
expectation made Chinese investors borrow dollars from foreign banks and exchanged them to 
RMB in order to get a high return. Chinese investors borrowed $20 billion from foreign financial 
institutions in 2008; however, this number soared to $1 trillion in 2014 (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2017: 80). China’s financial liberalization 
efforts in this period played important role in creating this debt. However, it is important that 
when Chinese currency started to depreciate, Chinese investors rushed to repay their debt after 
2015. 
          Another factor that increased the debt burden of China was the fast expansion of shadow 
banking. Shadow banking is a non-bank financial intermediary activity. It is less transparent 
service that produces high-risk loans with higher returns than traditional financial institutions. 
During and after the global financial crisis under the government massive economic stimulus 
packages many small and mid-size private firms still could not find enough credits from 
traditional financial institutions. Therefore, these firms borrowed heavily from shadow banking 
institutions that provide wider and easier access to affordable credit. Shadow banking’s loans 
became popular gradually and in 2015 the size of these loans reached nearly two-thirds of 
China’s GDP (over $7 trillion) (IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department, 2016: 36). 
However, it is important that most of institutions repackaged these loans and showed them as 
investment in their balance sheet. From that point, shadow banking institutions create big bad 
credit bubble that pose a serious risk to Chinese financial system. Therefore, Chinese authorities 
enacted a law that crack down shadow banking channels after 2016 (Financial Times, 2016).  
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          Energy prices were other major factors that significantly increased the debt of China in this 
decade. Due to its robust economic growth in the 2000s, China’s demand for oil increased 
significantly. Although its growth has slowed down since 2010, the country’s demand for oil is 
continuously rising. China’s consumption of oil increased from 7800 thousand barrels per day in 
2007 to over 10000 thousand barrels per day in 2012 and finally to over 13500 thousand barrels 
per day in 2018 (British Petroleum Company, 2019: 20). It is important that the country has 
relatively poor oil reserves. Therefore, China relies on import of oil around 75 percent of its total 
usage (Clemente, 2019). From that point, it is predictable that China has been affected severely 
by rising or declining global oil prices. Low prices of oil are expected to boost economic growth 
of China and also increase China’s current account surpluses. On the other hand, high oil prices 
are anticipated to decrease net export and total output. High oil prices also have negative effect 
on consumer prices and overall economic expansion. From that point it is crucial that prices of 
oil dramatically increased after 2000. Prices of a barrel oil rose from $23 in 2001 to $50 in 2005 
and then $107 in 2011. It stayed average $79 per barrel till 2018 (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, (OECD), 2019). However, it is very important that China uses state 
control over its oil industry by adjusting the prices of oil and its products and directing all sales 
through state agencies in order to keep the prices of goods and services in socially reasonable 
ranges. This way maybe helps to keep the prices in order and prevents a social unrest; however, 
it has a devastating effect on government budget.  
          After all of these spending programs Chinese government was able to create enough jobs 
to reduce unemployment rate and maintained a relatively high economic growth even during 
and after the Global Financial Crisis. However, the cost of implementing that was huge. China’s 
debt to GDP ratio increased dramatically from about 150 percent of GDP in 2008 to over 255 
percent of GDP in 2018 (IMF, 2019; World Bank, 2019). It is important to know that most of the 
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debt is corporate debt. China’s corporate debt rose sharply from 98 percent of GDP ($4.5 
trillion) in 2008 to 156 percent in 2018 (IMF; World Bank; Bank of International Settlement (BIS), 
2019). This is one of the highest corporate debt-to-GDP ratios in the world. The value of total 
amount of corporate debt is $20 trillion. It is also important to know that over two-thirds of 
Chinese corporate debt is owned by SOEs (about $13.2 trillion) (Deutsche Bank Wealth 
Management; NikkeiAsia, 2019). Local government accounted for half of SOEs debt and one-
third of total corporate debt ($6.6 trillion) (NikkeiAsia; Deutsche Bank Wealth Management).  
Besides that, China’s household indebtedness is moderate even though it jumped by over 30 
percentage points over a decade. In 2018 household debt increased from 18.4 percent of GDP ($ 
846 billion) in 2008 to 51.2 percent of GDP ($6.97 trillion) (IMF, 2019; World Bank, 2019). 
Government indebtedness is relatively low when it is compared to other governments’ debt. In 
2018 it is 50.6 percent of the GDP ($6.87 trillion) (IMF, 2019; World Bank, 2019; National Bureau 
of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 2019). However, like the household 
and corporate debt, the rise of government indebtedness from 2008 to 2018 was significant. 
Government debt was 27 percent of GDP in 2008 ($1.2 trillion) (IMF; World Bank; National 
Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook). It is crucial to know that 
regardless of the ownership of the total debt, dealing with considerably high level of debt 
creates serious challenges for Chinese economy. In total, China’s debt as a percentage of U.S. 
debt drastically increased from 17.1 percent in the 2000s to almost 60 percent in the 2010s. In 
terms of world total debt, the ratio of China’s total-debt-to world total debt surged from 3.2 
percent in the 2000s to 10.7 percent in the 2010s (IMF, Mbaye, Badia, Chae; World Bank; 




Figure 42 China’s Debt to GDP Ratio (Corporate, Household and Government Debts) 1980-2019 
Source: Data collected from National Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook (various years); 
World Bank (various years); Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (various years); IMF (various years). 
 
 
Figure 43 China Total Debt as Percentage of GDP from 1980 to 2018 
Source: Derived from (various years) National Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, IMF, 
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Table 18 China -U.S. Debt to GDP Ratio (Corporate, Household and Government Debts) 2007-2018 
Source: China’s debt data derived from National Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 
World Bank, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; IMF (various years). U.S.’s debt data collected from Council of Economic 
Advisers for federal debt; Boards of Governors of the Federal Reserve System for corporate and household debts; For 
calculating household debt from 1950 to 2001, nonprofit organization, household and motor vehicle loans data are 
used which are derived from Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. Starting from 2001 consumer loans such as credit card 
debt added to household debt. Starting from 2006 student loans added to household debt. Both databases are 
collected from Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. 
 
 
Figure 44 China’s Total 
Debt as a Percentage of 
U.S. and World Total 
Debt by Decade 
Source: China’s total 
debt data collected from 
National Bureau of 
National Statistics of 
China, China Statistical 
Yearbook, World Bank, 
Federal Reserve Bank of 
St Louis; IMF (various 
years). U.S.’s debt data 
collected from Council of 
Economic Advisers, 
Boards of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve 
System; World Bank and IMF database (various years). World total debt data derived from World Bank, IMF, US 
Federal Reserve, Economist and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) (various years) 
 
China U.S. China U.S. China U.S. China U.S.
2007 29 62 21 84 97 42 147 188
2008 27 68 20 85 98 45 145 198
2009 35 82 24 85 120 44 179 211
2010 34 90 27 82 121 41 182 213
2011 34 95 28 78 120 40 182 213
2012 34 99 30 74 131 40 195 213
2013 37 100 33 72 141 41 211 213
2014 40 101 36 70 150 42 226 213
2015 42 100 39 68 163 43 244 211
2016 44 104 44 68 166 45 254 217
2017 46 103 48 68 160 45 254 216
2018 50 104 51 66 156 46 257 216
Government Household Corporate Total 
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          Puzzle of China’s High Saving Rate 
          It is very crucial that saving, which leads to increase people’s income through investing in 
investment vehicles, plays an important role for economic growth of a country. In that respect, 
Deng’s Xiaoping economic reforms that started in the late 1970s made drastic changes on 
China’s saving rate. At the beginning of the reforms in the late 1970s, household saving was 
around 6-7 percent of the GDP, government saving accounted for 15-18 percent and corporate 
saving was between 8-9 percent of the GDP (Kraay, 2000: 551-554; Qian, 1988: 592-594).  Total 
saving in that period was around 30 percent of the GDP.  
          In the 1980s China’s household saving started to increase and that trend continued 
through the early 1990s. There were various reasons behind China’s high household saving rate. 
First of all, traditional ideas and historical factors played an important role on it. Not only in this 
period, but also in earlier periods people in China tended to save more than people in different 
countries. Past experiences, poverty and inequalities tragically affected people in China and 
made them reluctant to spend their earnings. From that point, they increased their 
precautionary saving even though their incomes started to rise. Besides that, reforms on 
agriculture in rural areas and then reforms on SOEs in urban areas significantly increased the 
income of Chinese households which made them able to save more for the future. In addition, 
the transition from a planned economy to a market economy in this period encouraged people 
in China to save more for future opportunities such as purchasing state assets or investing 
private companies’ bond. It is also important that in the early stages of reforms period people 
had less control over their earnings. It was usual that Chinese government forced people to save 
their income or purchase company bonds. Later in the 1980s, government’s control over 
people’s earning decline; however, household saving continue to rise. It is also crucial that 
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demographic changes played an important role on the rise of household saving. The fertility rate 
declined drastically in the 1980s due to the one-child policy that was enforced by Chinese 
authorities in the previous decade. This policy created a situation that increased household 
saving first by spending less for fewer children and then saving more for the future 
(precautionary saving) as fewer children would take care of them when they get old (Zhang, L., 
et al, 2018: 7). Finally, rural and urban reforms crated a volatile environment in China in this 
period that people felt less certain about their future income. This was another factor that 
forced people in China to save more for the future. In sum, household saving increased from 
around 6-7 percent of GDP at the beginning of the 1980s to 20 percent around the middle of 
decade (National Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 1999; 
Modigliani and Cao, 2004: 146-147; Kraay: 567-570). Due to social unrests and political 
instabilities in the late 1980s, household saving decreased 11-12 percent of GDP and then rose 
again to almost 15 percent at the end of the 1980s (National Bureau of National Statistics of 
China; Modigliani and Cao; Kraay). 
          On the other hand, there was a sharp decrease in government saving. Before the reforms, 
government was the largest saver in China (15-18 percent of GDP) (Qian, 594). At the end of the 
decade government saving rate dropped more than 10 percent to 5 percent of GDP (Yang, 
Zhang and Zhou, 2011: 13-14). This means government in this period spent a lot; however, it 
collected little. During the 1980s government authorities mostly used expansionary monetary 
and fiscal policies in order to support reforms financially. From that perspective for example, 
government authorities raised procurement prices of agricultural products, gave generous 
bonuses to SOEs employees, raised their wages and pressure financial institutions to extend 
credits for SOEs. Government also spent a lot for establishing SEZs. Besides that, authorities by 
that time gave tax breaks and all kind of incentives to foreign firms for moving them inside the 
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newly established SEZs. In addition to that government spending for social services such as 
housing, education, pension and medical services were high in this early reform period.  
          Finally, corporate saving increased few percentage points in this decade to 11-12 percent 
of GDP (Kraay, 566). It is important that during the 1980s some SOEs boosted their income due 
to lack of competition and their monopolistic power. On the other hand, government heavily 
subsidized these institutions in order to promote growth. From that perspective, corporations’ 
cost of production dropped steadily. They had easy access to energy, land and capital. Besides 
that, labor market reform in this decade relaxed workers mobility restrictions which allowed 
millions of rural workers to move to cities (Gregory and Meng, 395-399; Meng, 2012: 76-82). 
Due to a large flow of rural labor to cities, corporations in this decade were able to increase 
their profit by keeping the wages down. Corporate restructuring on the other hand, in the 1980s 
raised productivity and boosted corporate profit (Chow, 100). In total, China’s gross saving in the 
1980s was around 32-33 percent of the GDP.  
          Like in previous decade household sector was the largest saver in the 1990s. Household 
saving was around 17-18 percent of GDP (Kuijs, 2005: 17). Some of the reasons of high 
household saving rate in the 1980s were also the same reasons of high household saving in the 
1990s. For example, cultural, historical experiences, rising people income and demographic 
factors such as declining fertility rate also encouraged people to save more in this decade. Other 
than that, household in the 1990s saved more of their income due to China’s shrinking social 
safety net. The transition from central planned economy to more market-based economy led to 
the shrinking of social safety net in this decade (Zhang, L., et al., 8-9). For example, government 
responsibilities of pension, health care, welfare and unemployment insurance shifted to 
employers or employees themselves. As a result of this, people in China started to increase their 
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precautionary savings. It is also very important that housing ownership increased drastically in 
this decade. Government housing reforms at the end of the 1980s fostered the effort of 
privatization of housing on the one hand, and banned company-supplied dorm style housing on 
the other hand (Perkins, 2018: 150; Fang, H., Gu, Q., Xiong, W. and Zhou, L.-A., 2016: 110). After 
these reforms there was a massive surge for house ownership in China that prompted 
household saving in the 1990s. From the same perspective, government in this decade decided 
to take an aggressive action to privatize small and medium size of SOEs by selling these 
institutions to its employees which also stimulated the household saving. It is important that 
weak financial market and banking system in the 1990s created a lot of serious liquidity 
constraints in China. It was very hard to get a home loan or any other forms of credit in this 
period (Shimek and Wen, 2008). In order to obtain a loan, borrowers had to make a large down 
payment. That means increased savings were needed for obtaining the loan. This was another 
factor that increased household saving in the 1990s.   
          Government saving rate decreased by 2 percent during the 1990s and hovered around 3-4 
percent of GDP throughout the decade (Yang, Zhang and Zhou, 44). However, at the end of the 
decade it dropped to 2 percent of GDP (Yang, Zhang and Zhou). Except few years after the 
Tiananmen Square crackdown, government mostly used economic policies that accelerate the 
growth. During and after the Asian financial crisis government authorities increased public 
spending and used more proactive monetary and fiscal policies to protect China from the worst 
effect of the crisis. In addition to that, government like in previous decade covered SOEs huge 
budget deficits even though government enlarged its privatization of these institutions. 
          Corporate saving like previous decade rose moderately and reached 14-15 percent of GDP 
in the 1990s (Ma and Yi, 2010: 15-16; Kraay, 566). Previous decade’s reforms expanded and 
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intensified in this decade. It is important that China launched a serious large-scale market-based 
reforms included privatization and restructuring of SOEs in this decade. Due to that, 
corporations’ productivity and profitability increased drastically. Another important factor that 
boosted corporations’ profitability and productivity was China’s export expansion. China’s 
export growth accelerated when Chinese government devalued its currency and increased the 
amount of subsidies for its companies. After the Asian financial crises Chinese authorities 
expanded export-promoting policies and gave more subsidies to its corporations that included 
refunds, low-interest loans, cheap land and preferential tax rates. Other than export expansion 
and government subsidies which directly contributed to corporations’ profitability; keeping 
production costs down in this decade also increased the revenues of Chinese corporations. From 
that point, it is important to know that during this period Chinese authorities gradually loosened 
rural-urban migration restrictions in order to keep the wages and production cost down for 
corporations (Gregory and Meng, 395-396). In sum, corporate saving in this decade increased 3-
4 percentage points from the previous decade’s average. Finally, China’s gross saving in the 
1990s was around 35-36 percent of the GDP.   
          Household saving rate steadily increased after China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) 
entry. It is very important that China’s accession to the WTO resulted in a magnificent growth of 
export. This positively affected the wages. Household income grew at more than three times in 
the 2000s. It rose from about $800 in 2000 to over $2.7 thousand in 2009 (National Bureau of 
National Statistics of China, 2019). Due to rising income, households were able to save more. 
Other than rising income there were other factors that positively affect household saving. For 
example, One Child Policy that was introduced in the late 1970s resulted in more household 
saving in 2000s like previous decades. On the other hand, decline in social safety net continued 
in this decade which also increased household precautionary saving. The rise of private home 
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ownership that had started in the previous decade also continued until global financial crisis. 
Private home ownership rate in this period reached over 90 percent (Shepard, 2016). The 
impact of household ownership on saving was positive throughout the 2000s. Besides that, like 
in previous decades, historical and cultural experiences and demographic factors also 
encouraged people in this decade to save more. In sum, household saving rate reached 22-23 
percent of GDP in this decade 
          Government saving rate in 2000s was totally different from previous decade’s government 
saving rate. During the 2000s government saving was on a steady upward trend and peaked 
over 10 percent in global financial crisis times (Ma and Yi, 10; Yang, Zhang and Zhou, 44). After 
the crisis government saving moderated and stabilized at around 5 percent (Zhang, L., et al, 18-
19). First of all, export boom in this decade significantly increased government revenues. Rising 
government revenue had positive impact on government saving. Besides that, with its structural 
reforms that was started in the late 1970s Chinese authorities gradually diminished its social 
spending especially on health, pension and social assistance. Lower social spending in the early 
2000s allowed Chinese government to increase its saving in this decade. However, starting from 
the second half of this decade social safety spending started to increase under the harmonious 
society program (Hofman, 63). FDI also had positive impact on government saving. During this 
decade FDI rose substantially. At the end of the 2000s the value of FDI was over $100 billion 
(Ministry of Commerce, PRC, 2019). However, during and after the global financial crisis 
government authorities used aggressive expansionist monetary and fiscal policies which 




          Corporate saving rate increased significantly after China’s accession to the WTO. This surge 
continued until global financial crisis. During and after the crisis corporate saving rate 
moderated as the economy slowed down. It is essential that the exchange rate played important 
role on corporation saving in this decade. Chinese currency was undervalued until the late 2000s 
which had a significant impact on the export boom in this decade. It is also important that 
during this period government heavily subsidized Chinese corporations in order to increase 
export and economic growth. A result of these, trade surpluses drastically increased and due to 
trade surpluses Chinese corporations were able increase their savings. In addition to that factors 
that had contributed to corporate saving in previous decade also positively affected corporate 
saving in the 2000s. For example, like in previous decades Chinese authorities reduced workers 
mobility restrictions and encouraged rural-urban migration in order to respond corporations’ 
demand for unskilled labor in urban areas in the 2000s. It is important that the demand for 
unskilled workers significantly increased when China attracted more and more FDI especially in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s. The demand for labor reached the heights point after China 
joined the WTO. From that point, 100 million migrants joined to urban workforce in less than 
ten years (from the end of the 1990s to global financial crisis) (Gregory and Meng, 396). It is 
crucial that a large flow of workforce from rural areas to urban areas in that period helped 
corporations to keep their wages and production costs down even though these corporations 
substantially increased their profits. In total, corporate saving increased from around 15 percent 
of GDP in the 1990s to almost 20 percent of GDP in the 2000s (Ma and Yi, 2010: 15; Kraay, 566). 
Finally, China’s overall saving in the 2000s was over 45 percent of the GDP.  
          It is important that after the global financial crisis household saving remained around 22-
23 percent and then gradually decline to 20 percent (Zhang, L., et al, 6). One of the major 
reasons of this decline is China’s economic slowdown in the 2010s after export-driven growth 
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lost its power. Structural and institutional problems, the US-led trade war, aging population and 
a slowing global economy negatively affect household saving rate in this period. Besides that, 
factors that used to contribute significantly to household saving in previous decades have no or 
less impact on household saving in this decade. For example, after serious financial and interest 
rate liberalization programs in this period, financial constraints play no major role on boosting 
household saving in the 2010s. It is important that in previous periods due to China’s 
underdeveloped financial and banking system it was very difficult to borrow for housing, health 
care, durable goods such as car and appliances and other big expenditures. Hence, households 
increased their saving for their future expenses. However, since 2012 Chinese authorities have 
gradually liberalized banking and financial sectors that included the relaxation of financial 
constraints over Chinese household. This new situation results in a decline in household saving 
rate in this decade. Besides that, housing ownership rose drastically in previous decade (reached 
90 percent in the previous decade); however, in 2010 the growth stopped and then started to 
slow down (87 percent) (Huang, He and Gan, 2020). Decline in homeownership ratio decreases 
the household saving in this decade. In addition to that, Chinese authorities gradually decreased 
social safety net until the harmonious society program in the second half of the previous 
decade. Since then, Chinese government has started to rebuild the social safety net with various 
programs such as new rural health care system and pension schemes. It is also important that 
after his election as president, Xi Jinping pledged to improve all social and public programs. All 
of these factors play substantial role on decreasing household saving in this decade.   
          Government saving similar to household saving increased until global financial crisis (over 
10 percent). Then it slowed down and stabilized around 5-6 percent in 2010s (IMF, 2017). An 
important decrease from 10 percent in the second half of previous decade to 5-6 percent in the 
2010s was about rising social spending of the Chinese government. However, Chinese 
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government still has lower social spending compared to other countries, even though there was 
a significant spending increase on health (from 4 percent of GDP to 5 percent of GDP) (World 
Bank, 2019), education (from 3 percent of GDP to over 4 percent of GDP) (The State Council, 
PRC, 2019), pension (from 0.5 percent of GDP to 1.5 percent of GDP) (World Bank, Trading 
Economics, 2019), and social assistance to household (from 6 percent of GDP to 9 percent of 
GDP) (OECD, 2019) in this decade. Besides that, it is important that social security used to be 
one of the main drivers of government saving in the previous decades. However, due to aging 
population the system started to give deficit in the middle of 2010s. In other words, payments 
exceeded contributions in China’s social security system (almost 3 percent of GDP in the second 
half of the decade) (Zhang, L., et al, 12, 20). In sum, as a result of declining global demand for 
Chinese products during and after the global financial crisis it has become clear for China that it 
would be very hard to continue its economic growth with its labor intensive and low-wage 
manufacturing export. Since then Chinese government has spent hundreds of billion dollars in 
order to transit to an economic model that features strong domestic consumption, high value-
added production and strong private sector role. However, all of these factors have negative 
impact on government saving in the 2010s and brought down government saving from 10 
percent of GDP to 5 percent of GDP.  
          Like all other component of saving, corporate saving rate was stagnant during the global 
financial crisis period and then slowly decreased to 17-18 percent of GDP in the 2010s (Zhang, L., 
et al, 6). It is important that during and after the initial reforms periods economic and 
institutional changes resulted in the rise in corporate profitability. However, in 2010s most of 
these changes had no big impact on corporate profitability. On the other hand, expansion of 
export in previous decade significantly increased corporate saving. However, in the 2010s global 
demand of Chinese products gradually decreased. China-U.S. trade war on the other hand just 
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worsened this situation in the second half of this decade. Besides that, wages and other factors 
cost of production increased during this decade which also negatively affect corporation saving. 
It is crucial that in previous decade when Chinese authorities loosened rural-urban migration 
restrictions, over a hundred million rural workers responded that by migrating to the cities. 
However, in the 2010s only 20 million people migrate urban areas and more importantly from 
2014 to 2017 there was almost no rural worker migrated to cities (Gregory and Meng, 396) even 
though government officials substantially reduce rural workers mobility restrictions and 
encourage them to migrate urban areas. In sum, China’s gross saving in the 2010s was around 
42-44 percent of the GDP.  
  
Table 19-20 Saving Rates in China and in the U.S.  
Source: China’s household, government and corporate savings data derived from various resources included; National 
Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook (various years); Modigliani and Cao, 2004; Kraay, 
2000; Qian, 1988; Yang, Zhang and Zhou, 2011; Kuijs, 2005; IMF, World Bank and OECD (various years); Ma and Yi, 
2010 and Zhang, L., et al.,2018. U.S. household, government and corporate savings data collected from various (years) 
sources of Bureau of Economic Analysis, Department of Commerce, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, Minneapolis, 
Dallas, San Francisco, Richmond and Boston Gross National Saving data are derived from World Bank and Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), White House archives and Federal Reserve Banks publications. 
 
          The Rise and Decline of China’s Productivity  
          Productivity is one of the key sources of economic growth. It is important that in the long-
term countries capacities’ to improve their living standards depends on their abilities to increase 
their productivity. In that respect, from the early 1950s to the late 1970s China maintained its 
Soviet-style slow, inefficient and unproductive centrally planned economy. With that economy 
Household Government Corporation Total 
1980s 15-16 5-6 11-12 31-34
1990s 17-18 3-4 14-15 34-37
2000s 22-23 5-6 19-20 46-49
2010s 20-21 5-6 17-18 42-45
Saving Rates in China
Household Government Corporation Total 
1980s 8-9 (-1)-0 12-13 19-22
1990s 6-7 0-1 11-12 17-20
2000s 5-6 (-1)-0 12-13 16-19
2010s 5-6 (-4)-(-3) 15-16 16-19
Saving Rates in the U.S. 
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Chinese government controlled a large share of country’s economic output by regulating 
production, prices and resources. However, this did not bring prosperity to China. At the end of 
the 1970s China was still weak, stagnant, inefficient and isolated from most of the world 
economies. In order to increase economic growth, raise the income level and living standards of 
its citizens, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping decided to launch several economic reforms at the 
end of the 1970s. China at that time was primarily an agrarian country. Therefore, reforms were 
started in agricultural sectors. First of all, government shifted collective farming system to 
household responsibility system (HRS). Under the HRS, government allowed farmers to produce 
more agricultural output in order to sell them in the market at market prices after they finished 
selling their assigned fixed quota of products to the government with official prices (Chow, 94). 
Government’s decision of giving farmers freedom over production and allowing them to make 
profits from more efficient use of factors of production (particularly land and labor) created 
strong incentive among farmers to be more productive in the early 1980s. With their improved 
productivity farmers increased their agricultural output by almost 50 percent in the first half of 
the 1980s (Lin, 1992: 45; Huang and Rozelle, 492). It is very important that the increase in 
productivity and agricultural output reduced China’s food constraints in that period. Due to that, 
millions of people who had employed in the agricultural sector was able to change their jobs and 
work in more productive rural industrial enterprises which are also known “township and village 
enterprises” (TVEs). This was a structural shift in productivity that transferred labor from low 
productivity sector (agriculture) to high productivity sector (industry and service). 
          The success of the agricultural reforms in the early 1980s motivated Chinese government 
to launch same kind of reforms in the nonagricultural sector. From that point, the government 
which was responsible for 75 percent of nonagricultural output and 80 percent of the total 
urban employment at the end of the 1970s (Zhu, 2012: 114), introduced dual-tracking system. 
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This was very much like the HRS in the agricultural sector that state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
were authorized to purchase input and sell output at market prices beyond their quotas that 
was given to them by central government for their production input and output with the fixed 
official price (China Labor Bulletin, 2007). Like in the agricultural sector dual-tracking system 
increased the productivity in nonagricultural sectors. In addition to that, central government 
gave more autonomy to provincial, city and county-level of governments and SOEs managers for 
setting SOEs’ wages, hiring and firing SOEs’ workers, purchasing and selling SEOs’ goods and 
services, and pricing SOEs products (Chow, 97-98). It is important that lower-level governments 
and SOEs managers were thought to have greater knowledge on local SOEs’ needs. From that 
point, they mostly took decisions that make SOEs more productive in this period. Besides that, 
central government connected managers and workers’ wages to financial outcome of SOEs in 
order to increase workers and employers’ productivity (Hoi Yei, 2006: 157). Meanwhile, due to 
the central government’s generous financial and legal incentives the number of TVEs rapidly 
increased from 1.52 million at the end of the 1970s to almost 19 million at the end of the 1980s 
(National Bureau of National Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook, 2003). In the same 
period the number of workers employed in TVEs increased from 28.3 million to almost 94 
million (National Bureau of National Statistics of China). In addition to that, special economic 
zones (SEZ) played important role on increasing productivity in this period. Chinese government 
established SEZs in four coastal cities in 1979 and offered tax, trade and financial incentives to 
attract foreign investment. By establishing SEZs, central government also planned to build 
trading ties with other countries in the 1980s. In the final analysis, Deng Xiaoping’s reforms 
opened the economy to internal and external markets in this decade. Expanding markets 
allowed Chinese corporations to reach a higher degree of specialization and more efficient use 
of resources. In addition to that reforms (HRS, managerial responsibility system) that 
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encouraged workers and employers to use resources efficiently. There were also improvements 
in the quality of inputs. Labor and capital qualities gradually increased in the 1980s. Finally, 
technological change also played some roles on productivity in this decade. Starting from the 
early reforms Chinese government adopted policies that promote technological change in order 
to boost productivity. In total, annual average growth in labor productivity was 6.4 percent in 
the 1980s (Reserve Bank of Australia, 2019; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2019; National 
Bureau of Statistic of China, 2019; CEIC, 2019). Total factor productivity grew by 2.7 percent 
annually (Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; National Bureau of 
Statistic of China; Zhu, 111). 
          The productivity growth in agricultural sector started to slow down in the second half of 
the 1980s. Government in the 1990s gradually liberalized market for agricultural inputs and 
outputs. Farmers starting in the early 1990s were able to make their own decisions with less 
intervention and fewer restrictions. On the other hand, central government reduced its financial 
incentives for the farmers. Agricultural market liberalization encouraged farmers to invest more 
on new technologies. Due to technological investment, productivity in this sector increased. Like 
in the previous decade when productivity increased in the agricultural sector, a smaller number 
of farmers met China’s food demand without causing any difficulties. Due to that a great 
number of workers were reallocated to the nonagricultural sectors (Fang, 2018: 243-244). By 
that time average labor productivity in nonagricultural sectors was at least six times higher than 
the productivity in agricultural sector (Zhu, 114). Therefore, reforms and productivity growth in 
agricultural sector was one of the major sources of the productivity increase in other sectors. It 
was important that throughout previous decade SOEs’ productivity remained low. One of the 
main reasons behind that central government had commitment to support employment in the 
SOEs. Due to this commitment, SOEs had no budget constraints and market disciplines. 
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However, in the 1990s after their deteriorating economic performance, the economic condition 
of SOEs worsened significantly (Kobayashi, Baobo, and Sano, 1999: 12-15). From that point, 
financial aid that needed to sustain SOEs increased steadily in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In 
the middle of the 1990s it became clear that this could no longer be sustainable. Therefore, 
central government declined its commitment to SOEs and adopted a reform program known as 
“grasping the big and letting go of the small and medium size of these enterprises” (Hsieh and 
Song, 2015: 299-301). According to this program, government focused on large SOEs in strategic 
industries, and released small and medium size SOEs. From that point, government started to 
shut down many unproductive small-medium size SOEs. The vast majority of them were 
privatized and some of them were sold to their employees. In the middle of half of the 1990s 
Chinese government enacted “Company Law” that basically legalized the development of 
private firms (Lardy, 330). In addition to that, central government facilitated to reregister over a 
million collective firms as private companies (Lardy). After these decisions the number of private 
enterprises grew drastically. Labor and capital moved from state to private sector. State 
financial institutions gradually recognized private enterprises and directed a larger share of their 
lending to these institutions (Cheng and Wu, 2016: 2). Combination of shutting down of 
unproductive small and medium size SOEs, legalizing the development of private enterprises, 
and increasing the access of private enterprises to funds had strong effect on productivity 
growth in China in this decade. Meanwhile, central government gradually reduced and 
eventually eliminated the dual-tracking price system for the existing SOEs. In the middle of this 
decade most of the products were sold at market prices. Reforming price system created some 
incentives for SOEs to increase their productivity little bit. It is important that after the Asian 
financial crisis in the second half of the 1990s China experienced a massive downturn in export. 
In order to remove negative effect of financial crisis, Chinese authorities cut interest rates, 
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increased money supplies and used other expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. That 
response was successful. In a few years Chinese GDP started to increase again. However, it is 
crucial that monetary and fiscal stimulus projects were directed by public institutions such as 
SOEs, central, provincial or regional governments. This process cut the earlier efforts of 
expansion the relative role of private enterprises in Chinese economy. Overall, due to rising 
government and SOEs activities in the economy, productivity growth slowed down at the end of 
the 1990s. Nevertheless, except this, there were some factors that drove productivity upwards 
in this decade. For example, the quality of labor and capital increased much faster than previous 
decade. The quality of high school-college education and vocational training improved 
significantly (Tsang, 2000: 611). Besides that, spending on research and development rose 
gradually (World Bank, 2019). These factors helped China to develop industrial technologies in 
the 1990s. It is also important that starting from second half of the decade there was a sharp 
increase in FDI. FDI had a significant spillover effects that brought new production technologies 
and techniques and modern management practices to the country. From that point, FDI 
significantly contributed productivity growth in this decade. In sum, it is important that annual 
labor productivity increased by 2 percentage points from previous decade’s average and 
reached to 8.4 percent in the 1990s (Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; 
National Bureau of Statistic of China; CEIC). Annual total factor productivity was increased by 
less than 1 percentage point from precious decade’s average. In the 1990s annual average total 
factor productivity was 3.5 percent (Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; 
National Bureau of Statistic of China; Zhu).  
          The productivity growth in the 2000s was very much a continuation of previous decade’s 
productivity growth. Like in the previous decade, factors that drove the productivity upwards 
such as capital investment, resource allocation, technological change and improvement in the 
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quality of input continued even more intensively in this decade. Unproductive state enterprises 
(SOEs, TVEs) lost their edge. The number of SOEs that closed down increased. At the end of the 
1990s there were over 50 thousand SOEs in China; after a decade that number dropped to 9 
thousand (Song, 370). Many of these enterprises were privatized. Some of them restructured 
and reorganized. Reallocation of factors of production (labor, entrepreneurship and capital) 
from state to non-state sectors accelerated in this decade. Due to that, productivity has 
significantly improved. Chinese government’s decision to enter into World Trade Organization 
(WTO) opened a new era for China to launch further reforms. It is important that in order to join 
the WTO Chinese government cut tariffs, reduced restrictive barriers, broadened trade rights 
and allowed non-state enterprises enter the domestic trade sectors. After its entry into the 
WTO, Chinese firms improved their access to foreign markets. Improved access to foreign 
market created two major consequences. One was an expansion of trade which expanded the 
capital accumulation and the other was a further realization of its comparative advantages that 
helped China to use its production factors more efficiently (Chow, 2003: 109). Both 
consequences have positive effect on productivity growth in China. It is also important that with 
their increasing access to world markets after joining the WTO, Chinese firms were able to 
import more technology intensive goods as both investment and intermediate input which also 
promote productivity in that period. From the same point, liberalization of country’s economic 
system played critical role on accelerated FDI in China in the 2000s. At the end of the decade 
China attracted 20 percent of the world FDI (World Bank, Ministry of Commerce, PRC). Like in 
the second half of the previous decade, FDI brought new production technologies and new 
management practices that led to increase productivity. Besides that, it is also important that 
the improvement in human capital continued in this decade. The number of people who 
received college degrees increased. In addition to that, the quality of education at China’s 
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colleges significantly improved. Finally spending on R&D significantly rose in the 2000s (almost 2 
percent of GDP at the end of the decade) (World Bank; OECD, 2019). These developments also 
played important role on improving the productivity in China. It is critical to know that 
combination of trade liberalization, privatization, and access to foreign markets in this decade 
increased competition in manufacturing sector which led to a rapid productivity growth. 
However, the same thing can’t be said for the sectors that were dominated by SOEs. Especially 
in the service sector government, still made up over 70 percent of employment, had strict 
barriers to entry (Lardy, 334). From that point, due to overregulation, barriers to entry and low 
level of competition productivity growth in government dominated sectors lagged behind of 
other sectors. It is important that central government continued its previous decade’s policy of 
grasping the big and letting go of the small and medium size of SOEs. On the other hand, 
government identified some important industries (strategic and pillar) and used a variety of 
industrial and financial measures for allocating resources to these SOEs favorably (Song, 357-
361). As a result, revenue and the size of SOEs increased substantially; however, their 
productivity deteriorated especially at the end of the decade due to GFC and the polices that 
central government adopted after the GFC. GFC was an important factor that negatively 
affected productivity (slightly) at the end of this decade, but extensively in the next decade. In 
all, labor productivity grew by 9.4 percent annually which was 1 percentage point higher than 
previous decade’s average (Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; National 
Bureau of Statistic of China; CEIC). On the other hand, total factor productivity grew by 3.9 
percent annually in the 2000s (Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; 
National Bureau of Statistic of China; Zhu).  
          It is essential that China experienced a very different productivity growth in the 2010s. 
Starting from the GFC in the late 2000s, China’s productivity growth declined steadily. There 
231 
 
were many factors that contribute to decline in productivity growth. First of all, during and after 
the GFC the demand for Chinese export decline significantly. Chinese government responded 
this decline by adopting a massive stimulus package. The aim of this stimulus was to maintain 
the employment and sustain the production. Therefore, during and after the GFC Chinese 
enterprises increased its production even though the world trade slowed down significantly. 
Eventually this created serious overproduction and overcapacity problems that damaged foreign 
trade relations and economic sustainability of China. It is important that most of this package’s 
projects were in infrastructure and construction sectors that increased the economic growth 
substantially; however, added almost nothing to productivity. In addition, similar to that of the 
stimulus package in response to the Asian financial crisis a decade ago, central government 
authorized public institutions such as SOEs, regional and local governments to administer the 
monetary and fiscal stimulus project. From that point, a large amount of money from the 
stimulus package was directed to unproductive SOEs that mostly generated a weak return on 
assets (Song, 355). Overstaffing, overinvestment/overproduction and weak corporate 
governance after the GFC prevented SOEs to be more productive (359-361). Besides that, when 
Xi Jinping became president in 2013 he increased the role of the state in the economy. He 
launched many reforms that boosted the importance of SOEs. SOEs increased their production 
and profits in areas where private enterprises once led. On the other hand, business 
environment worsened for the productive private enterprises after Xi Jinping’s reforms. 
          It is noteworthy that in this decade many foreign companies started to reduce their 
investment in China as a result of trade disputes (particularly between China and the U.S.), 
political and economic pressure of Chinese government on foreign firms, foreign firms’ 
reluctance to share technology and management techniques with their Chinese partners, and 
finally continuously increasing production cost of corporations in China. From that point, the 
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pace of FDI flows into China decreased to 2 percent per year in this decade which is 8 percent 
lower than previous decade’s average of 10 percent (UNCTAD, 2019: 42). It is crucial that in 
previous decade China was able to attract 20 percent of the world gross FDI; however, less than 
a decade China lost half of that share (in 2018 China accounted for 10 percent of the world FDI) 
(UNCTAD). Declined growth of FDI in the 2010s slowed down the transfer of foreign technology 
into China which further deteriorated productivity in this country. Consequently, in order to 
raise productivity Chinese government aimed to create homegrown technology with the project 
called “Made in China 2025”. Chinese authorities identified ten key sectors (from information 
technology to aerospace equipment and from ocean engineering equipment to bio-medicine 
and high-end medical equipment) and several technologies (from 3D printing to mobile internet 
to cloud computing) in this project and aimed to improve its ability to innovate and then capture 
these sectors and technologies (The State Council, PRC, 2019). However, until 2019 Chinese 
enterprises failed to change their organizational structure which favors top-down and autocratic 
approaches to management that inconsistent with the culture of innovation. As a result of that, 
Chinese enterprises found it difficult to increase productivity through homegrown technology 
creation. 
          It is also crucial that China’s working-age population started to decline from the middle of 
this decade. This played an important role on productivity decline in China. When the working-
age population falls, domestic consumption decreases so do companies’ revenues. Lower 
revenue means less investment on factors that boost the productivity such as R&D. China’s one-
child policy is one the major reasons of working-age population decline. One-child policy also 
plays important role on reaching Lewis turning point (LTP) which is a situation that (surplus rural 
labor is fully employed in manufacturing and service sectors in urban areas) causes urban wages 
to surge. In the previous decades the migration from rural areas (agricultural sector) to 
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industrialized urban areas (manufacturing and/or service sectors) invigorated productivity in 
China since average labor productivity in nonagricultural sector is higher than the productivity in 
agricultural sector. It is noteworthy that in this reallocation case, migrant workers who drawn 
from the agricultural sectors forced to accept low wage-jobs. They accepted low-wages because 
they preferred to work in the city with low-wages over living in the farm. However, in the 2010s 
there is a situation that employers in the cities (nonagricultural sectors) could not find enough 
labor or attract workers from the rural areas (agricultural sector) to employ in their companies. 
Due to that companies started to raise their wages in order to attract more employees. This had 
important consequences. First of all, in the previous decades millions of people who had worked 
in the rural areas each year went to work in the cities. This structural shift increase productivity 
significantly, however; in 2010s the amount of people who head to work in the city gradually 
diminished (Balding, 2019) which means the productivity growth decreased in this decade. 
Another consequence was about the rising wages. Due to rising wages, companies’ profits and 
savings declined. And due to declined profits and saving, companies could not finance the 
capital formation for investment and expansion which also leads to decrease productivity. It is 
also important that there was a structural shift from industrial sectors to service sectors in China 
in 2010s which is quite different than the shift in the previous decade (from agricultural sector 
to industrial sector). It is the rule of thumb that productivity in industrial sector is higher than 
the service sector (Sorbe, Gal and Millot, 2018: 3). From that point, as the Chinese economy 
shifts closer to service sector, productivity growth will slow further down. In addition to that, 
service sector is mostly dominated by (unproductive) SOEs in China. Therefore, service sector is 
strongly protected with trade and non-trade barriers from international competition. Due to the 
lack of competition service sector in China has weak productivity growth.  
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          In sum, in order to increase productivity Chinese government proposed some reforms in 
the middle of this decade that included financial and fiscal reforms such as liberalizing the 
financial system and increasing the efficiency of fiscal policies (Huang and Wang, 2018: 295); 
structural reforms such as reforming the Hukou system (The State Council, PRC, 2014) and 
external sector reforms such as further opening up markets. However, after Xi Jinping took 
office in 2013 the chance of implementing these reforms successfully gradually diminished. 
Nevertheless, the productivity rate of China is still higher than most of the countries in the world 
in this decade. It is important that factors such as; R&D, improvement in human capital and 
some managerial capabilities, opening up some sectors to competition, resource (capital, labor) 
allocation, technological changes and technology diffusion, privatization, liberalization, 
institutional changes and policy reforms continued to contribute productivity growth; however, 
in this decade these factors’ contribution to productivity is smaller than the previous decades’ 
contribution. In sum, annual average growth in labor productivity was 7.4 percent which was 2 
percentage points lower than previous decade’s average (Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal 
Reserve Bank of St Louis; National Bureau of Statistic of China; CEIC). Total factor productivity 
also declined more than 2 percentage points. It grew by 1.8 percent annually in the 2010s 









Figure 45 China Total Factor and Labor Productivity (1980-2018) 
Sources: China GDP collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China, Statistical Yearbook, IMF, Federal Reserve 
Bank of St Louis and World Bank. Labor and Total Factor Productivity Data derived from (various years) Reserve Bank 
of Australia; Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis; National Bureau of Statistic of China; CEIC; Zhu. 
 
 
Table 21 China and 
U.S. Labor and Total 
Factor Productivity and 
GDP growth by Decade  
Source: China GDP 
collected from National Bureau of Statistics of China, Statistical Yearbook, IMF, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and 
World Bank. Labor and Total Factor Productivity Data derived from (various years) Reserve Bank of Australia; Federal 
Reserve Bank of St Louis; National Bureau of Statistic of China; CEIC; Zhu. U.S. GDP data collected from Federal 
Reserve Bank of St Louis and BEA database, Labor Productivity data collected (various years) U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, Total Factor Productivity is derived from (various years) University of Groningen and University of California, 
Davis, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis and various years from Bureau of Labor Statistics 
 
          Conclusion for the Third Part (Economic Power of China) 
           As it mentioned above that before its rapid economic growth, China was one of the 
poorest countries in the world. In 1978, China’s GDP was below $200 billion and its GDP per 
China U.S. China U.S. China U.S.
1980s 2.7 0.7 6.4 1.5 9.7 3.2
1990s 3.5 0.8 8.4 2.1 10 3.2
2000s 3.9 0.7 9.4 2.7 10.3 1.9
2010s 1.8 0.5 7.4 1.1 7.8 2.3
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capita was around $150. However, after the death of Chairman Mao, the Chinese government 
gradually shifted its Soviet style centrally controlled and highly inefficient economy to a Western 
style market-driven economy. Since then, China has experienced an unprecedented economic 
growth with its GDP growth rate averaged over 10 percent for decades. With this high growth 
rate China’s GDP increased from $190 billion dollars at the beginning of the 1980s to $13.6 
trillion at the end of the 2010s. Nevertheless, the overall situation raised several questions 
about China’s economic growth. How did China grow so fast? What were the external and 
internal factors that affected China’s economy growth? Is China's economic growth sustainable? 
What are the challenges for the future of China’s economic growth? What will be the future of 
China’s economic growth? It is important to note that rather than properly answering these 
questions, some scholars jumped to conclusions by assuming that China will continue to 
maintain relatively high economic growth rates in the future which would eventually make 
China the world next economic superpower. 
          However, this study goes into further detail to elucidates the reasons behind China’s GDP 
growth and determine the likelihood of whether China can maintain its high GDP growth in the 
future. In that respect, this study detects various factors that increased China’s GDP growth 
significantly through the decades. For example, in the 1980s, China’s economy greatly benefited 
from the reforms in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Besides that, starting from the 
middle of the same decade, the Chinese government launched various economic relationships 
with many countries in the western world that had no prior connection. Building economic 
relationships stimulated trade and trade increased China’s GDP in this period. In addition to 
that, China created SEZs and offered tax and trade incentives in order to attract foreign 
investment. This worked out as planned; trade and investment rose remarkably in this period. 
As a result, people’s income gradually increased. During this period, the Chinese government 
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was able to use people’s raised income for further investments. In the following decade, 
economic growth accelerated through the continuation of reforms. There was a structural shift 
in resources in the 1990s, which included millions of workers moving from agricultural sectors to 
nonagricultural sectors. Besides that, China’s government closed down many unprofitable SOEs 
in order to make rest of these remaining enterprises more competitive and productive. Some of 
the SOEs were sold to their employees while others were privatized. Private investment 
increased substantially through further integration with the world economy. At the end of the 
1990s, Chinese authorities changed its economic growth model to an export-oriented 
philosophy. From that point, China devalued its currency significantly (the dollar to yuan 
exchange rate increased from 5.8 to 8.6) and used extremely favorable monetary policies for 
expanding its exports. After its accession to WTO over the next decade, China drastically 
increased its exports and became the largest exporter in the world. Meanwhile, as in previous 
decades, China’s economy benefitted a lot from large scale capital investment, urbanization, 
and privatization. Moreover, the Chinese government expanded SEZs to the whole coastal 
region first and then expanded to the riparian and inland regions. Economic reforms, creation of 
new SEZs, decentralization policies, and the membership of WTO significantly accelerated FDI. 
Raising FDI inflows increased capital formation, technology transfer, and human capital 
accumulation that all contributed to China’s economic growth during the 2000s. In addition to 
that, all these processes also boosted demand for labor. It is important to note that during this 
decade tens of millions of people moved from rural inland regions to coastal provinces to find 
job in manufacturing and service industries. This created a situation in the 2000s that kept 
wages and production cost down which made Chinese companies highly competitive in the 
international markets.  
238 
 
          However, a few years after the GFC, China’s GDP growth started to decline. It is important 
to note that this decline has been slower, but steadier and more severe than earlier cases. There 
are various reasons behind this.  
          Primarily, factors that drove high-paced economic growth in the previous decades such as 
improving quality and quantity of labor force, allocating resources more effectively, investing 
public capital, and increasing FDI and export continued to contribute economic growth; 
however, in the 2010s their contribution to growth is not the same pace as in the past. It is 
much weaker than previous decades. For example, after the GFC, household income stagnated 
in many parts of the world. Due to income stagnation, households reduced their consumption 
significantly which had a major negative impact on Chinese exports since China is the largest 
supplier of consumption goods. Furthermore, as a result of serious economic crises and financial 
uncertainties in this era, the pace of the FDI inflows to China significantly decreased which 
created additional negative effect on GDP growth. In the previous decades, reforms in 
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors played significant role on economic growth; however, 
their effect on growth gradually diminished. From the same perspective, China exploited late-
comer advantages in the previous decades by acquiring and imitating technologies from 
developed countries and achieved higher level of technological innovation with low cost and 
fewer risk. However, this advantage dwindled in the recent period. It is noteworthy that China 
benefitted significantly from its growing working age population in the previous decades. 
However, due to the one-child policy and low fertility rate, China’s working age population has 
started to decline since early 2010s. This situation created a serious burden on the Chinese 
economy after the first half of the 2010s. With China’s declining working age population, it has 
become harder for China to adequately support its economic growth in the new period. China 
also enjoyed its mass migration of workers from rural to urban areas in the previous decades. 
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This large-scale migration created a situation in preceding periods that kept the wages and the 
cost of production remarkably low. As a result, Chinese corporations were able to raise their 
profits, savings, and investment. Therefore, mass rural-urban migration significantly contributed 
to China’s economic growth. However, this situation started to change in the early 2010s. There 
are many signs in eastern coastal provinces that availability of surplus labor at low wages is 
disappearing. In other words, China has passed the Lewis Turning Point. From the Asian financial 
crisis to GFC over a hundred million migrants moved to eastern coastal cities to find a job in the 
manufacturing and service industries. Yet, the number of workers who moved to coastal big 
cities declined to 20 million from GFC to 2016. And it is crucial that there was almost no increase 
in migrant workers from 2014 to 2017. One of the most important factors behind that is a trend 
toward closing the wage gap between rural and urban workers. Another factor is the hukou 
system that makes it difficult for workers to switch their registration from rural to urban 
workers. Hukou system also restricts migrant workers’ access to urban public services. All these 
factors discourage rural workers to move big coastal cities in recent period. From that point, in 
order to attract rural workforce, Chinese corporations start to offer higher wages. However, it is 
crucial that higher wages increase China’s production cost and also reduce its corporations’ 
competitiveness in the new period. It is also important that in the previous decade Chinese 
economic growth model which was characterized by labor-intensive manufacturing for export 
coincided with an era of increasing globalization. In that respect, China benefitted a lot from 
engaging in global production and trade in this period. However, this period came to an end 
after the GFC. Today’s international environment has entered a period of uncertainties. Rule-
based multilateral economic system and liberal economic principles are under assault by many 
institutions and countries. Therefore, in this new international economic environment it is very 
hard for China to seize the same opportunities that it enjoyed in the previous period. From that 
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point, after his election as President of China, Xi Jinping decided to change China’s economic 
growth model (Wong, 2019). The new model that included principles such as strong domestic 
consumption, high-value added production and high level of private sector role in the economy 
could not bring the same economic growth rate that China had in the previous decades. Xi 
Jinping and his government’s faltering performance on these new economic principles play an 
important role in that. In sum, forces discussed above that promoted rapid Chinese growth in 
last four decades have been withering each and every year since the early 2010s. From that 
point, China’s economic growth will decelerate even more in the new period, which is bound to 
create various economic challenges for China in the near future.   
          Many scholars take price inflation as a serious problem for China. It is important that like 
many other transition countries, China experienced extreme price volatility in the early decades 
of reform. For example, China used ambitious expansionary monetary and fiscal policies in order 
to finance investment and accelerate economic growth three times in the 1980s. In each of 
these periods, China’s economy grew significantly. However, each of these periods ended up 
with an overheated economy that led to rising prices of goods and services. Central government 
responded to these price rises by raising interest rates, cutting government spending and 
enforcing credit control on financial institutions. In the middle of the 1990s, China experienced 
its last severe price increase after another wishful growth-oriented policy that Chinese 
government had launched in 1992. At the end of this dramatic price hike, which increased the 
inflation almost 25 percent, Chinese authorities decided to implement some structural changes 
in the economy. From that point, China liberalized its trade and adopted an export-led economic 
development model. Since then China has increased its production significantly and overfilled 
not only domestic but also international markets with its goods. Nevertheless, overproducing 
and oversupplying goods put a strong and stable downward pressure on prices. In addition to 
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that people in China like in the previous decades preferred to save their income rather than 
spend. In all, China began to experience sustained periods of price decline (deflation). It is 
crucial that China fell into deflation three times in a decade. Before the GFC China was able to 
export its products to the world. Therefore, falling prices were not a serious issue for China. 
However, after the GFC global demand for Chinese goods fell sharply which increased the 
downward pressure on domestic prices. Meanwhile, Chinese authorities adopted a new growth 
model that aimed to increase domestic consumption. From that point, government used 
aggressive expansionary monetary and fiscal policies. Notwithstanding, after years of using 
these policies, domestic consumption still remains low which creates additional downturn 
pressure over prices. In all, combination of continuously rising supply and weakly growing 
demand has severely raised the fear of chronic deflation in China in the new period.   
          It is important that declinist scholars greatly underestimate China’s debt. First of all, they 
focus particularly on China’s government debt which is relatively low when it is compared to 
other governments’ debt. Besides that, the same scholars fail to emphasize China’s massive debt 
burden that was built up in the past decade. It is true that China used balance budget policy and 
carried little debt for about three decades after its establishment in 1949. However, when 
Chinese government launched its economic reforms first time at the end of the 1970s, China 
began to run budget deficit and issue some limited debt. China’s total debt increased 
moderately from 1980 to 2006-07 (from $100 billion to $4-4.5 trillion). During this period 
procurement prices of farms products, SOEs, local and regional governments expenditures, 
monetary and fiscal subsides, incentives and hundreds of thousands of infrastructure projects 
were the main drivers of total debt. Before the financial crisis, which was the origin of China’s 
debt problem, total debt was $4-4.5 trillion and around 150 percent of GDP (In 2006, GDP of 
China amounted to around 2.7 trillion U.S. dollars). However, only a decade from the GFC 
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China’s total debt increased tremendously, which deeply undermine the future of its economy 
in the new period. The reasons why China’s debt level in both dollars and as a percentage of 
GDP increased enormously within a relatively short time were various. First of all, instability and 
uncertainty in the world economy after the GFC significantly dropped global demand for Chinese 
goods. This led to a sharp decline in China’s export that caused thousands of factories to shut 
down and millions of workers to lose their jobs. In order to reinvigorate the economy and 
recreate hundreds of thousands of jobs, Chinese government started to use its massive stimulus 
packages. This project was one of the key reasons that boosted the debt burden. It is important 
that most of the funds from the stimulus packages went to real estate and infrastructure 
projects that generated low investment returns. From the same perspective, SOEs acquired a lot 
of stimulus support. With that support SOEs continued to maintain its employment and 
production level which worsened China’s overcapacity and overproduction problems. It is 
important to note that most of SOEs were inefficient and they maintained their operation with 
huge loses. However, contrary to earlier periods, central government did not allow these 
enterprises to go bankrupt or taken over though merger and acquisition. In fact, with the 
election of Xi Jinping more resources channeled to SOEs. In the new period, Xi Jinping promotes 
the role of SOEs at the expense of private corporation since he wants to continue state 
ownership in critical and strategic industries that includes defense, telecommunication, energy, 
civil aviation, IT, electric production and distribution, shipping, steel, coal and construction 
materials. In addition to that, he sees SOEs as the backbone of the socialist economy. In other 
words, he aims to implement his objectives such as maintaining economic and social stability 
through SOEs. In sum, some SOEs slightly increased their profit; however, most of SOEs financial 
performance declined substantially. From that point, these enterprises borrowed heavily from 
state-owned financial institutions to cover their losses. After a decade from the GFC their (SOEs) 
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debt level reached over $13 trillion which was equal to almost 100 percent of GDP in 2018. In 
addition to that in the new period due to overproduction and overcapacity problems many 
private enterprises’ efficiency declined which created serious challenges for these enterprises to 
repay their debts. After GFC, China also aimed to improve social services and the expand public 
safety net. Thus, Chinese authorities launched thousands of projects in central and western part 
of China. These projects significantly increased the budget debt. It is important that local and 
provincial governments took an important part in these projects. These governments rapidly 
raised their spending in this period as well. However, for obtaining the additional resources that 
needed for financing these and many other projects that includes infrastructure projects, local 
and provincial governments created informal and backdoor financing practices which are called 
local government financial vehicles (LGFV). It is critical that local and provincial governments 
operated these type of financing practices beyond the central government surveillance. 
Therefore, central government has little knowledge of how fast that debt is rising. Nevertheless, 
it is expected that local and provincial governments are in unsustainable level of debt at the end 
of the 2010s. On the other hand, small and mid-size private enterprises used similar types of 
financing practices in this period. After borrowing heavily from shadow banking institutions, 
these enterprises repackaged their loans as investment in their balance sheet. In that respect, 
these enterprises like local and provincial governments are also in unsustainable level of debt at 
the end of the decade. Another factor that significantly increased the debt of China is the 
government price control mechanism for some critical areas such as energy (oil, gas, coal and 
electricity), food (pork, wheat and corn) and real estate. Chinese government believes that a 
price hike in these critical areas could lead to a social unrest, much like China experienced 
previously in the late 1980s. From that point, government in China used policies that set the 
prices of goods and services in these critical areas below the market level; however, these 
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polices caused serious distortions in the economy and also led to a surge in government debt. In 
all, at the end of 2018 China’s total debt increased to over $34 trillion which was equal to 255 
percent of GDP in 2018 (Curran, 2018). That means China built up a massive debt burden ($30 
trillion) in a decade after the GFC. Through these tremendous spending programs, China was 
able to open tens of thousands of factories, create million jobs and maintain a relatively high 
economic growth even in the 2010s which were mostly remembered as a decade of uncertainty 
and instability. Nevertheless, it is important that at the end of the 2010s China’s debt reached 
an unsustainable level that could trigger an economic crisis in China in the near future. From 
that point, China’s future growth will very much depend on how well China deals with its 
massive debt.  
          China’s savings rate is another topic that attracts a lot of attention. Many scholars 
emphasize high savings rate in China, which is still about 10-15 percentage point higher than 
global average, without addressing the factors that increased the level of savings in previous 
decades and factors that started to reduce the level of savings in the new period. It is important 
that China significantly increased its already high savings rate in the early 1980s. Factors such as 
culture, past experiences, demographic changes, government’s strict control over people 
income, weak financial and banking system, increasing people income, shrinking social safety 
net and raising house ownership encouraged people to save more until the late 2000s. 
Corporations during the same period substantially boosted their profits and their savings as 
well. It is crucial that government subsidies such as easy access to energy, land and capital and 
corporations’ monopolistic power played important role on the rise of corporation savings. 
Besides that, labor market reforms during this period relaxed workers mobility restrictions that 
significantly pull corporations’ production cost down and their earnings and savings up. Finally, 
China’s accession to the WTO resulted in a massive growth of export which increased 
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household, governments and corporation’s savings significantly. At the end of the 2000s China’s 
total saving reached almost 50 percent of GDP. However, it is crucial that China’s total savings 
started to decline steadily few years after the GFC. For example, seven out of eight years in the 
2010s China’s total savings rate was in decline. There are various reasons behind that decline. 
One of the key reasons is about China’s economic slowdown in the 2010s after its export-driven 
growth model lost its power. Besides that, structural and institutional problems, the U.S.-led 
trade war, and a slowing world economy negatively affect China’s saving rate in the 2010s. It is 
important to note that factors such as weak financial system, rigorous state control over 
people’s income and poor social safety net played important role on China’s saving in previous 
decades. However, these factors had little impact on savings in the new period since China has 
gradually developed its financial market, improved its social safety net and relaxed its control 
over people’s income. From the same perspective, home-ownership positively affected savings 
in previous decades. Starting from the early 2010s home-ownership growth ratio started to slow 
down. Declining home-ownership ratio is another factor adversely affect savings in this decade. 
Social security was one of the main drivers of savings before the 2010s. Yet, as a result of the 
aging population in China the system has started to give its first deficit in the middle of the 
2010s. Corporate savings was also in decline. Previous reforms and expansion of export had a 
big impact on corporate profitability. Nevertheless, their effect gradually diminished after the 
GFC. Besides that, wages (Lewis Turning Point) and other cost of productions such as raw 
materials increased in the 2010s which negatively affect corporate savings. It is important that 
in order to pull wages down, Chinese authorities loosened rural-urban restrictions; however, 
there are still very few rural workers migrate to cities in the new period. In sum, China’s saving 
rate steadily and constantly declined from about 50 percent at the beginning of the decade to 
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43 percent at the end of the decade. After scrutinizing factors that is mentioned above, this 
paper predicts that China’s savings rate will fall further in the future.  
          As in the savings issue a lot of scholars pay specific attention to China’s productivity 
growth. In their research, most of these scholars emphasize China’s rapid productivity growth 
and its effect on the growth of Chinese economy. It is true that productivity improvement 
played an essential role on China’s economic growth in the previous decade. However, since 
GFC, Chinese productivity growth has declined steadily. This is mostly because the factors that 
significantly contributed to productivity in the previous decades have little or no effect on 
productivity in the new period. For example, in the early 1980s reforms in agricultural sector 
(household responsibility system) improved farmers productivity remarkably. Raising 
productivity in the agricultural sector freed millions of rural workers to move cities and work in 
more productive manufacturing and service industries. From the same point, reforms in 
nonagricultural sectors (dual-tracking system) improved the productivity of SOEs. The spillover 
of technology and knowledge from FDI was another factor that boosted China’s overall 
productivity in this period. There were also substantial improvements in labor and capital. For 
example, high school and college education improved significantly. Spending on research and 
development rose remarkably. The government started its further reforms on SOEs in the 
middle of 1990s. Chinese authorities took an important decision and closed down many 
unproductive SOEs. Thousands of other SOEs were privatized. Labor and capital moved to more 
productive private sector. It is important that, after China’s accession to the WTO, Chinese 
enterprises improved their access to global market. In addition to that, these enterprises started 
to import more technology intensive goods (inputs) that they used in their production function 
in order to promote their productivity further. Competition also increased noticeably 
particularly in manufacturing sector which led to a drastic productivity growth in this period. 
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However, few years after the GFC China started to experience a steady and continuous 
productivity slowdown. There were many factors that contributed to a decline in productivity 
growth in this period. First of all, after the GFC, Chinese authorities used massive stimulus 
projects in order to reinvigorate the growth. It is important that these projects caused serious 
overproduction, overinvestment and overstaffing problems that led to a decrease in China’s 
overall productivity. It is also important that most of the stimulus projects went to infrastructure 
and real estate sectors that rapidly increased GDP; however, they added almost nothing to 
productivity. Furthermore, for administrating these projects central government authorized 
unproductive SOEs and other local and provincial institutions that generated lower return from 
assets. From the same perspective, after his election as President of China, Xi Jinping 
substantially increased SOEs’ role in the economy. During this period, highly unproductive SOEs 
started to control most of service and some manufacturing sectors which private enterprises 
once led. Foreign corporations in this decade started to reduce their direct and portfolio 
investments to China as a result of China’s aggressive policies over foreign corporations, trade 
disputes, particularly between China and the U.S., foreign corporations’ unwillingness to share 
technology and know-how with their Chinese partners, and finally constantly increasing 
production cost of corporations in China. Decline in direct and portfolio investments in China 
further deteriorated productivity. It is crucial that starting from the middle of the 2010s China’s 
working population started to decline. When the working age population falls, domestic 
consumption decreases. Decline in domestic consumption causes corporations to have less 
revenue and less investment that needed for boosting the productivity. Around the same time, 
China reached the LTP. Due to LTP, corporations’ production cost started to increase, and that 
lead to corporations to have less revenue and investment which is critical for increasing 
productivity. In addition to that, China’s service sector is growing at the expense of the 
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manufacturing sector in the new period. It is important that productivity in service sector is 
much lower than the productivity manufacturing sector. This shift is quite different than the 
shift in the previous decades. In the previous decades, China experienced a transition from 
agricultural economy to manufacturing economy that played positive role on productivity 
growth since productivity in manufacturing sector is higher than productivity in agricultural 
sector. Finally, it is crucial that China’s service sector is protected with many barriers and mostly 
dominated by unproductive SOEs (in financial, banking, insurance, transportation, and utilities 
(water, gas, and electricity) sectors). This is another factor that causes further deterioration in 
productivity in the new period. In sum, it is important to know that factors that drove China’s 
productivity upwards in the previous decades are no longer contributing the productivity in the 
same way. In addition to that, some (new) factors that are mentioned above lead to a decrease 
in productivity. From that point, it is predicted that the almost decade-long drop in China’s 
productivity growth will continue further in the future.  
          In conclusion, it is important to note that overall findings in this section contradict the 
findings of scholars that state that China will continue to maintain relatively high economic 
growth rates and will displace the U.S. as the world’s next economic superpower. This paper 
asserts that forces that drove high-paced economic growth in China in previous decades have 
been withering each year since the early 2010s. As a result of that, China has been facing a 
number of major challenges that include excessive debt and persistent decline in prices, 
productivity and savings. Consequently, China’s economic growth has been steadily slowing 
down. It is very important that this economic slowdown is not a periodic downturn that China 
had experienced several times at the end of each decade since 1980s (the Tiananmen Square 
massacres at the end of the 1980s, the Asian Financial crisis at the end of the 1990s and finally 
the GFC at the end of the 2000s). This time the decline is continuous, more intensive, more 
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stable and more severe than previous cases. Thus, it will be very hard for China to maintain its 
high economic growth that it enjoyed in the last three decades. From that point, China’s future 
will be more about dealing with its own problems (mentioned above) rather than displacing the 
U.S. as the world’s next economic superpower.  



















          As this study mentioned earlier, the decline of American economic power has been 
vigorously debated for decades. Starting from the Kennedy administration, there were many 
cases that scholars interpreted as the beginning of American economic power decline. The 
financial crisis of 2007-09 is the latest case of the same debate. However, unlike the previous 
cases, scholars who support the idea of U.S. economic power is in decline after the financial 
crisis, strongly believe that this time the decline is different. This time the decline is real. In 
addition, the same scholars also argue that China, as an economic challenger which is different 
from previous ones, will replace the U.S. as the world’s next economic superpower. All these 
concerns made this topic necessary to examine again. From that point, this research study set its 
research questions as “is U.S. economic power in decline?” And “is China replacing the U.S. as 
the world’s next economic superpower.”  
          In order to answer the first research question, this study qualitatively explores four case 
studies, France and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods International Monetary System, the 
Oil Crisis and the role of Saudi Arabia, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and 
the U.S. - the EC – Japan Triangle, and finally the World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
relationships between the U.S. and developing countries, and analyzes perspectives of American 
economic power. In these case studies, this paper assumes that an economically powerful 
country (the U.S.) should have capacity to make decision that benefit itself alone, while at the 
same time it should have the ability to decrease the capacity of other countries that intend to 
challenge its (American’s) core interests and leadership position in the world economic system. 
However, after analyzing the cases, this paper reveals how the U.S. could not control and 
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influence the behavior of other countries in line with its own interest, not only during the period 
after the financial crisis of 2007-09, as many scholars predicted, but also in many decades before 
the financial crisis. In that respect, this paper asserts that there is no significant change in U.S. 
economic power now and then. In other words, contrary to most scholars’ arguments, U.S. 
economic power is not in decline.  
          In the second part of this study, the same question (is U.S. economic power in decline?) is 
tested by analyzing quantitative data that includes GDP, CPI, debt, savings, and productivity. 
After analyzing the data, this paper claims that under the extraordinary conditions (or period) in 
the decades following WWII, the U.S. experienced a sharp economic growth. Nevertheless, this 
exceptional period of time came to an end at the end of the 1960s. Since then, the abnormal 
increase in U.S. economic growth has returned to normal. From this point of view, the decline of 
American economic power in the 1970s rebounded in the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly, after the 
rapid economic decline in the 2000s, which made many scholars believe that U.S. economic 
power was in permanent and fundamental decline, the U.S. economy has slowly but steadily 
been growing again. Thus, as in the first part of this paper, overall findings of the second part of 
this study conflict with the arguments of scholars that state that U.S. economic power is in an 
irreversible decline.  
          In the last part, this paper tries to determine whether China can overtake the U.S. as the 
world’s next superpower. After analyzing GDP, CPI, savings, debt and production, this paper 
argues that forces that contributed to rapid economic growth in China in previous decades have 
been fading away each and every year since the beginning of the 2010s. Therefore, China’s 
economic growth has been slowly and gradually slowing down. It is important that this 
slowdown is not a cyclic downturn that China had faced several times in previous decade. It is 
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continuous, more stable and more intensive than previous slowdown cases that will pose many 
challenges to China’s future growth. In that respect, paper concludes that China’s future will be 
more about dealing with its own challenges, rather than overtaking the U.S. as the world’s next 
economic superpower.  
          Lastly, it is crucial to note that there are two major limitations in this research study that 
could help shape future work.  First, for analyzing qualitative data, four cases are scrutinized. 
These cases exemplify the most important international economic and financial events in the 
period before the financial crisis of 2007-09. Through these cases, this research study builds a 
pattern and develops a theory that aims to answer the first research question. However, it 
would be helpful if future studies consider more cases to account for in order to support its 
pattern and its theory more strongly. From the same perspective, this research study analyzes 
five economic indicators, GDP, CPI, debt, savings and productivity, and tries to answer the 
research questions in the second and third part. Nevertheless, a more complete picture about 
whether U.S. economic power is in decline and whether China is overtaking the U.S. as the 
world’s next economic superpower can be obtained by adding additional indicators such as 
competitiveness, GDP per capita, unemployment, technology and innovation, and income 
inequality to future research studies. It is crucial that the decline of American power and China’s 
rise as the world’s next superpower will remain contested issues with strongly held positions for 
and against it at least in the near future. In that respect, additional indicators that mentioned 
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